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Assessing the Impacts of Venezuela's State-led Agrarian Reform 
Programme on Rural Livelihoods 
By Ben McKay 
The debate surrounding land reform is back on the development agenda with a consensus 
that the severe unequal distribution of land in developing countries is the main cause of 
persistent levels of poverty and inequality in the countryside. In Venezuela, a state-led 
agrarian reform programme is being pursued. This programme is designed with the most 
promising elements to offset strong landlord resistance, alleviate poverty, and increase 
agricultural productivity; but key weaknesses in the implementation and 
institutionalization of the programme hinder its ability to be fully effective. Three key 
weaknesses have been identified - corruption and political sabotage; private 
intermediaries; and a lack of regulation. The ability of the state and society to overcome 
these key weaknesses will dictate whether this agrarian reform programme can make for a 
successful and productive agrarian transformation or whether its inconsistency and its 
lack of capacity will lead to a crisis of legitimacy and increased conflicts. 
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In Venezuela, under the Chavez administration, one of the most progressive forms of 
agrarian reform is being implemented. Venezuela is pursuing a model of agrarian reform 
that encompasses La Via Campesina's notion of food sovereignty. The Chavez 
administration has changed the Constitution and passed a new Land Law that is aligned 
with the food sovereignty movement in an attempt to reintegrate their agricultural sector 
back into the economy after years of neglect by previous regimes. Due to Chavez's blunt 
personality and populist rhetoric, many academics disregard this state-led agrarian reform 
as superficial and bound for failure. Moreover, Chavez's pursuit of a new model of 
socialism, and the anti-free market policies that this entails, has created a consensus of 
hatred towards him by the elites, corporations, and wealthy countries around the world. 
Land reform in Latin America was very common in the 1950s to 1970s, but their 
poor design led to failure and neoliberal policies came to dominate, promoting policies of 
'modernization' and agro-industry, GMOs, monoculture plantations, and a concentration 
of power in the countryside ensued. When Chavez came to power, land reform was one of 
his key policies and one of the most contested by the wealthy, elite class. Venezuela is an 
extremely urbanized country, after decades of agricultural neglect due to the previous 
governments purely concentrating on the oil industry. As a result, only 12% of the 
population lives in rural areas, compared with 35% in 1960 (Wilpert, 2007:110). 
Furthermore, "75% of the country's private agricultural land is owned by only 5% of the 
landowners, while 75% of the smaller landowners own only 6% of the land" (Wilpert, 
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2007:110). With these statistics in mind, the new Land Law under Chavez is designed to 
achieve greater equity in the countryside, eliminate the latifundio regime, and redistribute 
land to smaller family farms and cooperatives to increase agricultural production. Studies 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), among others, show that due to the 
"inverse relationship between farm size and production of food crops.. .the family farm is 
the most efficient and sustainable" (Riddell, 2000). The FAO also point out that most land 
reform programs implemented since 1945 have largely failed due to the tremendous gap 
between theory and practice. Without the ongoing government support to provide skills in 
training, credits, technology, access to markets, safety nets, etc., land reform initiatives 
are bound to fail. 
In the case of Venezuela, a state-led land reform model is being pursued. But how 
is this being pursued and for whom? To what extent is this reform process reaching those 
in need? And what is the context in which this reform is taking place? These are the 
central questions which help to identify how and to what extent pro-poor agrarian reform 
in the context of food sovereignty is being implemented in Venezuela. To understand the 
issues regarding agrarian reform, it is not only necessary to map out where it's coming 
from (historical context), the underlying reasons for its implementation, or how it relates 
to economic growth and the purposes it should serve for the overall national development 
strategy. It is also necessary to analyze the underlying theoretical debates and the 
proposed models they guide. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: identifying 
the problem of study; a brief overview of land reforms in a historical context and an 
exploration of the underlying reasons for which they were carried out; the role of 
agriculture in economic development; the analytical framework employed in the study, an 
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outline of the methodology; the scope and limitations of the study; the thesis statement; 
and finally an outline of the structure of the argument. 
The Problematic 
The debate surrounding land reform has been revived in the development discourse after 
years of neglect. The two decades of Neoliberalism as the hegemonic discourse in the 
1980s and 1990s "disdained land expropriation...as not contributing to greater 
productivity and not leading to a reduction in poverty and inequality" (Bello qtd in 
Borras, 2008:ix) Another reason why land reform policy was not brought to the fore, was 
that progressive peasant movements, at least since 1995, were preoccupied resisting the 
World Trade Organization's 'Agreement on Agriculture' (AoA) which, as we will 
explore later, is destroying the livelihoods of many in agrarian societies. The AoA was 
met with a force of resistance from developing countries' governments, peasant 
movements, and advocacy groups that - combined with the crisis neoliberal policies1 -
shifted attention back to issues of land reform. A key component of international 
development studies is how to transform the countryside into a productive, efficient, and 
effective part of a country's economic, social and cultural development. In the developing 
world, rural populations have suffered from neoliberal policies, as highly-subsidized 
foreign products flood their markets, corporations force them (through payment) off their 
land, and traditional methods of production become obsolete due to competitive forces. 
With approximately three billion people in the developing world living in rural areas, and 
' The crisis of neoliberal policies was exemplified by the failure of SAPs, which had to be revised and 
reformed into PRSPs. 
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70% of those living in poverty (World Bank, 2007:3), questions surrounding the rural 
sector are undoubtedly central to development studies today, especially in terms of 
meeting the Millennium Development Goal that calls for halving the share of people 
suffering from extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 (UNDP, 2010). 
The 2008 World Bank Development Report on "Agriculture for Development" highlights 
three complementary pathways out of rural poverty: farming, labour, and migration. 
Farming is a source of livelihood for an estimated 86% of rural people (World Bank, 
2007:3), deeming this pathway the fundamental component for rural development. Since 
farming is the main economic activity in rural areas, issues regarding access to, and 
control over, land and its productive resources are imperative to address rural 
development. Moreover, there is a consensus amongst academics that the severe unequal 
distribution of land in developing countries is the main cause of persistent levels of 
poverty and inequality in the countryside (Francisco, Ferreira, and Walton, 2006; 
Barraclough, 2001:26; El-Ghonemy, 1990:152). This is highlighted in the World Bank's 
2006 World Development Report on 'Equity and Development' which equates "a positive 
association between more unequal land distribution and lower GDP growth" (World 
Bank, 2006: pp.162). The debate surrounding land reform is thus of critical importance 
when concentrating on rural development. 
Although not always used synonymously (de Janvry, 1981), throughout this paper 
the terms 'agrarian reform' and 'land reform' will be used interchangeably to refer to a 
process that is meant to "correct or eliminate some or all of the conditions of agrarian 
production that give rise to inequality, poverty, and political powerlessness" (Diskin qtd 
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in Thiesenhusen, 1989:430). It is not simply the land-tenure pattern that must be 
reformed; it is the social structure of the countryside. Institutions must be reshaped or 
established to ensure that land beneficiaries receive the necessary means (services, inputs, 
research, irrigation and water facilities, credit, marketing assistance, education, etc.) to 
build productive and sustainable livelihoods. The redistribution of land with the 
simultaneous institutional reform and social support can facilitate the social 
transformation that 'pro-poor' agrarian reforms seek to achieve. 
Enabling the rural poor to hold the rights and the control over land and its 
productive resources is essential in their ability to overcome poverty. Although the rural 
poor have diverse livelihoods, farming accounts for a significant portion of rural income. 
Poverty and inequality are thus strongly related to the lack of access to land (Borras, Kay, 
Akram-Lodhi, 2007) . Land reform that empowers the rural poor - economically, 
socially, and politically - is crucial to facilitate their ability to build a rural livelihood that 
is sustainable and viable. As Herring points out, "Land confers power in agrarian 
systems; reform policy must work through that very system of power to restructure its 
base" (Herring, 2003 in Houtzager and Moore, 2005: 59). Thus, an effective land reform 
must also encompass the broader socio-economic and political issues to effectively 
transform the structural inequalities inherent in many rural areas. It is only through this 
transformation that will end persistent poverty, marginalization, and exploitation. 
The question, then, lies in the rationale behind, and the manner in which, to 
effectively implement an agrarian reform that will bring people out of poverty, decrease 
inequalities, and render the countryside a productive, viable sector for many to build a 
2 But see Griffin, Keith (1976) Land Concentration and Rural Poverty. London: Macmillan Press for 
quantitative and qualitative evidence. 
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sustainable livelihood. This is the fundamental problem that arises in implementing 
agrarian reform. Pursuing a land reform model for economic reasons will have different 
implications than pursuing land reform for socio-political reasons. In addition, a 
development strategy that purely focuses on how agriculture can contribute to 
industrialization, without concentrating on how industry can contribute to agricultural 
development will pursue a certain type of land reform strategy with different outcomes. 
The main actor in a land reform process - whether it is the state3, peasants, market, or a 
combination - will also greatly affect the outcome of the reform process. These issues 
contribute to the ongoing debate and problematic surrounding effective land reform. By 
exploring the outcomes of these methods and models, we can reveal which type of land 
reform has been most effective and under what circumstances. Moreover, the manner in 
which the main actor(s) initiates and implements the land reform process can also be 
problematic in terms of generating intended outcomes. 
Agrarian Reform in Historical Context 
It is no surprise that land reform is such a hotly debated issue in rural development given 
that the past century has featured numerous types of land reforms, carried out for a variety 
of reasons, and producing an array of outcomes. The 1910 Mexican Revolution, for 
example, was carried out by a mobilized mass of peasants who had been brutally 
suppressed for years by the ruling elite. The revolutionary force of the peasantry led by 
3 In this study, the terms 'state' and 'government' will be used interchangeably referring to the 
administrative bureaucracy who make political decisions, enforce and create new laws, arbitrate conflicts 
and control the public institutions. 
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Emiliano Zapata and Francisco (Pancho) Villa, failed to benefit from their struggles and 
sacrifices as land reform was dominated by a 'new bourgeois state', benefiting a new 
landed elite and guaranteeing 'private property' (Otero, 1989:277; Teubal, 2009:153). In 
this regard, the peasant movement successfully initiated a social revolution, but failed to 
gain from the ensuing political revolution. This case exemplifies - to a certain degree -
the importance of both the state and society (peasant movements) in carrying out 
successful redistributive land reform. The issue of state-society relations will be discussed 
in greater detail below. 
Furthermore, between 1945 and 1973 the 'development project' (McMichael, 
2008) was a period marked by peasant struggles that led to fundamental changes in 
agrarian property regimes carried out by the state. Agrarian reform that excluded the 
landowning oligarchy was an important part of political and social revolutions carried out 
in Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Algeria (Bernstein, 2002:436; Thiesenhusen, 
1989:10, 11; Teubal, 2009:152). 
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Table 1: Land Reform Accomplishments in Selected Countries 
Country Years Redistributed 
Land as a % of 
Total Arable land 
Household 
Beneficiaries as a 
% of Total 
Households 
Sources 





80 75 Kay (1998:11-
12) 
Bolivia 1952-77 74.5 83.4 Thiesenhusen 
(1989:10-11) 




42.4 32 De Janvry 
(1981:206) 
Mexico 1970 data 42.9 43.4 Thiesenhusen 
(1989:10-11) 
Ecuador 1964-85 34.2 No data Zevallos 
(1989:52) 




20 12 Paige 
(1996:136) 
Venezuela Up to 
1979 











1.65 2.0 SA Dept. of 
Land Affairs 
(2000) 
(Data from Borras, 2001) 
Under the Alliance for Progress, more moderate land reforms were carried out by the 
state in Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador without a strong supportive social base 
(Teubal, 2009:152). These reforms, however, were driven by the US anti-communist 
political agenda and were not designed to undertake substantive agrarian reform. The 
Cold War ideological warfare was also a key component in the land reform initiatives 
carried out in Asia "where (the US) imposed and financed sweeping land reforms in 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan partly in reaction to the revolutionary land reform being 
carried out in China (Akram-Lodhi, Borras, Kay, 2007:7). This period of the 
'development project' was thus marked by many different land reforms with a variety of 
outcomes between and within countries over time. Akram-Lodhi et. al (2007) highlight 
six broad interlinked types of socio-political reasons that are useful to mark this period: 
1. The post-WWII decolonization process by emerging nationalist 
governments 
2. Cold War ideological warfare between the capitalist and socialist 
3. National projects of victorious peasant-based revolutions 
4. State reaction to manage rural unrest and political pressure 
(external/internal) 
5. Legitimization/consolidation of state power and reach 
6. State-building process, develop tax base. 
(Akram-Lodhi, Borras, Kay, 2007:6-8) 
The demise of the development state was triggered by the debt crisis that emerged 
in the 1980s. As indebted countries were forced to seek loans from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), the era of Neoliberalism materialized. 
Governments were required to 'rollback the state' and allow the forces of free-market 
capitalism to correct the inefficiencies and inadequacies that caused their fiscal 
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recklessness and over-spending. The inconsistent record of state-led land reform 
combined with a dominant free-market capitalist ideology and the introduction of 'Green 
Revolution' technologies diverted attention away from redistributive land reform to a 
model of development based on 'modernization'. 
While land reform was officially taken out of many governments' 'policy agenda', 
"it never left the 'political agendas' of peasants and their organizations" (Herring, 2003 in 
Akram-Lodhi et. al. 2007) By the mid-1990s peasant movements once again began to 
mobilize and cause social and political conflicts. On January 1st, 1994, the same day the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect, the Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation (EZLN or 'Zapatistas') launched a series of coordinated attacks on 
the government in the name of "tierra y Hbertad''' (land and liberty) and in memory of 
revolutionary leader Emiliano Zapata (Fox, 1994:1119-1122). In Zimbabwe, black, 
landless peasants invaded white commercial farms; while Brazil's Landless Workers' 
Movement (MST) exercised militant land occupations on unused land (Akram-Lodhi et. 
al., 2007:12). Issues regarding land were therefore back on the international stage, as 
governments and international agencies alike, reconsidered the issue of land reform, 
particularly in terms of what to do with the large state and collective farms and how to 
capitalize on the resource-rich, labour-abundant developing countries of the South 
(Akram-Lodhi et. al., 2007). 
As the new free-market economic ideology set in - influenced by the likes of 
Nobel Prize in Economics winners Friedrich Hayek (1974) and Milton Friedman (1976) -
a new set of economic policies, designed to condition and render economies more 
(allocative) efficient, were adopted and supported by many developed countries of the 
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North and the major international financial institutions (IFIs). This so-called 'Washington 
Consensus' included the following elements: "the privatization of the state and state 
functions, and hence the privatization of the public sphere; the privatization of welfare, 
law and a vast expansion of the legal dominion of property rights, tax reform and upward 
income redistribution; the deregulation of labour markets and 'deproletarianization' 
policies; trade and market liberalization; and currency devaluation (Araghi, 2009:133). 
This ushered in the era of neoliberal globalization onto the land reform stage as 
"the consensus among mainstream economists was that many rural poor people have 
insecure access to land resources, leading to their unstable livelihoods and low levels of 
investment" (Akram-Lodhi et. al. 2007:13). The era of Market-Assisted and Market-led 
Agrarian Reform (MLAR) became part of the IFI's dominant discourse and policy 
prescriptions. This will be discussed in more detail below. 
The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development 
As large farms under-utilize their land and smaller farms have an abundance of labour, 
low levels of land and labour productivity persist, creating un(der)employment, 
inequalities, and poverty. This is a common trait amongst large farm estates and has been 
recognized as the 'inverse farm size-productivity relationship' which "implies that 
agriculture generally is characterized by diseconomies of scale, which means that 
redistributing land from large farmers to family farmers can bring efficiency gains to the 
economy" (Binswanger-Mikhize et al. 2009: 11). The question, however, remains as to 
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how this land redistribution should take place and where the fruits of increased 
agricultural productivity should be distributed. 
Questions regarding the reinvestment of the surplus value created in the 
agricultural sector have also been split between the 'agrarianists' and the 'industrializers' 
(Kay, 2009). This is a question of development strategy/paradigm and depends on what 
developmental end the rural surplus should be made to serve. (Akram-Lhodi et al. 
2007:4). Whether the fruits of economic growth in the countryside should be funnelled to 
the cities to support industrialization or reinvested in the rural sector, with industries 
supporting the process of agricultural development is contested. While some economists 
argue that agriculture should be developed and given priority over industry; others argue 
that funnelling all surplus resources to the industrialization process is the way to achieve 
development. This 'agrarianist-industralizers' debate presents the dichotomy as to which 
sector should be developed first, which would theoretically 'trickle-down' and transfer its 
fruits to the other sector (See Kay, 2009). 
For the 'industrializers', development is defined by the need to 'modernize' and 
transfer the majority of the agricultural surplus to industrial development. In 1945 
Mandelbaum argued that 'backward areas' (rural sector) ought to transfer the agricultural 
surplus and highly unproductive labour surplus to the productive industrial sector 
(Mandelbaum, 1945). This idea became the basis for Arthur Lewis' Two-Sector Model, 
which argued that developing countries' 'unlimited supply of labour' should be 
transferred to the modern sector which would have a much higher productivity of labour 
through technological superiority, but which could maintain close to subsistence-level 
wages (Lewis, 1954). 
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Lewis' dual economy model heavily emphasized transferring the rural surplus to 
the industrial sector and endangered the sustainability of the rural sector. Although it is 
necessary to extract a certain degree of resources and labour to the industrialization 
process, the danger of over-extraction from the rural sector would leave "too few 
resources to invest and hence (the agricultural sector would) be unable to provide an 
adequate supply of food and raw materials to the nonagricultural sector" (Kay, 2009:107). 
The argument against agricultural over-extraction became the basis for the 
'agrarianists' perspective, which saw the shortcomings of Latin America's import-
substitution-industrialization (ISI) as the mistake of favouring industry over agriculture. 
"According to the agrarianists, development strategy in LDCs should have prioritised 
agriculture, given that the majority of the population was rural, labour productivity was 
low and rural poverty levels were high" (Kay, 2009:109). Michael Lipton's Urban Bias 
Thesis (UBT) (1977) stems from this argument. 
In Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study of Urban Bias in World Development 
(WPPSP) Lipton argues that urban bias "involves (a) an allocation, to persons or 
organizations located in towns, of shares of resources so large as to be inefficient and 
inequitable, or (b) a disposition among the powerful to allocate resources in this way" 
(Lipton 2005:724 summarising from 1977). Lipton also suggests that the urban sector is 
favoured through 'price twists', in which the state's policies regarding the exchange rates, 
taxation, subsidies, and credit are disadvantageous for the rural sector. In this view, 
government's would deliberately turn the terms of trade against agriculture in favour of 
industry by making "outputs from rural areas to be under-priced, and inputs into rural 
areas to be over-priced when compared to a market norm" (Kay, 2009:110) 
Lipton's UBT has come under criticism, most notably from Terence J. Byres 
(1974,1979), Mitra (1977), Varshney (1993), Corbridge (1982), Griffin (1977) and Kay 
(2006) who argue, among other things, that Lipton's rural-urban class divide tends to 
group the urban rich with the rural rich, who exploit the urban poor and rural poor. Thus, 
the UBT fails to delve into a deeper class analysis, which would take into account class 
divisions and relations that exist in the context of ethnicity, caste, gender, regions, 
religions, and other social factors (Kay, 2009:112) For Kay, a more useful analysis would 
be to consider the 'landlord bias' who exercise their power "from the blocking of land 
reform, the absence or non-enforcement of minimum wage and social security legislation, 
the outlawing of rural trade unions, the failure to curb exploitative practices of traders 
(including sometimes landlords) who pay low prices for the peasants' marketed surplus 
and sell at a high price the inputs purchased by peasants, and lenders (including 
sometimes landlords) who charge usury interest rates for credit" (Kay, 2009:112-113). 
UBT critics such as Kay and Byers, therefore, see the problems of rural 
development as structural and cannot simply be resolved by increased investment or 
fixing 'price twists'. For them, problems of rural development are relational, meaning that 
poverty is produced by social inequality and the social relations and divisions that exist 
between class, gender, ethnicity, nation, etc. Proponents of the UBT, on the other hand, 
seem to view problems of rural development as residual, as they view the 'rural class' as 
being excluded from the benefits of the market and investment. The solution, therefore, 
is to introduce market-led policies to allow everyone to benefit from the fruits of the free 
market. In the World Development Report of 2008, the World Bank also approaches the 
problem as residual, claiming that "there has been an urban bias in the allocation of public 
investment as well as misinvestment within agriculture" (World Bank, 2007:38). The 
problem, however, is not solely one of misinvestment, but of the structure of the rural 
economy - those who control the means of production and those who do not - and the 
consequential relationship of these two social classes. This study approaches the problems 
of rural development as relational, not residual. 
Analytical Framework: State-Society Relations 
The relationship between the state and society is an issue of primacy in this study. The 
analytical framework for this study builds on Fox's interactive theory of state-society 
relations (sandwich theory) and Borras' 'Bibingka' strategy. In The Politics of Food in 
Mexico: State Power and Social Mobilization (1993) Fox examines Mexico's food 
distribution policy for rural development under the Lopez Portillo presidency (1976-
1982). With rising food imports and a landholding pattern that was not conducive to 
optimizing domestic food production, the Mexican government decided to empower 
peasant producers through state support, extension services, and enabling peasant 
beneficiaries to be part of the reform process itself by regulating community food 
councils. Fox comes to the conclusions that as peasant beneficiaries gained agency and 
became part of the reform themselves, sparking the movement 'from below', the policies 
initiated 'from above' were most effective. The Community Food Councils, Fox 
concludes, "became a new, two-way institutional access route that connected state and 
social actors. From above, state reformists structured new patterns of representation 
within rural society. From below, these new opportunities for participation became 
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autonomous channels for interest articulation that in turn left their imprint on the state" 
(Fox, 1993:217). Furthermore, Fox goes on to add that "the Mexican state's capacity 
to...carry out distributive reforms depended on its ceding power to autonomous, 
representative social organizations" (Fox, 1993:217). The 'sandwich strategy' emphasizes 
the need for interaction between autonomous social movements and the state, in order to 
combat entrenched authoritarian elites and make for a sustainable social transformation. 
Figure 1: The 'Sandwich Strategy' by Jonathon Fox (1993) 
International conjuncture 
National political and economic context: 
Pro-refrom shift within the state 
The 'Samhrich Strategy" 
State-led initiatives are implemented 




Latifnndistx, elite class resist 
reforms, attempt to co-opt 
bnreancrats/reactionarv violence 
pressure for accountability 
in policy implementation 
Rnral social movements 
ressio 
(collective action) 
• Possible outcome: Increased government accountability is contested policy 
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arena, spreading to other issues 
• Probable outcome: Increased peasant capacity to articulate interests, as 
autonomous, representative organizations consolidate 
(Data and photo derived from Fox, 1993) 
With pressure from both above and below, the sandwich strategy creates political 
space and shifts the balance of power between authoritarian elites and movements for 
rural democratization. 
Additionally, in his analysis of the Philippines' 'Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program' (CARP) in 1988, Borras shows that redistributive land reform is not limited to 
only 'less contentious' (primarily public) lands. Although the CARP programme 
redistributed only a small amount of private, 'highly contentious' land (100,000 hectares 
out of the 1,887,300 m.has.), Borras' thorough examination demonstrates that these cases 
were successful due to unique circumstances between the state and autonomous peasant 
movements. He shows that despite significant landlord resistance, highly contentious land 
was successfully redistributed to landless peasants, showing that the program's outcomes 
are not predetermined (Borras, 1998). Borras' conclusions are similar to those of Fox's in 
that successful land reform implementation, especially when it involves the expropriation 
of private lands, "involves the symbiotic interaction between autonomous societal groups 
from below and state reformists from above..." (Borras, 1998:66). For Borras, he refers 
to this dynamic relationship as the 'Bibingka' strategy. 
What both of these studies suggest is that the outcomes of an agrarian reform 
programme are not solely determined by the structural or institutional factors, the policy 
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elites, or strong peasant movements alone. The most promising strategy for a successful 
state-led agrarian reform programme is based on the progressive interaction between the 
institutional/social structure influenced by policy-making by the state 'from above' and 
the capacity of individuals to mobilize in the form of peasant movements and increased 
participation 'from below'. The state, through its institutions, produces the structure of 
rules and regulations that shape human behaviour. This behaviour, however, is not totally 
dependant upon the structure. People wield a degree of agency and can act independently 
and cooperatively against the structure as it increasingly constrains their social mobility. 
Over time, the structure tends to become shaped by the elite, wealthy classes in society 
and the co-opted bureaucrats. However, as the structure creates social exclusion and 
marginalization for the majority, through agency and class consciousness people demand 
change by acting as a 'class for itself through social movements. This, in turn, puts 
pressure on the state to create change. In a democracy, the majority should hold the power 
over their government and can thus influence its policy-making to alter the institutional 
structure, which in turn shapes the social structure and therefore social relations. 
Meanwhile, the increased agency of the majority challenges the unequal social structure 
through their actions (in this case it could be land occupations) and thus an interactive, 
reinforcing relationship emerges that is optimal for a structural transformation. Although 
the state could lead such a transformation through policy making 'from above'; and 
individuals, through their agency, could mobilize strong peasant movements and lead a 
social transformation 'from below' - the optimal circumstances are those where multi-
faceted state support creates increased emancipation in society. As the state's policies 
alter the social structure and create an environment conducive to emancipatory social 
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action, that social action begins to influence those very structures - an effect that Giddens 
(1986) calls 'the duality of structure' in his structuration theory.4 It is through this 
analytical framework that will be used as a guide to assess Venezuela's state-led agrarian 
reform and its ability to successfully decrease inequalities, alleviate poverty, and increase 
agricultural production in the context of a food sovereignty framework. 
Methodology 
The objective of this research is to assess whether Venezuela's State-led Agrarian Reform 
(SLAR) is effectively dismantling the structural inequalities inherent in the rural sector, 
while increasing agricultural production and rendering the country more food secure 
within the context of food sovereignty. Using an 'interactive approach' drawn from the 
works of Fox (sandwich strategy, 1992) and Borras (Bibingka Strategy, 1999), this study 
will examine the success of the agrarian reform programme based on the two key actors: 
the state and society. Thus, the key units of analysis of this research are state and societal 
actors. The empirical data I collected from the field is based on individual experiences 
and how this has affected their household. The overall effects on the community as a 
whole, however, will be used to make analytical generalizations at a macro level. The 
level of analysis will therefore be micro and macro. Due to the lack of empirical national 
data on Venezuela's land reform, it would be an over-extension of generalizations to 
4 The duality of structure is when social structures make social action possible, and at the same time that 
social action creates those very structures. Structuration theory, coined by Anthony Giddens, treats the 
influences of structure and agency equally and holds that they continuously shape each other as the 
structure only exists by the reinforcement of social action, and that human action is influenced by the 
structure. See Giddens, Anthony. (1986) Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
University of California Press: California. 
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make empirical generalizations for the entire country based on communities in one state. 
This case study will thus be used, at the macro level, in an instrumental way, so as to 
"provide insights into, or refine a theoretical explanation, making it more generalizable" 
(Berg, 2009:326). The empirical data from the individuals/households, however, still 
allows for a better recognition of the intrinsic aspects of that particular situation, and thus 
acts as a separate intrinsic case study. This case study is descriptive in design, as it is 
guided by a theoretical framework and specific research question. 
The theoretical framework which guides this thesis acts as the analytical lens 
through which the outcomes are assessed. The extent to which the state and society 
interact in a mutually reinforcing manner is of critical importance in a successful pro-poor 
agrarian reform initiative. A high degree of social mobilization 'from below' that 
reinforces, but remains autonomous from, the state reformist initiatives 'from above' is 
considered 'ideal' in transforming the countryside (Borras, 2008:190-191). 
This analytical lens will primarily be used in analyzing the primary qualitative 
data obtained through semi-structured interviews conducted in several rural communities 
around Carora in the state of Lara. As an exploratory process, individual interviews were 
conducted with participants being as differentiated as possible. To gain different insights 
into different experiences over time, the aim of the individual interviews were to involve 
resource-rich and poor people, people of different ethnic/religious groups, people of 
different ages, and of course, both males and females. These semi-structured interviews 
were conducted in two parts: part one presents a personal profile to gain perspective on 
where this participant is coming from, their family, upbringing, ethnicity, religion, age, 
gender, class, etc. Part two of the interview focuses on the more technical issues involved 
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in the land reform process: their experiences with the land reform, the benefits (or lack 
thereof) from the reform, whether this process has changed their political views, attitudes 
towards cooperatives/collectives versus individual farms, general sense of solidarity and 
views on the national development project, whether people are a 'class in itself or act as 
a 'class for itself, etc. Part one will therefore provide a deeper understanding and allow 
for patterns, similarities, and/or differences to be extracted from the answers given in part 
two. This qualitative research method will thus be extremely useful in assessing the extent 
of the relationship between the state and society. 
The lack of national data on Venezuela's land reform presents difficulties in 
obtaining useful secondary data for my research. However, some empirical data does 
exist by several key Venezuelan scholars such as Wilpert (2007) Suggett (2010) Isaacs et. 
al (2009), Wagner (2005), and Broughton (2010). Moreover, the Venezuela Analysis 
(Venezuelaanalysis.com) has a wealth of Venezuela news publications, government-
released data and announcements, and scholarly-works on Venezuela. These authors have 
written extensively on Venezuela's political economy and land reform process and 
provide thorough and in-depth examinations on the land reform process, implementation, 
and outcomes thus far. The goal of this research is to contribute to these studies and 
provide primary, qualitative data based on the experiences of those who have been 
affected by the reforms (rural populations). 
A timeline of secondary data based on employment, income, land concentration, 
and poverty will be of great use to assess how the reform process has affected each of 
these variables. National government statistics, the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the Center for Economic and Policy Research 
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(CEPR) are key sources for this data. More broadly, some macro-economic indicators 
will also be useful, such as changes in real GDP over time, GDP by economic activity, 
national unemployment rates over time, poverty rates, and trade policies concerning 
agriculture. These broad indicators are useful in assessing the state of Venezuela's overall 
economy in the context of such transformative reforms. 
Select works in several key academic journals have been used to frame my 
argument and establish a theoretical framework. Key academic journals include the 
Journal of Peasant Studies and the Journal of Agrarian Change. Moreover, the works of 
Borras (2001, 2008), Akram-Lodhi, Borras, Kay (2007), Akram-Lodhi et. al (2009), 
Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2009), Kay (2009), and Fox (1993) have been extremely valuable 
in gaining insights into the land reform debates, the agrarian question(s), and helping me 
construct an analytical lens through which to guide my thesis research. Meanwhile the 
World Bank's World Development Report of 2008 and 2006, as well as the works of 
Binswanger and Deininger, and Binswanger-Mkhize, Hans P., Camille Bourguignon, and 
Rogier van den Brink (2009) have been useful in assessing the dominant discourse in land 
reform and the ideology behind the World Bank's land reform recommendations. 
Scope and Limitations of the Research 
The main limitation of this research is the concentration of field research in only one 
state: Lara. This was primarily due to time and resource constraints. However, from the 
plethora of secondary sources from key academics, the use of government documents, as 
well as the primary research conducted in the field, this research does provide key 
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insights into how this agrarian reform is being pursued, its accomplishments to date, as 
well as its overall strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, the field research conducted, as 
well as first-hand experiences and daily interactions with Venezolanos has provided me 
with some important insights in terms of the political and social context in which this 
agrarian reform is taking place. Through many conversations, interviews, and personal 
observations, the weaknesses and hindrances in the land reform process became apparent. 
Although my field research was limited in terms of geographical coverage, the diverse 
groups of individuals - whom were affected both positively and negatively by the 
agrarian reform programme - addressed similar weaknesses in the reform process. 
Furthermore, these personal claims were then complemented with secondary data, 
reinforcing and making clear the problems in the Venezuelan countryside. A key 
limitation to this study, however, is the lack of accessible national data. The Land 
Institute does not publish data based on the land reform. Even visits to the Land Institute 
in Barquisimeto and Caracas, along with a letter of request to the director, left me with no 
official data from the institute. Much of the data on the amount of land redistributed and 
the beneficiaries were compiled from secondary sources. Another key limitation to this 
study deals with the lack of data on the degree and presence of rural social movements in 
areas where land has been successfully expropriated and redistributed. This data would be 
very useful for this study. 
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Thesis Statement 
The thesis of this study is that while Venezuela's state-led agrarian reform programme is 
designed with the most promising elements to offset strong landlord resistance, alleviate 
poverty, and increase agricultural productivity in the context of food sovereignty, there 
remain key weaknesses in the implementation and institutionalization of the programme, 
which hinder its ability to be fully effective. The weaknesses and challenges that lay 
ahead for a successful redistributive agrarian reform are not to do with the programme 
and policy design, but with the state and society's capacity to effectively institutionalize 
this programme. 
The findings of this study conclude that Venezuela's state-led agrarian reform 
programme is very inclusive and contains the necessary elements of an effective agrarian 
reform model: supportive and autonomous peasant movements; supportive state policies 
that favour the interests of the landless over latifimdistas; substantial public investment, 
state loans, and technical assistance aimed at assisting beneficiaries and increasing 
productivity; an overarching national development strategy to diversify the economy, 
alter the relations of production, and prioritize domestic production and consumption. 
This strategy is also within a food security and food sovereignty framework that uses 
discriminatory macroeconomic policies to protect domestic producers, yet encourages 
essential food imports which cannot be fulfilled under domestic production. 
With this model of agrarian reform, Venezuela has made significant progress 
redistributing land and increasing production. This, however, has been done on an 
inconsistent basis with some major implementation flaws: corruption and political 
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sabotage; private intermediaries; and a lack of regulation. The ability of the state and 
society to overcome these key weaknesses will dictate whether this agrarian reform 
programme can make for a successful and productive agrarian transformation or whether 
its inconsistency and its lack of capacity will lead to a crisis of legitimacy and increased 
conflicts. The state-society relationship and ability to confront and adapt to such 
challenges will determine long-term outcomes. 
Structure of the Argument 
The remainder of this thesis study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 will present two 
opposing theoretical debates on land reform - new institutional economics (NIE) and 
radical agrarian populism (RAP). These two theoretical approaches are examined so as to 
expose the rationale behind competing land reform models. The NIE and RAP 
perspectives hold opposing views as to the causes of rural development and unequal 
landholding structure, as well as how to overcome these problems. In the case of NIE, 
poverty is a residual problem and can be overcome by bringing the market to the rural 
poor. RAP, on the other hand, explains poverty as a relational problem and can be 
overcome by changing the unequal dynamics of the agrarian structure. The theoretical 
debates are followed by practical models of agrarian reform: market-led; state-led; 
peasant-led; and state-society driven. These different models are based on who should be 
the primary driver of the reform. Whether the market, the state, peasant movements, or an 
interactive, symbiotic relationship between state and society, could create the necessary 
conditions for successful agrarian reform is analyzed. The chapter concludes that the most 
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promising model is based on a mutually reinforcing relationship between the state and 
autonomous peasant movements. 
Chapter 3 presents the context in which Venezuela is operating under. A historical 
context of the international political economy is presented, with the emergence of 
neoliberalism as the dominant paradigm and its effects on rural development and 
agriculture. This is followed by a section on La Via Campesina as the world's largest and 
most influential peasant organization and their influence on the role of agriculture in the 
international trade regime. The concept of food sovereignty is introduced and the 
challenges it presents in terms of government policy-making and implementation in the 
context of influential international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, 
and WTO. Lastly, the chapter concludes a brief history of the Venezuelan political 
economy to set the stage for Venezuela's agrarian reform programme under Chavez and 
the context in which the government is operating. 
Chapters 4 presents the agrarian reform programme in Venezuela, its 
complementary social policies, and the ways in which the government is affecting class 
relations in the countryside. This is followed by the rural social movements in Venezuela 
and their role in the agrarian reform process. The chapter presents the successes of the 
reform to date, while also highlighting some weaknesses based on secondary data from 
academic and government documents. The chapter concludes with the country's 
economic and social indicators since Chavez came to power - which show positive 
results. 
Chapter 5 is based on my primary data collected in the state of Lara, Venezuela. 
Several rural communities were visited with a diverse group of participants. The main 
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focus of this chapter is the weaknesses in the agrarian reform programme as pointed out 
by mainly those affected by the programme. The main field research findings are 
presented, as three main weaknesses were identified by almost all participants - whether 
supportive or opposed to Chavez and his policies. The three key weaknesses identified 
are: corruption and political sabotage; private intermediaries; the lack of regulation. These 
three weaknesses are examined in detail and solutions are put forth in the following 
chapter. 
Chapter 6 concludes the study by summarizing the key findings and offering 
recommendations based on these findings. The recommendations are policy-oriented and 
directed at addressing the key weaknesses in the agrarian reform programme. 
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Chapter 2 
The Dynamics of Agrarian Reform 
There is a general consensus that the unequal structure of landholdings in many countries 
today causes increased poverty and lower levels of productivity in rural areas 
(Barraclough, 2001; Deininger, 2004; El-Ghonemy 1990; Borras and Franco, 2008; 
World Bank, 2006). However, there is still a lack of consensus as to the nature of these 
problems - whether they are residual or relational. On a theoretical basis, the underlying 
issues of these debates is whether or not they can be solved by market-led solutions 
(World Bank, 2006; Binswagner, XX; Deninger 2004) or whether it requires a structural 
transformation to change societal relations (Akram-Lodhi, Borras, Kay, 2007). This 
chapter presents two opposing theoretical perspectives of land reform, followed by four 
competing models regarding who should be the driver of an effective agrarian reform. 
Theoretical Debates 
In framing the theoretical debates regarding the viability of redistributive land reform, I 
will analyze two opposing paradigms: the new institutional economics approach (NIE) 
and the radical agrarian populist approach (RAP). These two conflicting paradigms 
exemplify, broadly, the competing perspectives on land reform based on either the market 
or the state/peasants as being the key drivers of agrarian change. In other words, these 
two theoretical perspectives view the problems of rural development as either residual or 
relational. For NIE, the cause of poverty is a residual problem, meaning that the cause of 
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poverty for the poor is their being excluded from the market and its benefits. The solution 
is to bring the market to the rural poor or vice versa. RAP explains the cause of poverty as 
a relational problem. Poverty is a result of the very terms of poor people's insertion into 
the particular patterns of social relations. The solutions are transformative policies and 
political processes that restructure such social relations. The following section explores 
these two theoretical perspectives based on their residual and relational arguments and 
also provides a synthesis of the two. 
Land Reform from a New-Institutional Economics Approach (NIE) 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) is an economic perspective that incorporates 
institutions into economics to resolve market imperfections, information asymmetries, 
and transaction costs. The unit of analysis is the individual, while the objective is to 
maximize the three dimensions of economic efficiency with the proper economic and 
political institutions necessary to offset market imperfections. From this theoretical 
perspective, rural economies are characterized by the market failures of incomplete 
information and missing and incomplete markets. Transaction costs - the act of engaging 
in market transactions, as well as defining, protecting, and enforcing property rights -
also cause market inefficiencies (Ankerloo, 2003:5). Property rights are crucial in NIE 
theory, as they enable actors to use, derive an income from, and sell an asset. Ankarloo 
suggests that "if property rights are well protected, enforced by the state and clear, then 
transaction costs will be low, and the gains from trade with be realized" (Ankerloo, 
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2003:7). These are the key components of NIE theory and it is the institutions which 
provide the means to meet such ends. 
Institutions are of critical importance to the NIE perspective. They are the socially 
created rules that govern human (inter) actions. Dorward et al. make a distinction between 
institutional arrangements and the institutional environment (Dorward, et. al, 2005:2-3). 
The former represents a particular set of rules and structures governing particular 
contracts; while the latter refers to general property rights, enforcement mechanisms and 
cost, expected human behaviour, power relations, communication infrastructure, and 
information flows. Moreover, the authors make the assumption that low-income countries 
are characterized by high transaction costs and risks, weak information flows, and a weak 
institutional environment (Dorward et. al., 2005:3). It is therefore necessary to increase 
and improve the institutional arrangements in order to improve the effectiveness of the 
institutional environment. Individual actors with little financial, social, and political 
resources face high costs in accessing information and enforcing property rights and 
therefore cannot benefit from the institutional arrangements due to the dynamics of the 
institutional environment. Power relations play an important role in this regard, especially 
when applying the NIE perspective to land reform since NIE would advocate for a 
market-led agrarian reform (MLAR), and such a model requires negotiation and 
bargaining power between parties. This issue will be discussed according to the Brazilian 
case in more detail below, but first the ideals of land reform from an NIE perspective will 
be further explored. 
While the NIE perspective views landless peasants and large landowners as 
rational decision-makers, the inadequate information or high transaction costs cause real 
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markets to become thin or even absent. To solve these issues this perspective promotes 
institutions such as rural money markets or share-cropping initiatives. Property rights that 
are rigid, enforced, clear and concise are also seen as institutions that help reduce 
transaction costs. 
Power relations are also recognized from an NIE perspective. Powerful groups can 
use their property rights, resources, and political connections to their advantage. This can 
lead to distributive inefficiencies which is detrimental to overall economic growth. This 
occurs "when large land owners prevent land markets from optimising farm size and 
allowing the economic strengths of labour-intensive, small-scale agriculture to be 
realized" (Lipton, 1993:643; Cousin and Scoones, 2010:40). It is thus crucial to resolve 
issues of power relations in order to redistribute land from large landowners to small 
landowners. This redistribution of land into smaller-holdings is important due to the 
inverse relationship between farm size and output per hectare (Deninger, 1999:651). 
Unequal land distribution can constrain economic growth as large landholders often do 
not maximize their landholdings. 
In order to achieve proper land reform, the NIE perspective argues that the MLAR 
model must be used with incentives to purchase land and effective new institutional 
arrangements to render the reform 'power compatible' (Cousins and Scoones, 2010:41). 
This 'new wave' of land reform - a term used by Michael Lipton (1993:650-5) - is seen 
as being much more efficient and effective in redistributing land than the traditional 
SLAR model of expropriation. However, the inverse-relationship assumption will only 
take shape if state policies provide access to proper credit mechanisms, input, product, 
and insurance markets (Cousins and Scoones, 2010:41). 
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New institutional economists measure land reform in terms of three main criteria: 
productive efficiency, higher levels of equity, and contributions by land reform to both 
wider economic growth and poverty reduction (Cousins and Scoones, 2010:41). It should 
be noted that higher levels of equity, for NIE, is a means to increase economic 
development and not social development. The main policy implications for land reform 
for an NIE are MLAR; reducing policy biases favouring large farms or urban consumers 
(urban bias); the promotion of efficient markets through the creation of new institutions; 
secure, enforceable property rights; access to credit; and land taxes (Cousins and Scoones, 
2010:37-38). For NIE, the market is an important factor to achieve economic efficiency. 
By responding to market signals, it is assumed that farmers will allocate their resources to 
produce those which are most 'valued'. They should also have access to credit in order to 
obtain new technologies to reach maximum output through technical efficiency. Finally, 
land should be distributed efficiently to enable efficient small farmers to maximize their 
returns to their land. 
Land Reform from a Radical Agrarian Populist Approach (RAP) 
The RAP approach discards economic theory based on modernization and promotes an 
approach to development based on the family farm, self-exploitation, and production for 
self provision; not for profit. RAP uses the household or an undifferentiated community 
as its unit of analysis. It views the peasantry as a homogeneous mass, whereby any 
differentiation is caused by cyclical demographic differentiation and not class 
antagonism/differentiation. The theory is based on a vision of viable family farms, non-
capitalist in nature, food sovereignty, and ecological sustainability. Before delving into 
RAP ideals on land reform, it is necessary to trace the history and origin of this 
perspective. 
The RAP perspective is largely based on the Chayanovian concept of the peasant 
economy, developed by the leading Russian authority on the economics of agriculture 
from 1919-1930, Alexander Chayanov (Thorner, 1988:xii). Chayanov's theory is 
essentially based on one kind of family farm in Russia that employs no hired labour. 
Static in nature, this theory works best in thinly populated countries with an abundance of 
land and no rigid agrarian structure (Thorner, 1988:xxi). Chayanov identified four major 
types of economies, with two additional subtypes: capitalism, slavery, communism, and 
the 'family economy', with the latter being divided into 'natural economy' (self-
subsistent) and 'commodity economy' (market-oriented) (Thorner, 1988:xxii). 
Chayanov's focus was on the self-subsistent family economy which could not be 
measured by classical economic models based on wages, interest, rent, and profits. 
Rather, Chayanov would measure peasant farm activity by "taking the entire family 
household as a single economic unit and treating their annual product minus their outlays 
as a single return to family activity" (Thorner, 1988:xiv). The peasant family would 
produce enough for their well-being and have no desire to produce for surplus or profit. 
Although the theory seems limited in nature in relation to the modern (capitalistic) 
circumstances of agrarian livelihoods, Chayanov did assert that the family farm economic 
system can (and does) coexist with other systems (Shanin, 1988:7). For the family farm to 
persist, Chayanov developed a program for the advancement of (Russian) agriculture, 
consisting of three interdependent conceptual elements: rural cooperatives, differential 
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optimums, and vertical cooperation (Shanin, 1988:7). These concepts have been adopted 
by the present-day RAP perspective, as well as other concepts originating from 
Chayanov. Chayanov was neither a Marxist nor a capitalist and thus became a populist as 
he "must be assigned to one of the intellectual chains" (Shanin, 1988:16). Today, the 
RAP perspective has drawn its ideals and concepts mainly from Chayanovian thought. 
Theodor Shanin describes it best in saying that, "For the increasingly complex rural world 
of today it has clear limits, hence, no "chayanovism" but there are many of Chayanov's 
illuminating insights, explicit and implicit, in the contemporary rural studies" (Shanin, 
1988:19). 
Radical Agrarian Populism asserts that rural poverty is due to the unequal agrarian 
structure, including land distribution and the socially constructed relations, and points to 
the exploitation and domination of the powerful landholding elite and agribusinesses over 
the rural poor. The homogeneous peasantry with converging interests are seen as "under 
threat of dispossession by policies and actions that support an emerging global food 
regime dominated by large corporations" (Cousins and Scoones, 2010:44). Although RAP 
does not differentiate the peasantry based on classes, they do view two broad groups of 
conflicting classes - the landholding elite and the poor peasantry. Redistributive land 
reforms are thus extremely important for RAP, as radical land reform is seen as the first 
step in changing the broader agrarian structure, including social relations, access to 
resources, enforced property rights, and sovereignty. 
RAP argues that the current food regime based on corporate domination and 
overseen by World Trade Organization policies, not only exploits rural producers, but 
also destroys the natural environment by relying on artificial fertilizers, chemicals, and 
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fossil fuels. The 'peasant way' is much more sustainable as it is based on small-scale 
agriculture, production for consumption, and ecological sustainability. The ideal RAP 
model would be based on small, family farm agriculture, with no labour market. Labour 
would be based on the consumer-worker ratio (dependents/workers), exploiting the self 
more as the ratio increases. In this model, farms that are more successful than others are 
due to the demographic differentiation (i.e. Higher/lower consumer-worker ratios), as 
well as support from the state. This directly relates to Chayanov's concept of differential 
optimums. Moreover, to remain viable, rural cooperatives are necessary, as well as 
vertical cooperation so that peasants can address the issue of economies of scale and 
compete with large farms. 
RAP does not assess the viability of the farm in terms of efficiency and 
productivity, based on the economic logic of quantitative growth (Cousins and Scoones, 
2010:45). Using such an approach would externalize the ecological and social effects that 
are caused by chemical pollution and agribusiness exploitation. RAP views a viable and 
effective land reform in terms of its ability to promote "broad-based and inclusive local, 
regional, and national economic development that benefits the majority of the population, 
as well as ecologically sustainable methods of farming" (IPC, 2006 qtd in Cousins and 
Scoones, 2010:46). While land reform should be 'by the people, for the people' as 
practiced by the MST, it is also necessary to have state support to expropriate land from 
large landholders, as well as peasant cooperatives. 
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A Synthesis of RAP and NIE 
The process of an effective and viable redistributive land reform is no doubt an issue of 
contention. The debate mainly exists in the meanings of effectiveness and viability. 
Depending on who you ask, which perspective they align themselves with, and what they 
value are key components in determining their view on an effective and viable 
redistributive land reform. While both perspectives build upon valid arguments, it is 
necessary to refer to historical data for concrete evidence and assess which model 
contributed to the overall well-being of society. The NIE and RAP perspectives on land 
reform agree that land should be distributed into smaller landholdings to improve the 
overall well-being of society. But, as shown above, both have very different views on 
how to achieve this process and what constitutes as 'overall well-being of society'. 
The only main point of agreement between these two perspectives is that large 
landholdings should be redistributed into smaller family farms. From the NIE perspective, 
this is due to the inverse relationship between land size and productivity, assuming that 
smaller farms will maximize their land and thus increase overall land productivity. From 
a RAP perspective, land should be redistributed into small family farms for household 
food security, social protection, and food sovereignty. Enabling the landless to acquire 
land will also empower the poor, changing the power relations and thus inequalities that 
exist in society. 
For NIE, using the market to distribute land is most efficient and effective because 
it is supply-driven and therefore only 'fit' beneficiaries will be included in the reform. 
Landlords will also receive 100% cash value for their land and market signals will 
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distribute land most efficiently. A state-led approach will only distort market signals and 
award land to those who are unfit and will therefore hinder economic growth. For RAP, 
the market will not benefit the rural poor as power relations and social exclusion will 
hinder their ability to negotiate land deals. Moreover, the market will continue to reward 
the wealthy, giving them more leverage, and leaving the social structure and power 
relations unchanged. Redistributive land reform 'from above' (SLAR), accompanied by 
support and organization 'from below' (social movements, MST) will enable the rural 
poor to establish their land rights and gain sovereignty over their livelihoods (Borras, 
Akram-Lhodi, and Kay 2007). 
Measuring the viability of redistributive land reform from an NIE perspective is 
based on farm efficiency, distribution of income, the impacts on poverty, and the growth 
multiplier. As land is redistributed into smaller, more efficient farms, more output will be 
produced and more wealth created. Resources are scarce, so it is essential that they are 
allocated in the most efficient way possible to obtain the optimum output. Chemical 
fertilizers and agro-industrial equipment are preferred to maximize output. For RAP, 
agriculture is a way of life, not a means to achieve economic growth. Agriculture and 
food are central to social and ecological sustainability and the viability of family farms is 
based on their non-capitalist nature. Production should not be based on export or to 
accommodate the 'age of high mass consumption', but to provide for household 
consumption and sustainability. 
The fundamental policy implications for NIE would be to allow the market to lead 
the land reform. This should also be accompanied by proper institutions to offset 
transaction costs and establish property rights. Policies favouring urban consumers should 
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be reduced and land should be redistributed on a voluntary basis. For RAP, the major 
concern is for a radical agrarian reform that secures rights to land and resources by 
peasant farmers and allows them to have sovereignty over their land, food, and way of 
life. The policy should also provide support so the rural poor are not exploited, but rather 
protected from the global corporate food regime. These two competing paradigms form 
the basis for the debate between using the market for effectively redistributing land and 
using the state and/or peasant organizations. Next, we will look at the four main models 
of land reform: Market-led Agrarian Reform (MLAR); State-led Agrarian Reform 
(SLAR); Peasant-led Agrarian Reform (PLAR); State/Society-driven Agrarian Reform 
(SSAR). (Borras, Akram-Lhodi, Kay: 2007) 
Competing Models of Agrarian Reform 
Market-led Agrarian Reform (MLAR) 
The Market-led perspective considers economic efficiency and productivity as key 
determinants of successful land reform and rural development. Land is viewed as a scarce 
resource necessary for economic production. If most rural households lack access to land, 
rural poverty will persist. The key component for MLAR is bringing peasants into the 
market. Land, which is viewed as a commodity, needs to be titled, privatized, and become 
a tradable good. Leading MLAR advocates such as Binswanger and Deininger, argue that 
the MLAR model will distribute land most efficiently and will thus be most productive 
and create maximum levels of economic growth. The argument is based on assumptions 
that government bureaucracies are corrupt and will engage in rent-seeking around land 
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policy-making and implementation. The market, they argue, will distribute land on a 
purely voluntary buyer-seller basis where both parties receive a fair market price for their 
transaction. It is demand driven and assumed that land prices will be lower, with 
transactions that are transparent, corrupt-free and fully voluntary. The MLAR argument is 
based on the belief of the free market to determine the most economically efficient 
allocation of resources. In addition, giving poor people property rights secures their 
access to land and its productive resources while giving them an incentive to take care of 
the land and render it most productive. Securing property rights will also entice financial 
investment into the rural economy (Deininger 1999; Deininger and Binswanger 1999; 
Binswanger 1996; World Bank 2003). 
In 1994, Colombia started a subsidized land market program aimed at 
redistributing public lands via the market. In 1996 the World Bank issued the Colombian 
government a grant of US$1.82 million to fund the project and support the MLAR. The 
MLAR program, called Incora, was largely seen as a failure with "high interest rates, 
defaults in payments by beneficiaries, and the ongoing reductions to Incora's budget, 
(have) resulted in a vast slow-down of beneficiaiy disbursement" (Mondragon, 
2006:166). Without the expropriation of land by the government, the Incora program did 
not have enough funding to subsidize the purchase of all land available. Only 3.7% of the 
total available land was subsidized, benefitting only 8% of interested families in 1997 and 
less than 3% in 2000 (Mondragon, 2006:166-167). 
40 
Table 2: Colombia's MLAR 1995-2001 
Year Families Hectares 
1995 1,308 17,479.3 
1996 4,633 71,616.1 
1997 3,113 42,527.0 
1998 1,767 22,879.4 
1999 845 10,454.0 
2000 646 7,087.9 
2001 662 8,167.3 
Total 12,974 180,211.0 
(Data from Mondragon, Hector, 2006) 
Table 3: Land Redistribution Outcomes of Major Market-Led Agrarian Reform 
Programmes in Several Countries 
Country Period Redistributed Land as % 
of total arable land 
Number of beneficiaries as % 
























(Data from Borras and McKinley, 2006) 
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During the past two decades MLAR programs have largely been seen as a failure 
to redistribute land and effectively encourage farming as a pathway out of poverty. Borras 
and McKinley reveal the outcomes of major MLAR programmes in several countries in 
Table 3. 
State-led Agrarian Reform (SLAR) 
Conversely, proponents of the SLAR model argue that letting the market dictate 
land reform inevitably results in a concentration of land in the hands of a few wealthy 
elites. This is largely due to the very nature or a free market - those who already have 
resources and capital are able to forcefully persuade, through monetary or other means, 
the poor. Moreover, in the event of natural disasters, poor harvests, or drought, poor 
peasant may see the cash value for their land as more valuable than their current rural 
livelihood and due to short-term desperation, sell their land. The end result of this, of 
course is an increase in landless peasants, resulting in poverty and inequality (Borras 
2003ab) (Rosset el al.2006). In addition, Anna Tsing (2002) argues that property rights 
cannot be viewed as "things", rather they are social relationships. The MLAR view of 
property rights defines them so as to be traded on the market, for economic relationships. 
True agrarian reform however, as argued by SLAR proponents, must not only 
reform land for economic reasons, but must reform the social relationships that exist in 
rural areas. The social and political relationships between different classes are part of the 
agrarian structure and, just like the land, must be reformed in order for agrarian reform to 
be effective and increase equality in the countryside. SLAR thus goes beyond economism 
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and takes into account the underlying social and political processes that exist and make up 
the structural inequalities in the rural sector. It is crucial for the state to fully support and 
carry out this reform in full, with not only redistributing land to the landless, but also 
providing key extension services (people's access to markets; access to land and its 
productive resources; access to social, health, education and technical services; 
agricultural inputs, access to low-interest credit; marketing assistance; and distribution 
channels, agro-ecology education, cooperative education). The state-led perspective 
considers strong peasant organizations as key to the success of the land reform movement 
to support the state's expropriation and build a loyal mass. (Borras 2003ab; Rosset et. al 
2006; Kay 2009; Chang 2009; Borras et. al 2007; Borras 2008; Bernstein 2002; Akram-
Lodhi et. al 2007). Before the neoliberal discourse came to dominance as the World 
Bank's policy prescriptions, many developing countries used an SLAR programme to 
redistribute land. In Table 4, Borras and McKinley show the outcomes of SLAR in 
several countries. 
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Table 4: Land Redistribution Outcomes of State-Led Agrarian Reform Programmes in 
Selected Countries 
Country Period Redistributed Land as 
% of total arable land 
Number of beneficiaries as 











Chile 1964-73 Nearly 50 20 
Taiwan 1949-53 48 48 
Peru 1963-76 42.4 32 







Ecuador 1964-85 34.2 No data 
El Salvador 1980 thru 
1990s 
20 12 
Venezuela Up to 
1979 
19.3 24.4 




Costa Rica 1961-79 7.1 13.5 
(Data from Borras and McKinley, 2006) 
Peasant-led Agrarian Reform (PLAR) 
The peasant-led perspective comes from the failures of the two former models' ability to 
achieve comprehensive pro-poor agrarian reform. Though similar to SLAR in many 
ways, PLAR ultimately assumes that the state is too pre-occupied in politics and tied 
down by the elite's interests of anti-reform to really achieve comprehensive redistributive 
land reform. Since the state will 'inevitably' be influenced by the wealthy elites, it is 
necessary for the peasants to organize and mobilize the masses and take back the land 
themselves. This perspective requires a vibrant and highly organized peasant movement 
and has been effective in redistributing land where the state failed to do so. 
The Brazilian Constitution, for example, states that land that is unproductive 
should be used for a 'larger social function' - a stipulation that Brazil's Landless Workers 
Movement (MST) has acted upon with substantial success. Since 1985, the MST has 
"occupied unused land where they have established cooperative farms, constructed 
houses, schools for children and adults and clinics, promoted indigenous cultures and a 
healthy and sustainable environment and gender equality" (MST, 2010). They have won 
land titles for over 350,000 families in 2000 settlements and have gained prominence and 
legitimacy in state affairs (MST, 2010). The MST opposes the neoliberal model and the 
agribusiness/agro-export economy based on free trade, privatization and commodification 
of natural resources. In contrast, the MST advocates a model of agriculture based on the 
family farm and food sovereignty which "prioritizes local production of food for local 
and national markets, negates dumping, and uses sustainable production practices based 
on local knowledge" (IPC, 2010). MST has been successful in establishing 96 small and 
medium-sized cooperatives, 1800 public schools, literacy and health programs. The MST 
is expanding their reach in their fight for agrarian reform, a free, sovereign, egalitarian 
Brazil and a continent free from the FTAA (MST, 2010). Along with La Via Campesina, 
they have been one of most influential, highly organized peasant movements that have 
been a cause for real change in agrarian societies. 
45 
State/Socieiy-driven Agrarian Reform (SSAR) 
Lastly, the state/society-driven agrarian reform (SSAR) is, in some ways, a synthesis of 
the three other perspectives. While the state-led approach overemphasizes the role of the 
state in carrying out sweeping redistributive land reform that may go against the best 
interests of elite policy-makers (and the urban bias); the peasant-led approach gives too 
much weight to the ability of peasant movements to overcome the structural-institutional 
factors, international institutions, and government policies that work against their 
interests. In some cases, peasant movements can win the social revolutionary struggle, but 
fail to take control of the political realm, as in the case of the 1910 Mexican Revolution 
discussed above. On the other hand, peasant movements can take action and occupy 
unused land and forcefully take control of these lands and their productive resources, but 
without government support, cannot achieve large-scale success. This is the case of the 
MST, who occupy land 'from below', but compete with a government implementing 
MLAR strategies 'from above'. While both state-led and peasant led models have 
achieved success to a certain degree, neither can explain their failings with such a one-
dimensional view of state-societal relations (Borras, 2001:548). 
Jonathon Fox offers a useful analysis of the importance of state-society relations 
in analyzing the states' two distinct dimensions of power: the autonomy and the capacity 
of state actors (Fox, 1993:12). In Fox's analysis, autonomy is defined in terms of the state 
leaders' 'independent goal formation'; while state capacity is "the ability of state leaders 
to use the agencies of the state to get people in the society to do what they want them to 
do" (Migdal, 1988:xi quoted in Fox, 1993:12). Borras contributes to this analysis by 
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insightfully adding that "during the conflict-ridden process of (land reform) 
implementation, the policy is transformed by politics, and vice versa, as the policy is put 
in the crucible of state-society relations where changes in the balance of power within the 
state dynamically interact with the shifting alignments of forces in society (Borras, 
2001:567). Thus, the state-society relationship dynamic is fluid in nature and cannot be 
viewed or interpreted in isolation from one another. This relationship is the key 
component of an agrarian reform initiative and should be taken into consideration when 
analyzing the success and failure of different land reforms. For Borras, this "symbiotic 
interaction between autonomous societal groups 'from below' and strategically placed 
state reformists 'from above'" offers the most promising strategy for a successful 'pro-
poor' agrarian reform (Borras, 2001:571).5 It will be through this analytical framework 
that will guide this thesis in assessing the success of land reform in Venezuela. The top-
down, state-led agrarian reform does consist of promising characteristics for successful 
redistributive land reform, but without a supportive peasant mass, ideal outcomes are 
unlikely to be achieved. 
A Redistributive Alternative? 
Though all of these perspectives encompass a degree of validity in their arguments to 
successfully redistribute land to the landless, it is evident that only one camp (MLAR) 
views rural development as a residual problem, while all others view the problem as 
being relational. SLAR, PLAR, and SSAR all view the state and peasants as key actors 
5 In the Philippines context Borras (1999) calls this the 'Bibingka' strategy; while Fox (1993) calls this a 
'sandwich strategy'. 
47 
for land reform, but they differ in who will take the lead role and initiate the process. Any 
pro-poor land reform policy should protect and secure land access and property interest of 
landless peasants. Gaining access to, and control over, land and its productive resources is 
crucial to alter the land based social relations amongst the peasantry. As Borras and 
Franco point out, "It is these relationships between groups of people or social classes that 
are the subject of any pro-poor land policies" (Borras and Franco, 2009:10). They also 
outline nine interlinked themes that should be key features of a pro-poor land policy: 
protection or transfer of land-based wealth in favour of the poor; transfer of land-based 
political power; class-conscious; historical, gender-sensitive; ethnic-sensitive; 
productivity-increasing; livelihood enhancing; and rights-securing (Borras and Franco, 
2009:10-16). These features cannot be met by purely market-oriented means. They 
require a state-led initiative to compensate for the inherent structural inequalities that 
exist between peoples in the countryside. 
Pro-poor redistributive land reform, to be most successful, requires action and the 
will of both the peasants and the state. Borras and McKinley outline 'four pillars' 
necessary for a 'redistributive alternative' that will advance pro-poor agrarian reform 
most effectively (Borras and McKinley, 2006; Akram-Lodhi, et. al, 2007).6 Firstly, the 
rural poor must form their own independent organizations - peasant movements (i.e. 
MST, Via Campesina) - to exert 'relentless pressure from below' (Borras and McKinley, 
2006). The movement 'from below' has played key roles in advancing successful land 
6 The 'Four Pillar' strategy was published in a UNDP-IPC Policy Brief No. 2 in 2006 <http://www.ipc-
undp.org/pub/IPCPolicvResearchBrief2.pdf>. The original was derived from ten land reform case studies in 
Akram-Lodhi, Haroon, Saturnino M. Borras Jr. and Cristobal Kay (2007) Land, Poverty and Livelihoods in 
an Era of Globalization: Perspectives from developing and transition countries, (eds.) Routledge: New 
York. 
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reform in Mexico in the 1930s; in Kerala, India in the 1960s and 1970s; and in Chile in 
the early 1970s (Borras and McKinley, 2006). But strong peasant movements need 
powerful political allies to achieve a greater degree of pro-poor land reform. 
The second pillar is the need for a broad pro-reform political coalition that will 
support the peasants' demands for land reform. Highly mobilized, mass peasant 
movements demanding state-support for land reform will pressure the state and allow the 
party in power to justify actions of expropriation that are unpopular with the large 
landholding elites. The key role of the state is to support the reform with subsidies and 
public investment. 
This brings us to the third pillar - substantial public investment, state loans and 
technical assistance. The state needs to support land reform by not just redistributing 
public/private lands, but also supporting these formerly landless peasants in establishing 
their livelihoods on their newly acquired land. Investments, loans, technical assistance, 
cheap inputs, and education are all important features to accommodate the land reform. 
Successful pro-poor land reforms in Japan, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan all featured 
strong state support with loans, public investment and technical assistance. Bolivia, on the 
other hand, redistributed 74.5% of agricultural land available to 83.4% of potential 
beneficiaries, but these beneficiaries got little else but land. "They received few 
productive inputs, insufficient credit, and not enough technical assistance to launch 
productive, independent careers in farming" (Thiesenhusen, 1995). 
The fourth pillar is the overarching macro-economic policies to complement the 
land reform within a broader growth-oriented development strategy. Small-holder farmers 
and peasant cooperatives need to be protected from highly-subsidized foreign competitors 
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to allow fair competition in domestic markets. Pro-poor land reform in the context of a 
broader neoliberal economic orientation will inevitably destroy any pro-poor land reform 
progress and result in the demise of the peasantry. High tariffs, increased public 
investment, and capital controls should be part of a broader policy orientation to 
complement successful pro-poor land reform (Borras and McKinley, 2006). 
Pro-poor land reform remains a contested issue for policy makers, academics, and 
civil society today. Based on historical experiences and processes, it is evident that there 
are key characteristics consistent in successful pro-poor land reforms, as described above. 
Based on these characteristics of previous successful pro-poor land reforms, Venezuela's 
land reform policies, practices, and implementation will be explored. Equally as 
important for this research however, is the voice of the rural peoples who have been 
affected by this reform. A prime indicator for this study is the character and degree of the 
relationship between the state and society. 
Conclusion 
After reviewing the debates surrounding agrarian reform models and their theoretical 
underpinnings, the most comprehensive approach to land reform is one in which society 
and peasant movements are politically active in making demands to the state, as well as 
carrying out a certain degree of land reform autonomously. This is met with supportive 
state-led policies which aim to give landless peasants control over land and provide 
complementary social policies and extension services. Thus, an interactive state-society 
driven model of agrarian reform will present the optimal conditions for success. Agrarian 
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reform is not just about reforming the landholding structure; it is much more than that. 
The structure of the landholdings create certain land-linked social and economic 
relationships which are "economically inefficient, socially exclusionary, culturally 
alienating, and politically disempowering (Akram-Lodhi, Borras, Kay, 2007:391). Thus it 
is imperative that both the state and society are equal drivers of an agrarian reform. For 
this study, the optimal conditions for a successful agrarian reform exist when there are 
autonomous peasant movements and strong supportive policies from the state (SSAR) 
which not only provides extension services and social support, but also uses productivity-
enhancing policies within an overall growth-oriented national development strategy to 
protect domestic producers and consumers. 
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Chapter 3 
Political Economy in Historical Context 
The dominant development discourse is based on the need to 'modernize' or strive to 
reach 'the age of high mass consumption', which has prompted and encouraged a strong 
•y 
trend of rural-urban migration. This neoliberal discourse - largely imposed upon 
developing countries through loan conditionalities, military means, or strategic alliances -
has been extremely detrimental to rural livelihoods in the developing world. The highly 
subsidized agricultural goods flooding developing countries' markets via free trade 
agreements; the lack of government spending to provide the rural sector with safety nets, 
access to credit, extension, and basic services; the deregulation of the market economy 
and the financialization of capital has destroyed rural livelihoods through neglect, unfair 
competition, and speculation. In response, rural populations have migrated to the cities, 
suffered in poverty, or - in the most extreme of circumstances - committed suicide 
(Bello, 2009:35).8 This may happen as a response to the loss of any hope of survival as 
farmers cannot compete to sell their crops, or, as in the case with Korean peasant Mr. Lee 
Kyun Hae, may happen out of protest. At the 2003 World Trade Organization (WTO) 
7 For example, Petras and Veltmeyer point out that "The 1986 rural Census estimated the rural population 
as 23.4 million people. By 1995, the rural population had declined to 18 million, pointing towards a 
massive exodus of over five million people. Because of declining revenues, the compression of prices to 
below production 1972 costs, and massively increasing indebtedness among producers, an additional 
800,000 families, that is, over two million persons, are estimated by IBGE (the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics) to have abandoned the countryside in just five years (from 1995 to 1999) because 
of low prices and the lack of land and credit." Petras, James and Henry Veltmeyer. 2010 "Social 
Movements in Latin America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance. Pp. 52 
8 Walden Bello notes that "In the state of Andhra Pradesh, farmer suicides rose from 233 in 1998 to 2600 in 
2002; in Maharashtra, suicides more than tripled from 1,083 in 1995 to 3,926 in 2005. One estimate is that 
from 150,000 Indian farmers have taken their lives over the last few years." Quoted from Bello, Walden. 
(2009) The Food Wars. London:Verso Pp. 35 
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Ministerial in Cancun, Mexico, Lee Kyun Hae stabbed himself in the heart during a 
protest while holding a sign saying "WTO kills farmers" (La Via Campesina, 2007). Lee, 
who had joined a march with 15,000 other peasants, was a member of one of the most 
prominent transnational social movements against globalization and free trade. 
Mobilizing the masses with huge transnational social movements that gain international 
attention can force change through media pressure by delegitimizing policies and 
multilateral organizations, such as the WTO. This is the most effective way to make 
change in the systems of agricultural production and consumption, and social movements 
around the globe are participating in the resistance movement today. 
One of the largest and most influential social movements that has arisen in 
response to poor living conditions in rural areas is La Via Campesina. This international 
peasant movement consists of peasants, small- and medium-sized producers, landless, 
rural women, indigenous people, rural youth and agricultural workers from 69 countries 
from Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas (La Via Campesina). La Via Campesina's 
principal objective is to "develop solidarity and unity among small farmer organizations 
in order to promote gender parity and social justice in fair economic relations; the 
preservation of land, water, seeds and other natural resources; food sovereignty; 
sustainable agricultural production based on small and medium-sized producers" (La Via 
Campesina). This section explores La Via Campesina's notion of 'food sovereignty' in 
contrast to the dominant systems of agricultural production driven by free-market 
capitalism. 
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section will provide a brief 
overview of how the neoliberal era of globalization emerged as the dominant 
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development discourse. The following section will discuss the emergence of resistance 
movements against neoliberal policies - namely La Via Campesina - their 'food 
sovereignty' movement and how this idea can be turned into a successful development 
policy. The following (fourth) section presents a brief historical perspective on land and 
agricultural policy prior to the Chavez Administration, followed by crises that took place 
previous to, and in the early stages of the Chavez Administration. This chapter provides 
the political, economic, and social context in which Chavez came to power and 
challenges his administration faced in implementing a state-led agrarian reform 
programme. 
The Neoliberal Era of Globalization 
Neoliberalism, or 'new'-liberalism, has its roots in classical liberalism advocated by 18th 
century economist Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith proposes that a 
free-market economy, with liberalized trade, government deregulation, and the 
specialization of labour would be most efficient and effective. These fundamentals are 
still relevant in the political economic paradigm that dominates today. 
Modern day neoliberalism mainly stems from ideas propagating out of the Mont 
Pelerin Society which was made up of academic economists, historians, and philosophers, 
namely Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman (Harvey, 2005:19,20). The founding 
statement of the society states that, "The central values of civilization are in danger....by a 
decline of belief in private property and the competitive market; for without the diffused 
power and initiative associated with these (government) institutions it is difficult to 
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imagine a society in which freedom may be effectively preserved" (Mont Pelerin Society 
in Harvey, 2005:20). The society labeled themselves as liberals, but also adhered to the 
free market principles of neo-classical economics and agreed with Adam Smith's 
'invisible hand' notion that the market is best left to guide itself (Harvey, 2005:20). The 
result of this was a 'new'-liberalism, or neoliberalism, which was deeply opposed to state 
interventionist theories such as that proposed by John Maynard Keynes. The two central 
figures in this movement - Friedman and Hayek - emphasized the importance of 
individual freedom, both politically and economically, as central values to civilization. 
This link between political, economic, and individual freedom is widely referred to in 
Hayek's books "The Road to Serfdom" (1944) and "The Constitution of Liberty" (1960), 
as well as Friedman's "Capitalism and Freedom" (1962). 
Prior to 1970, Keynesian economics prevailed to guide the fiscal and monetary 
policies used by the major international financial institutions (IFIs) (Harvey, 2005:10). 
This post-war system of political-economic organization is known as 'embedded 
liberalism' - a term coined by John Ruggie (1982:392) ~ which refers to "how market 
processes and entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social 
and political constraints and a regulatory environment that sometimes restrained but in 
other instances led the way in economic and industrial strategy" (Harvey, 2005:11). 
Essentially, Keynes argued for more government spending in an economic downturn, and 
less spending in an upturn. If an economic boom creates high rates of inflation, the 
government could cut back its spending or increase taxes, taking on an interventionist 
approach. This era of 'embedded liberalism' was promoted to correct the failures of past 
policy-making. As John Ruggie explains, "...unlike the economic nationalism of the 
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thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard 
and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism" 
(Ruggie, 1982:393). In the late 1960s this system started to break down as unemployment 
and inflation surged all over the world, enabling the emergence of a new international 
economic order - the era of neoliberalism. 
Although neoliberal policies were implemented in Chile and Argentina in the 
1970s, it was not until the era of Thatcher and Reagan that the neoliberal revolution had 
flourished and had been accomplished by democratic means (Harvey, 2005:39). This was 
brought on by a period of high unemployment and inflation in the US, resulting in a 
global phase of'stagflation' (Harvey, 2005:39). The fall of the gold-standard announced 
by Nixon in 1971 sparked the demise of Keynesian economics. The Bretton Woods 
institutions changed their roles - the IMF, from stabilizing exchange rates to providing 
aid to countries with balance-of-payments difficulties; and the World Bank, from 
providing aid to war-torn countries to providing aid to developing countries and moving 
closer to the IMF operations designing conditionalities on loans. The interventionist and 
regulatory practices of the state were seen as the cause of the 'stagflation' that took place, 
turning the masses against these policies. 
The mid-1970s brought about a debate between "those ranged behind social 
democracy and central planning...and the interests of all those concerned with liberating 
corporate and business power and re-establishing market freedoms" (Harvey, 2005:13). 
The latter group emerged victorious in this debate, as the neoliberal ideology gained 
respect amongst academics and politicians with Nobel Prizes given to neoliberal 
economists Milton Friedman (1976) and Friedrich von Hayek (1974) for their 
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contributions to economic theory. Friedman and Hayek's ability to use the term 'freedom' 
- politically, economically, and individually - gained support from the masses. 
The oil price boom following the oil embargo in 1973 flooded US commercial 
banks with petrodollars, after Middle Eastern oil conglomerates invested their 
petrodollars in the United States largely due to US military pressure (Gowan, 1999:20). 
These US commercial banks were thus eager to lend their petrodollars and turned to 
developing countries as potential customers. Developing countries borrowed heavily at 
low interest rates to foster their industrialization and development process, only later to 
realize that their future lay at the hands of the United States. The loans given to 
developing countries were subject to US interest rates which "could easily push 
vulnerable countries into default" (Harvey, 2005:29). The fate of developing countries 
was thus subject to US interest rates. 
The debt crisis that emerged in the 1980s with Mexico leading the way resulted in 
the formal, widespread neoliberal model of development. This debt crisis was largely due 
to the increased interest rates in the US led by the chairman of the US Federal Reserve 
Bank Paul Volcker who increased interest rates from 11% in 1979 to 19% in 1981 
(Henwood, 2003:208). This so-called 'Volcker shock' indirectly initiated the neoliberal 
model of development through its mass creation of debt amongst developing countries. 
With the ensuing debt crisis, the IMF took the lead role in financing and restructuring 
these economies in need. With SAP conditionalities in place a massive wave of 
privatization, financial deregulation, and trade liberalization swept across the developing 
world. This resulted in increased poverty, widespread inequality, and above all, posed a 
serious threat to agrarian livelihoods. In fact, studies show that between 1982 and 1993 -
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the first decade of this 'new (neoliberal) economic model' - poverty levels increased 
from 78 to 150 million (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2010:2). What's more, is that these 
neoliberal policies, designed to produce economic development at the short-term cost of 
social development, have not only failed to produce economic growth in many 
developing countries, but have also impoverished societies on a grand scale (Chang, 
2008). 
Table 5: GDP Growth Rates 
'Bad Old Days' 
1960-80 
(%) 
'Brave New World' 
1980-2004 
(%) 
All Developing Countries 3.0 2.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.1 0.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.6 -0.3 
(Date from Chang, Ha Joon, 2008) 
During the 1980s Venezuela adopted neoliberal structural adjustment policies, 
with direction from the IMF. During this period, real GDP per capita in Venezuela 
decreased substantially (World Bank, 2010). Although this period coincided with a 
dramatic decrease in oil revenues, Venezuela's rural sector was nonetheless destroyed by 
such neoliberal policies, which continue to plague the country today. This resulted in 
roughly 90% of the population living in urban areas, and Venezuela became the only 
country in Latin America to be a net importer of food (Wilpert, 2005). 
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Figure 2: Venezuela GDP per capita 
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There is a fundamental contradiction with the neoliberal model of development. In 
both cases above, among others, the IMF and World Bank force countries to liberalize 
their capital accounts and the financial sector in general, while keeping a stable exchange 
rate to encourage investment. The pressure that arises from the foreign capital inflow, 
however, causes the collapse of the currency and a financial crisis ensues. Another 
fundamental problem is that of privatization. The government, especially in developing 
countries, needs to play a key role in the economy to ensure the development of key 
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industries and protect infant industries from foreign competition. The decreased 
government expenditure also cuts public spending on key sectors such as health, 
education, and welfare. Meanwhile, the lack of trade barriers exposes domestic industries 
and producers, making them subject to unequal, heavily subsidized foreign competition. 
The IMF and World Bank's neoliberal agenda is based on an economic theory that has 
been popularized as a hard science. Yet, time and again, the neoliberal model based on 
this economic theory proves disastrous. As a response, neoliberal advocates point to the 
flaws in the policy implementation, the prevalent corruption, or the lack of a completely 
'free market'. Thus, the neoliberal agenda continues to dominate, arguing that any failure 
is due to some externality that has disrupted the 'flawless' theory. The IMF and World 
Bank are largely controlled by the industrialized north, namely the United States. The 
neoliberal model of development that these institutions promote is also very favourable to 
the corporate interests of the 'North' and allows them to penetrate the economies of the 
'South'. Despite such corporate control 'from above', the people 'from below' that have 
been continually marginalized and exploited have mobilized to form a force of resistance. 
Radical social movements - like the MST in Brazil - have formed, as well as 
international organizations - such as La Via Campesina - to combat the forces of 
neoliberalism in the countryside. These peasant-led social movements are attempting to 
construct new agrarian systems of production and consumption based on co-operatives, 
family-run farms and self-managed agro-industrial complexes (Petras and Veltmeyer, 
2010:46) 
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La Via Campesina and Food Sovereignty 
La Via Campesina is one of the most important transnational social movement in the 
world and considered by many to be 'the international peasant movement' by leading 
academics in the field, such as Borras (2004), McMichael (2006), Patel (2005), Edelman 
(2005), Martinez Torres and Rosset (2008). During the 1980s and 1990s - the height of 
neoliberal conditionalities - peasants around the world suffered from a rapid decline in 
crop and livestock prices, largely due to free trade agreements that allowed highly 
subsidized foreign goods to flood developing countries' markets. The structural 
adjustment imposed upon developing countries' economies, combined with the onset of 
free trade agreements - from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) - created an institutionalized neglect on the 
agricultural sector. 
Walden Bello exemplifies the causes of such Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) on 
developing countries in his book The Food Wars. After the creation of NAFTA for 
example, Bello points to three causes that led to the erosion of the Mexican countryside, 
that are very similar to the causes that led to the downfall of many developing countries' 
agrarian sectors. First, Bello points out that US government subsidies for corn increased 
even as Mexican government subsidies were drastically slashed. Secondly, US export 
credits to the Mexican government rose to $3 billion so the Mexican government would 
be able to purchase the overproduction of highly subsidized US corn. Thirdly, the 
structural adjustment program imposed on Mexico enabled the food distribution channels 
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to be privatized and monopolized by a few multinational corporations, namely the US-
owned Cargill and the partly US-owned Maseca (Bello, 2009:45). Elaborating on this, 
Bello explains how controlling the distribution channels as such, allows these 
multinationals to speculate on trade trends, ensuring "that a rise in international corn 
prices does not translate into significantly higher prices paid to small producers at the 
local level" (Bello, 2009:45-46). 
Agrarian livelihoods have suffered greatly, which led to revolt amongst the 
peasantry on an international basis. As Martinez-Torres and Rosset put it, "If your real 
enemy is beyond your national borders and is also the real enemy of your peers in other 
countries, then you must join forces with those peers to fight your common enemy" 
(Martines-Torres, Elena, and Rosset, 2010:153). 
Not surprisingly, the Latin American region was the first to initiate this 
transnational resistance movement and networking, since it is "the region of the world 
with the most unequal distribution of land and income" (Martines-Torres, Elena, and 
Rosset, 2010:154) and suffered a dramatic decline in living standards during the 'lost 
decade' of the 1980s. This 'lost decade' inspired a force of peasant mobilization that 
swept the continent beginning with the formation of the Continental Conference on 
Agrarian Reform and Peasant Movements in Managua, Nicaragua in 1981. This 
conference was held for the next eight consecutive years bringing together "revolutionary 
peasant organisations, national peasant organisations, and independent peasant 
organisations, beginning a process of exchanges of experiences that led to an embryonic 
Latin American peasant movement" (Martinezz-Torres, Elena, and Rosset, 2010:154). As 
peasant organizations expanded and connected with a common anti-neoliberal, anti- agro-
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industrial sentiment, La Via Campesina emerged as a global peasant and farm movement 
at an international farm leader conference in Mons, Belgium in May 1993 (Desmarais, 
2002:93). The international peasant movement began large scale protesting at key 
international conferences starting with a 5000 person march at the GATT conference in 
Geneva in 1993, to the infamous WTO protests dubbed the 'Battle in Seattle', to the 
ongoing WTO Doha Round which continually fails to reach an agreement due to peoples' 
resistance 'from below' and left-wing government resistance 'from above'. Today, La 
Via Campesina is the leading international network of grassroots organizations opposed 
to the process of neoliberal globalization. The movement has played key roles in 
protesting against the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), World Bank land policies, among others. At the heart of this 
movement for an alternate model of agricultural development is the concept of food 
sovereignty. 
Food sovereignty is defined as "the RIGHT of peoples, countries, and state unions 
to define their agricultural and food policy without the "dumping" of agricultural 
commodities into foreign countries" (La Via Campesina, 2007). The food sovereignty 
movement seeks to change the systems of agricultural production and consumption 
according to the needs of local communities, prioritizing production for local 
consumption. It requires strict regulation on national agricultural production and 
protecting domestic farmers from competing with highly-subsidized agricultural goods 
from foreign countries. It also promotes state-led land reform - reform that redistributes 
land to the landless and provides safe access to land, water, seed, productive resources, 
public services, extension, and credit, so as to enable small farmers to be sustainable, 
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productive, and have a sense of security in case of crop failure, drought, or natural 
disaster. Essentially La Via Campesina is "arguing for a fundamental shift in who defines 
and determines the purpose and terms of knowledge, research, technology, science, 
production and trade related to food" (Desmarais, 2002:100). Food sovereignty 
emphasizes the need to capture valuable local knowledge in the production process to 
utilize the native seeds and traditional practices that will lead to sustainable agriculture. 
The challenge is how to implement food sovereignty as an agricultural policy in a country 
successfully. 
To implement food sovereignty as a governmental policy requires enormous 
government support and commitment. It also requires policy-decision making that 
challenges the dominant development discourse advocated by powerful corporate 
interests, the wealthy and highly influential developed countries, and the dominant 
international financial institutions (IFIs) established in Bretton Woods, NH - the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization 
(formerly GATT). These are the forces that have designed and sustained the free-market 
capitalist system of neoliberal globalization that dictate international trade and the 
international political economy of today. 
In February 2007, La Via Campesina held the Nyeleni Forum for Food 
Sovereignty in Mali to bring together and align peasant struggles with other societal 
groups, including workers, the urban informal sector, environmental and women's 
indigenous rights movements, etc (Martinez-Torres, Elena, and Rosset, 2010:167-168) 
This conference was held to promote a sense of urgency in altering the current model of 
economic, social, and cultural development in rural areas. The dominant models of 
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agricultural 'development' versus the food sovereignty model oppose each other on 
virtually every issue related to food, agriculture, and rural life, as we can see from Table 6 
(Martinez-Torres, Elena, and Rosset, 2010:169-170). The food sovereignty model of 
today is essentially bringing the Chayanovian model of the family-farm and adapting it to 
the modern day era. 
Table 6: Dominant Model versus Food Sovereignty Model9 
Issue Dominant Model Food Sovereignty Model 
Trade Free trade in everything Food and agriculture exempt from 
trade agreement 
Production priority Agroexports Food for local markets 
Crop prices According to free market Fair prices that cover costs of 
production and allow farmers and 
farmworkers a life with dignity 
Market access Access to foreign markets Access to local markets; an end to 
the displacement of farmers from 
their own markets by agribusiness 
Subsidies While prohibited in the 
Third World, many 
subsidies are allowed in 
the US and Europe - but 
are paid only to the largest 
farmers 
Subsidies that do not damage 
other countries (via dumping) are 
okay; i.e., grant subsidies only to 
family farmers, for direct 
marketing, price/income support, 
soil conservation to sustainable 
farming, research, etc. 
Food Chiefly a commodity; in 
practice, this means 
processed, contaminated 
food that is full of fat, 
sugar, high fructose corn 
syrup, and toxic residues 
A human right: specifically, 
should be healthy, nutritious, 
affordable, culturally appropriate, 
and locally produced. 
Being able to An option for the A right for rural peoples 
9 Source: Martinez-Torres, Maria Elena and Peter M. Rosset. (2010) "La Via Campesina: the birth and 
evolution of a transnational social movement". The Journal of Peasant Studies. Vol 37. No. 1. January 
2010: Pp. 169-170 
65 
produce economically efficient 
Hunger Due to low productivity A problem of access and 
distribution; due to poverty and 
inequality 
Food Security Achieved by importing 
food from where it is 
cheapest 
Greatest when food production is 
in the hand of the hungry, or 





Privatized Local; community controlled 
Access to land Via the market Via genuine agrarian reform; 
without access to land, the rest is 
meaningless 
Seeds A patentable commodity A common heritage of humanity, 
held in trust by rural communities 
and cultures; 'no patents on life' 
Rural credit and 
investment 
From private banks and 
corporations 
From the public sector; designed 
to support family agriculture 
Dumping Not an issue Must be prohibited 
Monopoly Not an issue The root of most problems; 
monopolies must be broken up 
Overproduction No such thing, by 
definition 
Drives prices down and farmers 
into poverty; we need supply 





The wave of the future Bad for health and the 





chemical intensive; uses 
GMOs 
Agroecological, sustainable 
farming methods, no GMOs 
Farmers Anachronisms; the 
inefficient will disappear 
Guardians of culture and crop 
germplasm; stewards of 
productive resources; repositories 
of knowledge; internal market 
and building block of broad-
based. Inclusive economic 
development 
Urban consumers Workers to be paid as little 
as possible 
Need living wages 
Another world 
(alternatives) 
Not possible/no of interest Possible and amply demonstrated 
(Data from Martinez-Torres, Elena and Rosset, 2010) 
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As we can see from Table 6, the food sovereignty model of rural development has 
some key characteristics that oppose the key tenets embedded in the dominant IFIs and 
FTAs. Firstly, the food sovereignty model exempts food and agriculture from trade 
agreements. It also prioritizes food production for local markets and not agro-exports. 
Instead of letting the market dictate crop prices, which can be altered by government 
subsidies and speculative attacks, food sovereignty advocates fair prices for farmers with 
access to credit from the public sector, not private banks and corporation seeking profit. 
Productive resources such as land, water, forests, should be controlled by the local 
community, not privatised. Food is seen as a basic human right, not a commodity; while 
farmers are viewed as knowledgeable stewards of the environment and important, 
productive parts of the economy, not an anachronism from a bygone era. Instead of agro-
industry and chemical-intensive monoculture crops, food sovereignty promotes 
agroecology, sustainable farming methods, and traditional, native seeds to grow crops. 
For these reasons, food sovereignty policies are very difficult to implement as they not 
only contest the dominant model, but also retreat from policy conditionalities imposed 
upon IMF/World Bank indebted countries and from FTAs, specifically the multilateral 
WTO and its Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). 
The three key components of SAPs imposed upon developing countries by the 
IMF and World Bank are privatization, financial deregulation, and trade liberalization. 
These policies privatize productive resources, redistribute land based on a market-led 
system, encourage agro-industry using chemical intensive inputs to produce monocultures 
and promote economic efficiency above all else, including societal needs and human 
welfare. Secondly, financial deregulation allows foreign capital to flow freely in and out 
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of the country, exposing countries to speculative attacks. This, combined with waves of 
privatization paves the way for monopolies and oligopolies to form which control 
productive resources and channels of distribution, creating unfair competition, market 
asymmetries and allow the supply of goods to be dictated in the hands of a few. Lastly, 
trade liberalization exposes LDC farmers to foreign competition that is highly subsidized 
by wealthier governments. Under SAPs, subsidies are prohibited, exacerbating the 
existing market asymmetries. Any country indebted to the IMF/World Bank is supposed 
to abide by these stipulations in order to create 'economic growth' and balance their 
budgets. As argued above, these policies have largely resulted in failure, discrediting the 
institutions amongst the developing world. Moreover, the other force which countries 
must deal with when implementing food sovereignty policies is the largest multilateral 
trading organization in the world - the WTO. 
The Agreement on Agriculture is an agreement under the WTO framework that 
has greatly plagued developing countries. Initially, the AoA was attractive to the primary -
producing export-oriented countries as they saw the benefits from agricultural 
liberalization and subsidy reduction in all countries. Knowing that they (LDCs) could 
produce agricultural goods cheaper than the industrialized 'North', LDCs viewed the AoA 
as an opportunity to gain from their comparative advantage on the international 
marketplace. However, the AoA had underlying attachments and loopholes that went 
unrecognized. Loopholes like the 'Green Box' allowed 'non-trade distorting subsidies' to 
be implemented (Jawara and Kwa, 2004:27). In effect, the rich developed countries of the 
North established an agreement that allowed them to maintain their highly subsidized 
agricultural industry and sell these extremely cheap goods on international markets. The 
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US and the European Commission subsidize their agricultural industries to the point 
where they are "exporting corn at prices 20 per cent below production cost and wheat at 
46 per cent below cost" (Jawara and Kwa, 2004:27). 
The result of this dumping has drastic effects on developing countries. With 
subsidized imports flooding developing countries' markets, the local producers are unable 
to compete. The increased subsidies by developed countries' governments created over­
production which depresses world prices, floods markets, and destroys the livelihoods of 
farmers who cannot compete. Many countries that have traditionally been net food 
exporters become net-food importers as their agricultural sector suffers and lives are 
destroyed. The over-supply from the North lowers the price of their agricultural goods. In 
turn, farmers who were already on the brink of poverty are now unable to buy their basic 
needs. A vicious cycle of loans, debt, increased loans, etc., ensues. Eventually, this 
process leads to farmers selling their land and being reduced to measures of extreme 
poverty. The AoA has ruined the livelihoods of many farmers in developing countries, yet 
the agreement lives on. Even with the mass protests and desperate attempts to reform the 
agreement, as demonstrated by Lee Kyung Hae, the WTO officials and those within the 
sphere of influence continue to ignore the consequences of the AoA. 
The above makes up the numerous hardships and conditions imposed on 
developing countries in trying to implement food sovereignty policies. The political will 
to dislocate ties with the IMF/World Bank as well as the WTO stipulations that pressured 
countries into signing all sub-agreements under one WTO document is extremely difficult 
and has only started to transpire within the last decade. In September 2003, Argentina, 
under the leftist-Kirchner government, neglected to pay back up to $21 billion of loans 
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'owed' to the IMF and other multilateral lenders (Bello, 2005:125). These actions 
followed the IMF's so-called 'poster-child's' debt crisis of 2001-02 in which the IMF lost 
much of its legitimacy and credibility, admitting that its imposed policies crippled the 
country's economy (Conway, 2004). This was followed by a wave of left-leaning leaders 
dislocating their countries from the influences and imperialist tendencies of IMF-
neoliberal policies. In 2005 Brazil paid off all debts to the IMF to take back its 
sovereignty; 2006 saw Evo Morales of Bolivia become the first country to benefit from 
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI); in 2007 Hugo Chavez announced 
Venezuela's withdrawal from the IMF, while promoting the Bank of the South as an 
alternative (Ambrose, 2008). This 'pink tide' sweeping over parts of Latin America is 
challenging the neoliberal model of development with a new model of 21st century 
socialism. Noone other than Hugo Chavez is advocating such a transformation, and his 
policies reflect his ambitious rhetoric. In 2008, for example, Chavez passed The Law of 
Food Security and Food Sovereignty as a means to establish strategic food reserves to 
stabilize the price of essential food items and ensure a secure supply of food in the event 
of natural disasters or human interferences. The law requires the storage of enough food 
to feed the entire population for three months (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
2001). Other policies the government has implemented to promote food sovereignty 
include: prioritizing domestic production for local markets; establishing a state 
purchasing agency to guarantee a fair price for farmers; access to cheap credit for 
farmers; access to and control over land and its productive resources for peasants; the 
promotion of, and investments in, agroecology; and although they do not exempt food 
and agriculture from trade agreements, they do have a discriminatory import policy on 
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essential and non-essential food items. These policies are discussed in more detail 
throughout. 
A Brief History of the Venezuelan Political Economy 
When Venezuela's first patch of oil was discovered at Mene Grande near Lake Maracaibo 
in 1913, the oil-driven country that we now know today began to surface. Under the 
dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gomez (1880-1935), large scale oil production began and by 
1929 Venezuela was the world's second-largest oil producer, though much of the oil 
wealth fled the country with foreign companies, most notably Standard Oil of New Jersey 
and Royal Dutch Shell (Bruce, 2008:XV). As oil became heavily demanded by the 
international community - with two world wars, petroleum-based industrialization, 
personal motor vehicles, etc. - oil came to dominate the Venezuelan economy. In the 
1940s, Venezuela emerged as the world's largest exporter of oil (Bruce, 2008:XV). At 
this time, 4.8% of landowners controlled 88.8% of the total arable land with landholdings 
of 1,000 hectares or more. Small farmers, with 10 hectares or less, constituted 57.7% of 
the total number of landowners, but held just 0.7% of arable land (Wilpert, 2005). This 
prompted President Romulo Betancourt to initiate a state-led land reform program in 
1960 which, over the course of twenty years distributed state land to over 200,000 
families (Wilpert, 2005). By the 1970's, the government neglected to provide proper 
support in extension services - access to credit, technical assistance, price support and 
marketing assistance - resulting in little overall change to the Venezuelan agricultural 
sector. 
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Petras (1970) highlights three key weaknesses that led to the failure of 
Venezuela's agrarian reform in 1960. First, the large landholding elite (latifundistas) 
received more benefits in terms of technical assistance, credit programs, and other 
extension services, than the landless peasant beneficiaries. This failed to weaken the 
economic power of the latifundistas and, as a result, the means of production and unequal 
social structure were maintained. Secondly, it failed to provide land to roughly two-thirds 
of landless peasants in dire need. Thirdly, it failed to provide sufficient credit, technical 
assistance, training, and other extension services to formerly landless beneficiaries 
(Petras, 1970:96). This agrarian reform programme did not attempt to transform the 
structural inequalities in countryside, nor did it support the viability of new farms. 
Furthermore, the agrarian reform was not even resisted by the latifundistas as many of the 
wealthy, landowning elite actually benefitted from the reform. As Petras notes, "The 
government paid very high prices for their land, allowing the landowners, who raised 
their prices to take advantage of 'democratic' land reform, to earn very substantial profits, 
which in some cases were used to purchase new lands in outlying areas" (1970:97). In 
1969, the Director of the National Agrarian Institute issued a statement on outcomes of 
the agrarian reform programme: "little significant progress has been made in the 
reduction of the concentration of land ownership in few hands, in the increase of 
peasants' production or income, or in the formation and strengthening of economic 
enterprises and organizations of small farmer" (Petras, 1970:97). 
As a result of the lack of discriminatory policies against the latifundistas, as well 
as a lack of support to peasant beneficiaries - the programme failed to make any 
substantial structural change in the countryside. One of the key problems in this era was 
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the strong relationship between the state and the latifundio class - both of whom had 
interests in maintaining the control of commercial farms in Venezuela. The inability to 
secure a viable livelihood in the countryside led to a continuous trend of rural-urban 
migration, as the rural population (as a percentage of the total) declined from 38.4% in 
1960 to 10.9% in 1999 (World Bank, 2010). Likewise, agriculture's share of GDP 
declined from 50% in 1960 to just 6% in 1999 (Wilpert, 2003). 
During this period, the government solely focused on a process of development 
through industrialization and neglected its agricultural base. With a government heavily 
concentrated on oil production, the Venezuelan economy suffered from what is widely 
known as 'Dutch Disease' - referring to a heavy inflow of revenues from natural 
resources (oil) which strengthens the country's currency, making other exports 
(manufacturing, agriculture) less competitive (Cordon, Max, and Neary, 1982). 
Essentially, all sectors of the economy not affiliated with oil suffered as a consequence of 
neglect and their inability to compete in the marketplace. The Middle East oil embargo of 
1973 started a world-wide oil boom which quadrupled the Venezuelan government's 
revenues between 1972 and 1974 (Wilpert, 2007:89). With increased oil revenues 
President Carlos Andres Perez promised to make Venezuela a developed country within a 
few years and nationalized the oil industry, creating the Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) 
in 1976 (Wilpert, 2007:89). However, as Bernard Mommer points out, "Nationalization 
changed ownership of the oil industry but not, for the most part, managementThis 
allowed many executives from Exxon, Shell, and Mobil to remain in control and created 
conflicting interests amongst the government and the oil industry. PDVSA concentrated 
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on its own agenda (Mommer in Ellner and Hellinger, 2003)10 and thus "undermined 
nationalization and paved the way for the return on private investors." (Mommer in Ellner 
and Hellinger, 2003) During this process, PDVSA bought refineries in the US and Europe 
(Citgo) and used 'transfer pricing' to sell Venezuelan oil to its own subsidiaries at 
discount prices under long-term contracts. This indirectly transferred many of PDVSA's 
profits abroad (Wilpert, 2007:90). The results of this mismanagement were disastrous and 
with the oil price collapse of 1986 (Forbes, 2008) and the currency crisis of 1983, the 
Venezuelan economy was in terrible condition. 
In 1989, Carlos Andres Perez came back to power as Venezuela's President, this 
time entering a country in near collapse as foreign reserves were minimal and food 
shortages were mounting. The neglect of the agricultural sector brought the sector's share 
of economic activity, as a percentage of Venezuela's GDP, from 50% in 1960 to only 6% 
in 1999, the lowest in Latin America (Wilpert, 2007:110). These statistics reflect the fact 
that Venezuela is Latin America's sole net importer of agricultural products. As the 
economy approached crisis, Perez gave in to the IMF's SAPs and Venezuela began its era 
of neoliberal policy prescriptions. 
In February 1989, Perez adopted the neoliberal discourse, privatizing services, 
cutting social spending, abolishing subsidies, deregulated trade, and oriented the economy 
for export (Isaacs et al., 2009). The effects of SAPs on the fragile Venezuelan economy 
further devastated the economy and society as government expenditure was reduced and 
trade barriers collapsed to stimulate the growth of oil exports. With highly subsidized 
10 Mommer notes the PDVSA's agenda as being: "the development of the oil sector in real terms, maximizing volume, turnover and 
sales (not profits) in all the segments of the industry, both at a national and an international level, at the same time that fiscal revenues 
were disregarded." In Mommer, Bernard. 2003. "Subversive Oil" in: Venezuelan Politics in the Chavez Era, edited by Ellner, Steve 
and Daniel Hellinger, London: Lynne Renier. <http://www.isioma.net/sds00703.html > Accessed September 10,h, 2010. 
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agricultural goods flooding the Venezuelan market, and the decades of agriculture neglect 
by the government, Venezuela's agricultural sector was destroyed. The government was 
unable to subsidize even its own oil under SAPs, and "prices of everything, especially 
food and transportation, doubled overnight" (Isaacs et. al., 2009). Outraged by the price 
increases, corruption, deceit, and the government's loss of sovereignty over its own 
economic and social policies, the people mobilized and chaos ensued - a rebellion known 
as the Caracazo. 
The Caracazo began on the morning of February 27th, 1989, as gangs of civilians 
took to the street, infuriated with the state of their government. Looting, riots, and 
destruction ensued, lasting only a couple days before the military reacted with brutal 
repression, killing over two thousand civilians (Gott, 2000:46). This massacre concretized 
the peoples' displeasure with their government and a new movement began to emerge 
within the military itself with support of the masses fed up with living in a state rattled 
with corruption, violence, and poverty. 1989 marks an important date worldwide as it was 
this year that the Berlin Wall fell, the pro-Soviet governments collapsed in Eastern 
Europe, and "the beginning of the end of Venezuela's ancient regime" (Gott, 2000:45). It 
was not until another decade that Hugo Chavez would come to power, after gaining 
public support from the most marginalized in society and within the military that he was 
apart of throughout his career. Public discontent and the opportunity for change was very 
evident after Venezuela had suffered a steady decline in real per capita income from 1979 
to 1999, declining by 27%. Even with neoliberal policy prescriptions invading many other 
Latin American countries, no other country experienced such devastation. Moreover, 
Venezuela's poverty rate increased from 17% in 1980 to 65% in 1996 (Wilpert, 2007:13). 
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As the middle-class became heavily affected by these downfalls, the country was ever 
more divided up between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', with the latter making up much 
of the population and eager for change. 
On December 9th, 2002, opposition parties to the Chavez government sabotaged 
the economy by going on a prolonged strike. Management and white collar workers of the 
state-owned oil company, PDVSA, paralyzed the oil industry for nearly two months by 
refusing to move ships, withholding computer passwords and refusing to do anything 
productive (Wagner, 2005). In one month, production dropped from 3.1 million to 25,000 
barrels per day, leading to shortages of food due to the lack of transportation and 
distribution (fuel), and leaving many households without the ability to cook (Wagner, 
2005). Venezuela's chamber of commerce - Fedecamaras - also supported the lockout, 
along with international food corporations operating within the country, leading to closed 
supermarkets, growing malnutrition, and massive food shortages nation-wide. In the 
meantime, the government hired retired oil workers from Brazil and purchased their fuel. 
Since many medium and small-scale businesses were not connected to the wealthy, elitist, 
anti-Chavez class, these businesses remained open and provided the public with food 
staples. Nonetheless, when the strike ended in February, 2003, it had cost Venezuela $10 
billion dollars, temporarily closed the country's mining and steel industries, increased 
unemployment to 22%, and increased the level of poverty from 44% to 54%, bankrupting 
thousands of businesses (Wagner, 2005). 
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Conclusion 
As the neoliberal discourse gained hegemony from the 1980s onward, the solutions to 
unequal land tenure systems, as supported by mainstream perspectives such as the World 
Bank (2003), Deininger (1995, 2002), and Deininger and Binswanger (1999), were a 
series of market-led reforms. Market-led land reforms, as directed by the World Bank, 
were carried out by Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Philippines, South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, among others. The results have been very bleak, as the average of redistributed 
land as a percentage of total agricultural land of the preceding countries was only 4.13% 
(including Zimbabwe which distributed 16%). The MLAR table by Borras and McKinley 
(2006) exemplify these programme failures. 
Table 7: Land Redistribution Outcomes of Major Market-Led Agrarian Reform 
Programmes in Several Countries 
Country Period Redistributed Land as 
% of total arable land 
Number of beneficiaries as 

























(Data from Borras and McKinley, 2006) 
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It is obvious that Chavez was confronted with many challenges upon being 
elected. He was advocating change through redistributive pro-poor policies that went 
against the dominant discourse. Venezuela was also extremely urbanized, being one of 
the only net importers of food in the region, and had a very strong landlord class which 
occupied the countryside. The unsuccessful agrarian reform programme in 1960, failed to 
change the unequal structure of the countryside and Chavez sought to change that. 
Chavez adopted the view of food sovereignty from La Via Campesina and is in the 
process of pursuing a model of agrarian reform that is in line with the more critical 
academics in the field such as Akram-Lodhi, Borras, and Kay (2007), Borras (2007), 
Rosset, Patel, Courville (2006). The next chapter will examine Venezuela's agrarian 
reform programme under Chavez and discuss the main actors, complementary 
programmes, and outcomes. 
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Chapter 4 
Agrarian Reform Initiatives: The Venezuelan Case 
As one of the most urbanized countries in the region, Chavez came to power in a country 
with only 12% of the population living in rural areas, compared with 35% in 1960 
(Wilpert, 2007:110). Furthermore, "75% of the country's private agricultural land is 
owned by only 5% of the landowners, while 75% of the smaller landowners own only 6% 
of the land" (Wilpert, 2007:110). Elected on a 'pro-poor' platform with promises to 
redistribute the wealth, Chavez sought to restructure the agrarian sector with a state-led 
agrarian reform programme to eliminate the latifundistas and transform the countryside 
into more productive, small-medium sized landholdings. 
This chapter examines Venezuela's state-led agrarian reform programme and the 
key actors involved in the process. The programme is examined and analyzed and 
provides data based on the outcomes to date, as well as an overview of economic and 
social indicators to gain a perspective of the agrarian reform programme within the 
overall national development strategy. 
Venezuela's Land and Agricultural Policies Under Chavez 
In 2001 Mision Zamora11 was established as the main agrarian reform programme to 
redistribute land and re-integrate and restructure the Venezuelan countryside. Created in 
11 Mission Zamora is a government initiative inspired by Ezequiel Zamora who was a crusader for land reform and peasants' rights in 
the 1850's. The mission is in charge of helping to organize small and medium producers and assisting them to receive land titles. 
79 
law by the Ley de Tierras, the goals of this policy are to: set limits on the size of 
landholdings; tax unused property as an incentive to spur agricultural growth; redistribute 
unused, primarily government-owned land to peasant families and cooperatives; and 
lastly, as of 2005, to expropriate uncultivated and fallow land from large, latifundistas for 
the purpose of redistribution (Delong, 2005). The original Land Law passed in 2001 
stated that "only high-quality idle agricultural land of over 100 hectares or lower quality 
idle agricultural land of over 5000 hectares (latifundios) can be expropriated" (Wilpert, 
2007:111). Mission Zamora's goal is "to reorganize the ownership and use of idle lands 
with agriculture to eradicate the latifundio" (Isaacs, et a., 2009). In June 2010, the Land 
Law was reformed, redefining latifundios as being "a piece of land that is larger than the 
average in its region or is not producing at 80% of its productive capacity" (Suggett, 
2010). Moreover, the reformed law also eliminates the contracting or renting of land 
cultivation to third parties. Although this law is quite contentious, the government will 
compensate expropriated land with legal titles at market value, unlike other state-led land 
reforms. 
Under the Ministry of Agriculture and Land, four new institutions were also 
created to facilitate the land reform process - the National Land Institute (INTI), 
responsible for land tenancy and redistribution; the National Rural Development Institute, 
responsible for technical assistance and infrastructure (including construction projects 
like irrigation, drainage, bridges, and roads); the Venezuelan Agricultural Corporation 
(CVA), which provides assistance with distributing and commercializing the agricultural 
products of farmers who have benefited from the land reform; and the Socialist Agrarian 
Isaacs, Anna et al. (2009). "The Food Sovereignty Movement in Venezuela, Part 1" Venezuelan Analysis. 
<http://vene7uelanalysis.coni/arialysis/4952> Accessed September 10th 2010. 
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Fund (FONDAS) assists farmers through micro-lending at little to no interest (Suggett, 
2010). Other institutions that offer key extension services for farmers, such as cooperative 
education training; agriculture research; subsidized credit programs; and subsidized food 
outlets were also established to assist the agrarian reform process (Ramachandran, 2006). 
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The first step in the process of land redistribution for INTI is to examine large 
(latifundio) farms and evaluate the legitimacy of property rights, tenure, and productivity. 
Next, they look at the physical infrastructure to identify whether there are roads, 
electricity and energy, irrigation works, etc., to estimate the degree of work and 
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investment that must be supplied in order to accommodate the development of viable 
farms. Once these evaluations are completed, the beneficiaries must undergo programmes 
of 'socio-economic and technical capacity-building' to learn how to run a cooperative 
farm. During this time, participants were paid to attend the training school (Mision 
Vuelvan Caras) at a salary equivalent to $150 USD per month (Ramachandran, 2006). 
This monthly allotment, however, was terminated as of 2007, when the Mision was re­
designed and named Mision Che Guevara. According to government officials and 
workers of the Misiones, individuals were mainly attracted to the monthly allocation and 
not to the creation of economically sustainable cooperatives, resulting in a massive waste 
of resources and the need to restructure the Mision (Daguerre, 2011:10). 
The Venezuelan Agricultural Corporation (CVA) is of particular importance due 
to its task of ensuring newly established farmers have a guaranteed buyer at a guaranteed, 
fair price. The CVA is a government marketing board for agricultural products which 
offers producers a guaranteed floor price for their products. The goal of the program is to 
eliminate intermediaries which manipulate prices between producers and consumers. An 
ongoing problem in rural Venezuela is corporate intermediaries which tend to pay 
producers unfair (low) prices and sell to consumers at unfair (high) prices. The CVA has 
been established to eliminate this process by providing producers with price stability and 
simultaneously make the final price for consumers much more affordable. 
In January 2008, the Venezuelan Food Products and Distribution (PDVAL) was 
set up to work as a state-run food distributor to strengthen distribution networks (Suggett, 
2008). A government report from 2008 shows that through these institutions the 
government has purchased 659,419 tons of foodstuff of which 237,085 tons are from 
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domestic producers and 422,334 from international producers. These are distributed to 
Mercal's across the country to be sold at subsidized rates (Gobierno Bolivariano de 
Venezuela, 201 lg). While Mercal and PDVAL continue to expand, they serve over 30% 
of the Venezuelan population - over 10 million people (Wagner, 2005; Gobierno 
Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 lh). A closer look at the Mercal as a social 'Mision' is 
discussed below. 
To encourage more urban-rural migration, any Venezuelan citizen who is either 
the head of a family household or is between 18-25 years old can apply for a parcel of 
land through the National Land Institute (INTI). This land must be productively 
cultivated for three years, after which the applicant can acquire full ownership and title to 
the land. However, the owner cannot sell the land on the market, it can only be passed 
down through the family. This form of redistributive land reform is state-led, where the 
market cannot influence farmers to sell their land for currency, which often leads to the 
wealthy elite or corporations exercising their monetary power over the peasantry and thus 
concentrating land in the hands of the few. Critics argue that by prohibiting people to sell 
their land can lead to a black market in land titles, which end up being traded far below 
market value because titles are not completely legal (Delahaye, 2002:351-354). These 
arguments contribute to a long debate that exists between academics advocating market-
led agrarian reform (MLAR) versus state-led agrarian reform (SLAR). Among the top 
academics in the field today, it is generally recognized that the SLAR approach has been 
much more effective in delivering true agrarian reform that changes power relations and 
does not allow the market to dictate the distribution of land. Agrarian reform, it is argued, 
must be state-led to facilitate a social transformation in the countryside. However, many 
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SLAR. models have failed, due to the lack of credit and extension services available to 
farmers, or the failure of the peasantry to empower themselves through self-organization 
and mobilization.12 
In March 2005, the National Land Institute expropriated five latifundios, not on 
the basis of being too unproductive and idle, but on the basis that the land actually 
belonged to the government. The owners of these lands contested the expropriation, 
trying to prove their ownership with documentation that apparently dated back to the mid 
19th Century. The government however, claimed that these documents were false and 
redistributed the large landholdings to landless peasants. Due to the extreme vagueness of 
land title documentation and ownership, it is extremely difficult to gauge the legitimacy 
of land titles. Many land owners, over the years, have expanded their territory, perhaps 
knowingly or unknowingly. This could be due to a transfer of ownership, or perhaps due 
to the ancient land titles that are very vague about demarcating territory (Wilpert, 
2007:113). In other circumstances, a person could have bought the land 'legitimately', not 
knowing that the previous owner did not have the legitimate land title. The Chavez 
government, however, is on a mission to redistribute large landholdings to small farmers 
to increase productivity. After all, as stated in the Constitution under Article 307, "The 
predominance of large land estates is contrary to the interests of society"13, so one would 
assume that any vague or controversial land titles would result in the government and its 
military presence having the final say. Under the Law, proof of private land ownership is 
accepted so long as the 'owner' has a "perfect sequence and linkage among documents 
12 For a thorough analysis of MLAR and SLAR see Borras, Satumino. (2008). Competing views and strategies on agrarian reform: 
International Perspective. Ateneo de Manila University Press: Quezon City. Also, see Rosset, Peter, Raj Patel, Michael Courville. 
(2006). "Promised Land: Competing visions of agrarian reform" Land Research Action Network. Food First Books: Oakland, 
California. 
13 See Appendix I 
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that must have been granted by state entities including the former National Agrarian 
Institute, government ministries, the military, or the Spanish Crown" (Suggett, 2010). 
Furthermore, another recent reform to the 2001 Land Law passed in June 2010 
eliminates the contracting or renting of land cultivation to third parties. This means that 
anyone or any group of people that has occupied or worked as tenants on privately owned 
land for over three years will potentially be given the title of ownership to that land under 
the direction of the National Lands Institute (INTI) (Suggett, 2010). The Law also 
prohibits the eviction of farmers from the land they are occupying or working on at the 
time the law's implementation. This is in accordance with Article 13 which states that 
land tenure must be in line with, "the socialist principle according to which the land is for 
those who work on it." 
This new reformed law parallels that of the Brazilian Constitution and how 
Brazil's Landless Workers Movement (MST) is practicing land reform 'from below'. 
Similar to Venezuela's new Land Law, the Brazilian Constitution states that land that is 
unproductive should be used for a 'larger social function' - a stipulation that the MST has 
acted upon with substantial success. Since 1985, the MST has "occupied unused land 
where they have established cooperative farms, constructed houses, schools for children 
and adults and clinics, promoted indigenous cultures and a healthy and sustainable 
environment and gender equality" (MST, 2010). They have won land titles for over 
350,000 families in 2000 settlements and have gained prominence and legitimacy in state 
affairs (Suggett, 2010). 
Venezuela's state-led agrarian reform programme has thus far redistributed 
roughly 3 million hectares of state-owned land to over 200,000 families (Pearson, 2011; 
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Wilpert, 2007:112). This public land is mainly distributed to cooperatives known as 
Zamoran Farms. The state assumes ownership of the land, but is considered the 
cooperatives so long as it stays 'productive'. In 2005, the Chavez government began to 
expropriate and redistribute privately-held land - which, for obvious reasons became a 
very contentious issue. This was also the year that Chavez, in a speech to the fifth World 
Social Forum on January 30th, declared that Venezuela would pursue a model of 
socialism of the twenty-first century.14 According to the then-President of the National 
Land Institute (INTI) in 2006, Richard Vivas, the total amount of arable land in 
Venezuela is roughly 30 million hectares (Ramachandran, 2006:8). Of the 30 million 
hectares, "19 million were under the control of INTI (and in the process of being 
redistributed to small/medium/cooperative farmers) or owned by the state. The remaining 
11 million hectares are in the form of private land holdings and latifundistas 
(Ramachandran, 2006:8). 
According to the 2007-2008 National Agricultural Census (VII Censo Agricola 
Nacional) conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land, the total amount of arable 
land is 27,073,879 hectares. According to this census, 25,903 farms over 200 hectares in 
size, occupy 19,462,060.87 hectares - which accounts for 71.89% of arable land. There 
are a total of 424,256 farms in Venezuela, meaning that these large landholdings make up 
6.1% of farm holdings and occupy 71.89% of the land (Gobierno Bolivariano de 
Venezuela, 201 li). It is unclear, however, whether these large landholdings are private 
latifundios or if they have been reclaimed by INTI. 
14 21st Century socialism was never specifically defined by Chavez, rather it is seen as a constant work in progress, a system that is 
more pluralistic and less state-centred than the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba today. (See Wilpert, Gregory. (2007) 
Changing Venezuela bv Taking Power: The history and policies of the Chavez government. Verso: London. Pp.237-266) 
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Although these figures are not in stark contrast to the unequal concentration of 
land that Chavez inherited in 1999 (75% of arable land, owned by 5% of landowners), the 
land reform programme only began redistributing private lands in mid-2005 (Wilpert, 
2007:110). The programme was also delayed due to the crises that ensued due to the oil 
crisis and coup attempt in 2002-2003. Since most of the land redistribution happened after 
2005, this census is based on the data available less than two years after the more radical 
reform had taken place. It is also unclear as to whether or not some of these latifundios 
had been expropriated or reclaimed by INTI at the time of the consensus, as the then-
President of INTI Richard Vivas said in 2006 that 63.3% of arable land was under INTI 
control (Ramachandran, 2006:8). In many cases, INTI will claim the rights to large 
landholdings, but the process to redistribute that land to small-medium size landholdings, 
or cooperatives can take over a year. It is thus unclear as to the exact outcomes of the land 
reform, However, the ranges displayed in Table 7 show the best available data from a 
variety of sources to date. 
Also, at the time of the consensus, only 1 million hectares of private land had been 
redistributed (Isaacs, et al., 2009). To date, Chavez has said that a total of 4 million 
hectares of land has been nationalised by the government over the last twelve years, 
leaving a total of 8 million hectares in hands of private landowners and latifundistas 
(Pearson, 2011). According to the figures from INTI President Richard Vivas, only 
26.67% of arable land in Venezuela is controlled by private-latifimdio farms. However, 
due to a lack of concrete data it is estimated that only 3-7 million hectares have been 
redistributed to beneficiaries in the form of small landholdings and cooperatives -
meaning that the total redistributed land as a percentage of arable land is between 10% -
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23.33%. According to one of the leading academics Venezuela today - Gregory Wilpert -
over one million Venezuelan's have benefitted from the land reform (Wilpert, 2011). 
With a rural population of roughly 1,929,306, this means that 51% of the rural population 
has benefitted from the reform (World Bank, 2010). 
Although there is no official data on the amount of land that has actually been 
redistributed to date on governmental websites or official documents, the data available 
has been retrieved through secondary sources which consist of interviews with top INTI 
officials. In March 2011, I made a personal visit to INTI offices in Barquisimeto and 
Caracas in search of official land reform statistics. I was told that this information is not 
made public, but I could send a letter of request to INTI state director Pedro Moreno. 
After sending a letter by mail and by e-mail, I have yet to receive a response. 
Table 8: Outcomes of Venezuela's Agrarian Reforms 
Period 
Redistributed Land as a % 
of Total Arable Land 
Number of Beneficiaries 
as % of total rural 
population 
2001-2010 10-23.3% 51.8% 
1960-1979 19.3% 24.4% 
(Data from Wilpert, 2007; World Bank, 2010) 
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Complementary Social Policy: The 'Misiones' 
Hugo Chavez was elected on a 'pro-poor' political platform that would break-away from 
the free market, neoliberal discourse and place human development, welfare, and social 
inclusion at the crux of the 'Bolivarian Revolution'. The goal was to create social policies 
that would encourage 'grassroots' movements through worker-control and community-
managed social policies. As long as communities were able to organize and work together 
through Communal Councils, a system of self-management would emerge and the 
government would provide the necessary resources. With a new Constitution in 1999, the 
Chavez administration sought to create a universal welfare state, guaranteeing a right to 
"life, work, culture, education, social justice and equality", as stated in Title III of the 
Constitution (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 la). It was not until 2003 however, 
that the government's social policy was much more radicalized in the context of a 'pro-
poor' agenda. After a failed coup and oil strike that left the economy and polity in crisis, 
Chavez lost support amongst his main supporting base - the lower classes - as support 
from lower income groups dropped from 94% at the start of his presidency to a mere 34% 
after the crises (Corrales, 2005:113). As we can see from Table 8 titled, 'Venezuela: 
Poverty and Unemployment Rates, 1997-2009', the percentage of extremely poor people 
jumped from 16.9% in 2001 to 30.2% in 2003. This prompted the government to create a 
diverse set of social programmes called 'Misiones' to meet the needs of the countries 
poorest. 
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Households (% of total 
declared) 
Population (% of total 
declared) 
Poor Extremely Poor Poor Extremely Poor 
1997 
1st Half 55.6 25.5 60.9 29.5 
2nd Half 48.1 19.3 54.5 23.4 
1998 
1st Half 49.0 21.0 55.4 24.7 
2nd Half 43.9 17.1 50.4 20.3 
1999 
1st Half 42.8 16.6 50.0 19.9 
2nd Half 42.0 16.9 48.7 20.1 
2000 
1st Half 41.6 16.7 48.3 19.5 
2nd Half 40.4 14.9 46.3 18.0 
2001 
1st Half 39.1 14.2 45.5 17.4 
2nd Half 39.0 14.0 45.4 16.9 
2002 
1st Half 41.5 16.6 48.1 20.1 
2nd Half 48.6 21.0 55.4 25.0 
2003 
1st Half 54.0 25.1 61.0 30.2 
2nd Half 55.1 25.0 62.1 29.8 
2004 
1st Half 53.1 23.5 60.2 28.1 
2nd Half 47.0 18.6 53.9 22.5 
2005 
1st Half 42.4 17.0 48.8 20.3 
2nd Half 37.9 15.3 43.7 17.8 
2006 
1st Half 33.9 10.6 39.7 12.9 
2nd Half 30.6 9.1 36.3 11.1 
2007 
1st Half 27.5 7.6 33.1 9.4 
2nd Half 28.5 7.9 33.6 9.6 
2008 
1st Half 27.7 7.5 33.1 9.2 
2nd Half 27.5 7.6 32.6 9.2 
2009 
1st Half 26.4 7.0 31.7 8.9 
2nd Half 23.8 5.9 29.0 7.4 
(Gobiemo Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 Id) 
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The 'Misiones' are social assistance programmes aimed at meeting basic human 
welfare needs in terms of nutrition, health, and education. The 'Misiones' are funded by 
the central government budget and by oil revenues derived from the state-oil company 
PDVSA. The operations are carried out by public employees, volunteers from the NGO 
sector, social movements, and the local people in the community. From 2004, the 
government created a new 'Mision' every time a new social need was identified. 
Presently, there are over 28 Misiones focusing on a myriad of areas such as education, the 
electoral, the environment, food and nutrition, healthcare, housing, identification, 
indigenous rights, land reform, rural development, science, socioeconomic 
transformation, civilian militia, and culture (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 lg). 
For the purpose of this research paper, I will solely focus on the two complementary 
'Misiones' that have a stronger correlation with the agrarian reform process:, Mision 
Alimentacion (Mercal), and Mision Che Guevara (Vuelvan Caras). 
Mision Mercal 
Under the Ministry of Food, Mission Mercal (Mercados de Alimentos) was established as 
a state-run food company, initially to combat the food shortages that plagued the country 
during the corporate lock-out in December 2002. Mission Mercal is a chain of 
government-subsidized grocery stores that sell "meats, fish, eggs, milk, cheese, bread, 
cereal, pasta, rice, flours, tomato sauce, fruit, coffee, margarine, oil, sugar, and salt, all 
priced roughly 39% below traditional supermarkets" (Isaacs et al., 2009). The Mercal's, 
along with PDVAL, are distribution links of the state-run intermediary chain which 
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provide low-income Venezuelan's with food staples at affordable rates. Large storage 
spaces, distribution centres, and transportation networks have also been set-up to combat 
food speculation, hoarding, and sabotage (Isaacs et. al., 2009). In 2010, there were 16,600 
Mercals nationwide, employing roughly 85,000 workers (Smith, 2010). In addition to 
Mercals, the Mision has set up 6,075 Casas de Alimentacion (CASA), or food banks, 
which currently provide free meals to roughly 900,000 people in need (Schiavoni and 
Camacaro, 2009). Since its inception in 2003, Chavez announced that Mision Mercal has 
seen its sales increase from 45 000 tons of food products to 9.4 million tons in 2010 
(Ellis, 2010). These impressive figures have ensured all Venezuelan's that their country is 
becoming much more food secure with an increasing amount of affordable food 
distribution networks. In total, Mercals account for roughly 20-30% of food sales in 
Venezuela with roughly two-thirds of the population visiting the stores regularly 
(Government of Canada, 2011). 
Mision Che Guevara 
People who apply to occupy idle land must complete the government-sponsored mission 
'Che Guevara', which educates people about how to form cooperatives. Without 
attending these free workshops, people are not eligible to receive micro-credits and 
benefits from the government. From 2004-2007 this programme was known as 'Mision 
Vuelvan Caras' but became plagued by many bureaucratic and regulatory inefficiencies. 
Thus, before examining Mision Che Guevara as a successful social policy, it is necessary 
to examine the failures of Mision Vuelvan Caras to analyze its inefficiencies and guide 
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the new social programme. As the agrarian reform programme is designed to redistribute 
"land for those who work on it", as well as encouraging an urban-rural migration to 
repopulate the countryside, it is imperative that the redistributive land reform is 
complemented with the appropriate extension services so as to prepare, train, and 
organize the populace to restructure the countryside with viable, sustainable cooperative 
farms. It is through this cooperative training, now Mision Che Guevara, that this 
'movement from below' should flourish as government expenditures on social 
programmes and support is extremely high. 
Developed mainly from the ideas of former guerrilla Carlos Lang, 'Mision 
Vuelvan Caras' was based on a partnership between the people and the government to 
transform the country's socio-economic structure through education and systems of social 
production (Daguerre, 2011:10). Participants were to apply to the government in groups 
of at least five, with a cooperative economic project. Participants were also given a 
monthly stipend, as an incentive to attract people who might not otherwise choose to 
work in a rural setting or a cooperative, more generally. Upon the year of inception, 
Vuelvan Caras recruited 355,000 people, of which 298,000 received socio-economic 
training, and 264,720 actually were authorized to create their cooperatives. In total, 6,814 
cooperatives were created from 2004-2005 (Daguerre, 2008; Observatorio Socialista de 
Venezuela, 2008). 
The programme, however, was largely seen as a governmental failure as it did not 
lead to the development of economically viable and sustainable cooperatives, nor did it 
encourage people to organize or work together as a 'class for itself as a means towards 
social transformation. Five key problems led to the failure of Vuelvan Caras and, in some 
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ways, continue to plague other 'Misiones' today, as well as the government's ability to 
achieve 'Socialism of the 21st Century'. These five key flaws - none of which are 
mutually exclusive or unrelated - are drawn from the author's own empirical field 
research, as well as other extensive studies in Venezuela (see Daguerre, 2011; D'Elia, 
Lacruz, and Maingon, 2006; D'Elia and Cabezas, 2008; Hintze, 2009; Pineiro, 2009; 
Wilpert, 2007). 
First of all, due to the government's incentives to attract participants into the 
Mision - easy access to credit, monthly stipends, and lack of an effective regulatory 
framework - beneficiaries were taking advantage of government handouts. In an 
interview with the Vice-Ministry for Training and Communal Development, Emma 
Hermoso, it was acknowledged that many people who had enrolled in the programme 
were not committed and motivated to actually start a cooperative and be productive. 
Rather, "most individuals enrolled in the programme only to receive the monthly 
allocation...motivated by greed, instead of being inspired by altruism and solidarity" 
(Daguerre, 2011:10). For such a worker-led social programme to come into fruition, a 
culture of cooperation and solidarity must exist, or be created, in order to successfully 
restructure society's inequalities. 
Secondly, the inadequate management by both the government and beneficiaries -
strongly influenced by a lack of regulatory mechanisms - also led to the demise of 
Vuelvan Caras. To ensure the viability of a cooperative, the proper execution of 
organizational and production systems must take place. We must not forget that these 
cooperatives are supported by the government during their infancy and must become 
viable, sustainable, and independent productive systems in the long term. As Daguerre 
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(2011) points out, for example, most cooperatives did not even use book accounts to 
properly manage labour time, cost of input-output ratio, productivity, etc. Furthermore, 
the government showed a lack of supportive commitment to the cooperatives, "especially 
in terms of administration, accountancy and human resources management" (D'Elia et al, 
2007:77 qtd in Daguerre, 2011:10). This is exemplary of one of the main failures of the 
Venezuelan agrarian reform in 1960. The lack of technical assistance and training failed 
to assist beneficiaries in the infant stages of farm production - which ultimately led to a 
large-scale failure, as described in Chapter three. 
The third problem that plagued Vuelvan Caras was the inconsistent monetary 
support from the government. According to Daguerre, the civil-servants in the state of 
Zulia, or facilitadores, protested in response to a pay decrease in July 2004 (Daguerre, 
2011:11). The monthly stipend allotted to beneficiaries was also reduced, leading 
approximately 15,000 students to quit the Mission in 2005 (Daguerre, 2011:11). 
Government inconsistencies in regards to its own legislation demoralizes the people 
involved who are - or, as a result are not - working to organize, mobilize, and change the 
structural inequalities in societal relations. 
Fourthly, the bureaucratic inefficiencies - largely caused by an unorganized 
interdepartmental coordination undoubtedly led to confusion amongst public servants. 
Vuelvan Caras was placed under the authority of four different governmental departments 
-- Department of Work, Department of Trade, Ministry of Defence and the 
National Institute for Educational Cooperation, INCE. Without having a single 
department fully in charge, it is apparent that inefficiencies by a lack of coordination will 
plague the programme. 
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This problem was exacerbated by the fifth program failure which was the high 
degree of turnover at the executive level. This disrupts continuity in governmental policy 
and requires renewed networks of organization and information sharing. Whether the high 
rate of turnover is due to corruption, inadequacies, position transfers, or an otherwise 
inexplicable executive decision from above, the persistent presence of personalistic 
politics is apparent in Venezuela. This is due in part by Chavez's top-down management 
style and uncontested decision-making authority that leaves little room for constructive 
criticism within the political realm. 
It was the combination of these problems that led to the restructuring of Vuelvan 
Caras into Mision Che Guervara. The new programme was created with a framework that 
address the former's flaws, first by creating an all-encompassing educational programme 
meant to not only train participants in their respective productive trades, but also to create 
a social consciousness based on ideas that reflect the 'Bolivarian Revolution' - namely 
liberty, equality, social justice, and sustainability. Another programme reform was the 
placement of Mision Che Guevara under a single department - the Ministry of Communal 
Economy (MINEC) - which is in charge of endogenous development projects (Daguerre, 
2011:11). Finally, there is no longer a monthly stipend for participants, eliminating the 
ability of participants to simply join to take advantage of government handouts; while 
also removing the immediate monetary incentive for committing one's time and effort 
into the cooperative movement of social production. A closer look at the Mision offers a 
better understanding of its all-encompassing, inclusive policy framework. 
Renamed and refined as 'Mision Che Guevara' - the programme was established 
as a labour market program designed to pursue "the ideological and comprehensive 
training in productive skills, to promote the transformation of the capitalist economic 
model towards the socialist model and ensure social welfare and job placement in projects 
under lel Plan de Desarrollo Economico y Social de la Nation"'' (Gobierno Bolivariano 
de Venezuela, 201 If). Essentially, this 'Mision' is a policy designed to boost the social 
economy by offering citizens the ability to alter the social relations of production with a 
cooperative movement that relies on an egalitarian worker-management framework. The 
programme is available to all Venezuelan citizens, over the age of fifteen, who wish to 
start or join a "socio-productive project" to "transform the capitalist economic model" (of 
worker exploitation) into a model of "socialist production" (Gobierno Bolivariano de 
Venezuela, 201 If). 
The training, education, and support services are classified into six categories for 
development training: 1) Industry; 2) Textiles; 3) Construction; 4) Tourism; 5) 
Agriculture; 6) Commerce and Services (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 If). As 
long as the project proposal will benefit the community and contribute to development 
and employment - in the context of the pursuit of a social economy and a model of social 
production - the government is to provide the necessary resources (education, training, 
credit, subsidies) to establish the cooperative. 
The training consists of three components - General education; Technical 
training; and ideological education. Firstly, the general education component teaches 
participants about the government's 'Strategic Plan for Economic and Social 
Development 2007-2013 ('Plan Estrategico de Desarollo Economico y Social 2007-
2013'), as well as familiarizing oneself with the Bolivarian Constitution. Education on 
management and administrative tasks for each individual project is also provided, to 
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"acquire knowledge about the design, establishment and management of production and 
distribution units" (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 If) Finally, education 
regarding the cooperatives social relations of production in terms of social production and 
distribution is provided, as all members of the cooperatives will have control over, and 
access to, land (in the case of farmer cooperatives) and its productive resources. 
The technical training component consists of in-class training sessions on the 
technical aspects of each project. Depending on the project, training in that particular 
trade is provided in the classroom and in a 'hands-on', practical setting. The proposed 
project must be socio-designed to meet the development needs of the community at hand. 
Lastly, the final training component is one of ethical, political and ideological 
education. These so-called 'Socialist Training Centres" (CFS) promote social inclusion, 
participation, and class-consciousness to encourage participants to act in the interests of 
society instead of as self-centred individuals. 
As described, the reformed Mision does address many of the problems of the 
previous Mision Vuelvan Caras. The stipend elimination will likely filter out those 
participants who are not serious and committed to starting a viable cooperative; the multi-
tiered education and training programmes provides the necessary means to overcome the 
previous managerial inadequacies, as well as the increased government commitment 
through social spending. The departmental restructuring of the programme appointed 
Mision Che Guevara under the authority of a single department - MINEC - which should 
address the bureaucratic inefficiencies and previous coordination failures. 
One problem that remains is the high degree of turnover in governmental 
positions. Field research conducted by Daguerre in September 2008, reveals that a high 
degree of turnover remains within the Mision, but that this "culture of permanent change 
(is) associated with the last phase of the 'Bolivarian Revolution"' (Daguerre, 2011:11,12). 
This draws from Chavez's following of Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' and peoples' 
willingness to change for the necessities of the revolution, as it changes itself with 
degrees of progress. This culture of change, however, has become detrimental to the 
institutionalization of government programmes (Daguerre, 2011:12). The lack of 
institutionalization will ultimately lead to the failure of all government policies. The 
government's policies are designed with a mission and a vision through organizational 
codes of conduct and regulatory mechanisms to turn a strategic plan into action. The daily 
activities of those involved in implementation need to reflect the fundamental values and 
objectives inherent in the policies to create the desired culture and structure pursued by 
the government. Once these fundamental values and objectives are accepted and practiced 
by society, successful institutionalization has been achieved. It is through this process of 
institutionalization that the government's policies actually turn into practice and make for 
great social change. 
In April 2010, Francy Rodriguez - the President of Mision Che Guevara - stated 
that the Mision was still experiencing problem due to "the lack of ideological and 
political formation" (Daguerre, 2011:12). Rodriguez went on to add that the objective to 
create people whose actions are in agreement with their discourse and values has been a 
major problem. The new focus is to increase the quality of socialist management and 
production, but the lack of institutionalization plagues progress. Part of the problem, 
acknowledged by Rodriguez, is the lack of continuity in executive posts, a problem that 
even the Castro regime in Cuba has been critical of (Daguerre, 2011:12). This issue goes 
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back to the high degree of turnover of political appointees that I argue is due to Chavez's 
top-down management style of personalistic politics and a lack of constructive criticism 
tolerance. 
Although the Mision is still plagued with some inadequacies and inconsistencies, 
the success and commitment to changing the structure of the rural economy through the 
democratization of relations of ownership, labour, and production cannot be ignored. The 
policies and institutions have been created; it is the lack of functionality and consistency 
that creates a barrier to institutionalization. Building a new social economy through state-
led redistributive polices, increased social spending, and worker-led cooperatives is a 
model of endogenous development that undoubtedly requires an ideological shift. This 
period of transformation requires the acceptability by the public and belief in its 
institutions. Indeed, this process takes time, but as the government hiccups and attempts a 
trial and error strategy, the people will become more critical and allegations of Chavez's 
vote-buying with petro-dollars may become a reality if inconsistencies and a lack of 
regulation continue to plague social programmes. 
What is needed is more constructive criticism and democratic discussion within 
the government itself. Ministers and civil servants should be appointed based on expertise 
and experience, not on their unquestionable loyalty to Hugo Chavez. There is no question 
that Chavez's blunt, charismatic, and leadership personality has ignited hope within the 
country amongst the lower classes, united Venezuela's left, and created the 'Bolivarian' 
movement. And it is his leadership that the people believe in - his image, character, and 
personality. However, as Chavez's personalism becomes more intertwined with the 
revolutionary process, his unquestioned authority deepens in the political realm. This 
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personal reliance presents vulnerabilities for the long term sustainability of the Bolivarian 
project. If Chavez were to be assassinated or become ill, the entire movement could 
crumble. Additionally, the polarization created by Chavez himself exacerbates the degree 
of class conflicts and class polarization that already exists in Venezuela. Divisive 
statements such as, "Those who are with me are with me, those who are not with me are 
against me...I will not accept gray areas: that one would have one foot here and another 
there, it is time that we leave that behind" (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 2004) 
create a bipolarized country ridden with internal conflict. Instead, Chavez should be more 
inclusive in the context of Venezuelan politics. Taking into account the perspectives of 
the opposition to create a more legitimate political environment will evolve into a higher 
degree of consent amongst the opposition. Engaging in dialogue and being more 
'bipartisan' - specifically by clearly defining laws and not leaving room for interpretation 
- makes for a much more legitimate, accepted, and healthy political environment. This is 
not to say that Chavez should make concessions that alter the 'Bolivarian project', but to 
solely take into account and critically engage with the perspectives of the opposition. 
What is needed is a more pragmatic approach with democratic decision-making, 
constructive criticisms, accountability, and consistency with policy procedures, oversight, 
and implementation. As expressed throughout this work, it is not the policies, institutions, 
or vision - but rather the institutionalization of such through consistent implementation 
and oversight procedures. The lack of continuity impedes this process of 
institutionalization and is a cause for concern for the success of the 'Bolivarian project'. 
Although these 'Misiones' have benefitted many of Venezuela's lower classes, the 
capacity to implement the vast amount of programmes has been questioned as many 
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inconsistencies continue to persist. The opposition, for example, argues that since the 
executive posts in the 'Misiones' - referred to as 'cargos de confianzay libre remocion' — 
are nominated on the basis of their political affiliation and can be revoked at any time, 
creates a culture of unconditional loyalty to Chavez and is not conducive to criticism 
(Daguerre, 2011). Moreover, the creation of so many 'Misiones' as the answer to any 
social problem that arises leads the opposition to criticize the government as having a lack 
of long-term planning; a pattern of institutional improvisation; and a clientelist 
redistribution of oil revenues to Chavez's key constituency - poor people (Daguerre, 
2011:8). Questions remain as to whether or not these 'Misiones' are resulting in the 
development of a sustainable, viable, productive system or whether they are simply 
resulting in a dependence on state oil revenues and unsustainable government hand-outs 
(McCoy, 2005:109-123; Oppenheimer, 2006). 
'Mision Che Guevara', for example, has produced some very mixed results with 
its ability to properly manage the cooperatives. To date, many cooperatives are still very 
dependent on the state finances and direction. The government's generous amounts of 
credit with lenient terms and exemption from all taxes have resulted in many beneficiaries 
abusing the system. As Steve Ellner points out, "The failure of mass numbers of state-
financed cooperatives - due to improvisation or, worse yet, misuse of government funds -
has translated itself in the loss of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars" (Ellner, 
2008:130). While some of these cases are surely due to a lack of organization and 
commitment, other instances are the result of beneficiaries simply pocketing the loans 
with no intentions of repayment (Canache, 2002:150; Ratcliff, 1999:104.105). 
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As a response to the misuse of government funds, the Ministry of Popular Power 
for the Community Economy (MPPEC) has tightened its regulatory requirements on 
cooperatives. Every three months, cooperatives are required to obtain a Certificate of 
Fulfillment of Responsibilities, issued by the MPPEC office in Caracas. The paperwork 
required must be approved by a certified accountant and needs to demonstrate "solvency 
with regard to financial obligations to such government agencies as the social security 
system, the housing authority, and the job training institute known as the National 
Institute of Educational Cooperation (INCE)" ) (Canache, 2002:150). Although this 
procedure is quite thorough, it may be necessary to ensure proper accountability and 
proper use of state funding. 
The lack accountability and ability of the government to penalize those who 
misuse funds is also a problem. For example, the Minister of the MPPEC, Pedro Morejon, 
announced in 2006 that he had taken 300 cases of cooperatives to court for not complying 
with the regulatory requirements or misusing their public funds (Canache, 2002:150). At 
the time of writing, there is still no evidence that any have been held responsible, or 
sentenced in any way for their illegal activities. This puts into question Chavez's ability 
to penalize the poor - his own constituents and political base - for their wrongdoings and 
illegal activities. If Chavez himself will not uphold the rule of law against his 
constituents, then such a culture of clientelism will continue to increase political and class 
polarization within Venezuelan society, and could result in increased class wars, 
bureaucratic inefficiencies, and a lack of social progress. 
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The Movement "From Below": Class Struggle in Venezuela 
"The socialist revolution is the first in which is in the interests of the great majority and 
can be brought to victory only by the great majority of the working people 
themselves..."Socialism will not and cannot be created by decrees; nor can it be created 
by any government, however socialistic. Socialism must be created by the masses, by 
every proletarian. Where the chains of capitalism are forged, there they must be broken. 
Only that is socialism, and only thus can socialism be created." (McNally, 2006:348) 
Class conflict and polarization, especially in the countryside, is extremely severe in 
Venezuela. The government's agrarian reform programme has undoubtedly facilitated a 
restructuring of the relations of production, and in turn, has transformed class relations to 
a certain extent. The Chavez Administration is implementing policies which create a 
favourable environment for economic and political class struggles "from below". With a 
highly centralized, top-down government advocating for peasant/worker-led movements, 
the government has waged an 'offensive' class struggle in the name of the exploited, 
landless rural class and against the wealthy - latifundista - elite. Meanwhile, the 
latifundistas have reacted with a 'defensive' class struggle, through violence in the 
countryside, a coup attempt, and economic sabotage (Petras, 2011). Caught in the middle 
of this struggle are the landless peasants - who, in reality, are the subjects of the struggle. 
Here, the landless peasants are confronted with defending their lives and livelihoods from 
a violent and reactionary landholding elite class; while also trying to take advantage of 
the government's agrarian reform programme and its complementary social programmes. 
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In the Venezuelan countryside, it is precisely these peoples, who have been exploited for 
so long, that need to create this socialist transformation "from below". Without their 
ability to organize as a "class for itself', exercise and defend their rights, and mobilize for 
common objectives, a socialist transformation cannot be realized. In order for this to 
happen, however, the government needs to make sure people can exercise their 
constitutional rights without worrying about reactionary violent 'defensive' class struggle 
by the latifundista regime. The government also needs to make sure the agrarian reform 
policies that are meant to restructure relations of production are consistent and effectively 
delivered as promised. This section will examine issues of class in Venezuela and the 
ways in which the government is contributing to the class struggle. It will also present 
views and experiences from Venezuelan's living in rural areas, based on research from 
the field conducted in March 2011. 
The Venezuelan countryside is made up of many different social classes - from 
landless peasants, small-medium sized landholders, latifundista elite, to small-scale 
entrepreneurs, public servants, and non-farmer rural wage labourers. The livelihood 
diversity means that different individuals have different interests based on their wants and 
needs. While the agrarian reform programme will mostly serve to benefit landless 
peasants, its effects will be much more widespread in terms of the rural social structure. 
When seventy-five percent of the country's private agricultural land is owned by only 
five percent of the rural population, great discrepancies in relations of production and 
income inequalities undoubtedly affect societal relations (Wilpert, 2007:110). While the 
structure of landholders becomes more egalitarian, new opportunities arise for non-farmer 
rural wage labourers and small-scale entrepreneurs. A greater percentage of the rural 
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populace will have greater incomes and gain access to and control of productive 
resources, enabling them to contribute more to the local rural economy and society. 
Demand for consumer goods and agricultural inputs will thus increase as wage labourers 
and landless peasants become small-medium sized landholders or part of a cooperative or 
collective. 
As the formerly exploited classes gain rights and powers over productive 
resources, class relations are altered. The owners of labour power become the owners of 
the means of production, creating not just a physical restructuring of landholdings, but 
also a restructuring of peoples' relationships with the means of production and in turn the 
relationships between eachother. In Venezuela, the agrarian reform programme 
redistributes land to landless peasants seeking to work on small-medium sized 
landholdings or cooperatives. In these cases, the beneficiaries must maintain 'productive 
efficiency' of at least 80% of the farms capacity for three years, after which they will 
eligible to receive the permanent land title (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 le). 
Title to the land is only transferable by inheritance and cannot be sold on the market. This 
law impedes the ability of people to sell their land on the market, ensuring that the land 
reform will not be eroded by wealthy landowners or corporations who seek to purchase 
land from the more vulnerable smallholder farmers and cooperatives. Allowing market 
relations to dictate the landholding structure results in those who are: a) more wealthy and 
powerful to begin with; or b) those most effective at reducing the per unit cost of 
production - to dominate the landholdings. Those peasants who cannot as easily adapt 
from a sustainable, family-oriented, or Chayanovian style, system of production to a 
market-oriented system and competitive framework - due to a lack of resources or 
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expertise - will inevitably be pushed off their land. This type of land reform would not 
result in a more egalitarian rural environment, nor would it create social justice for 
landless peasants or rural wage labourers seeking to become viable farmers.15 This law 
ensures that class relations are not controlled by market relations, as is the case in a free-
market capitalist society. 
As a greater percentage of the rural population gains access to, and control over, 
land and its productive resources, class relations change in rural society. Formerly 
landless peasants and wage labourers become landowners, which distributes income 
much more equally, driving up the incomes of the 75% of the rural population who 
previously controlled only 6% of rural land (Wilpert, 2007:110). This will have a positive 
impact on the beneficiaries' families, small rural entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, etc., altering 
class relations on a grandeur scale. The overall transformation of these class relations 
make up the class structure of society which is exactly what the Venezuelan government 
seeks to restructure. To restructure the relations of production - or, rather the rights and 
powers people have over productive resources - results in a restructuring of peoples' 
standards of living. Changing a class structure is not so easy, however. It requires a 'class 
offensive' from above (government policies), reinforced by a 'class offensive' from 
below. A class struggle 'from below', brought about by landless peasants and rural wage 
labourers to act as a class with common objectives - or a 'class for itself - is a necessary 
precondition to change the class structure and therefore the relations of production. 
15 For a much more thorough analysis of Market-Led Agrarian Reform see Borras, Saturnino M. (2008) 
"Competing Views and Strategies on Agrarian Reform: Volume 1 International Perspective: Manila 
University Press 
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When agrarian reform is not accompanied by a movement 'from below' it may 
result in rent-seeking behaviour on the part of the beneficiaries. The government's vast 
array of social programs and public spending has been criticized for not having the 
capacity to regulate such programs effectively. The results have been, according to many 
Venezuelans and critics from the right, the misuse of credit, loans, or land by 
beneficiaries. Many see this as 'government handouts' that are issued quite liberally 
without much oversight or accountability. In these cases, class relations are not changed 
since people will only increase what they have and not what they own/produce. A social 
transformation must be driven by society with support policies from the state. This 
highlights the importance of the state-society synergy in pursuing a structural 
transformation in the countryside through agrarian reform. 
Rural Social Movements 
The largest and most active peasant movement that exists in Venezuela today is the 
Ezequiel Zamora National Campesino Front (FNCEZ), or El Frente. El Frente was 
founded on May 27th, 2004 with the union of the Simon Bolivar Revolutionary 
Campesino Front (FCRSB), founded in 2000, and the Ezequiel Zamora Revolutionary 
Campesino Front (FCREZ), founded in 2001. The movement now consists of 
approximately 15,000 campesino families across the country (Martinez, Fox, and Farrell, 
2010:47). El Frente is a social and political organization of peasant movements that 
brings together all peoples who wish to engage in the struggle for an agrarian revolution. 
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Its main purpose is to "advance the struggle for agrarian revolution, popular power and 
socialism to achieve freedom, social justice, and food sovereignty" (FNCEZ, 2011). 
When Chavez passed the Land Law in 2001, the FCRSB and the FCREZ 
organized over 3000 peasants and claimed 60 rural settlements deemed 'idle' or 
'unproductive' (FNCEZ, 2011). Prior to the Reformed Land Law of 2005, the 
government authorized expropriations of fallow land under certain conditions. High-
quality private land over 100 hectares (roughly 250 acres) or low-quality land over 5,000 
hectares (12,355 acres) could be expropriated. Any public land that was idle could also be 
redistributed amongst landless peasants. However, due to the lack of clarity in the law and 
Chavez's blunt and sometimes misleading speeches, landless peasants starting occupying 
lands in the name of 'public benefit' or 'social interest' as stated in Article 115 in the 
1999 Constitution. Article 307 goes on to say that "The predominance of large land 
estates is contrary to the interests of society" (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
2011a). The interpretation was similar to the basis for occupations by the Brazilian 
Landless Worker's Movement (MST) as they state that, "Land occupations are rooted in 
the Brazilian Constitution, which says that land that remains unproductive should be used 
for a 'larger social function"'(MST, 2010). In 2005, however, the government did in fact 
legalize pre-emptive occupations by giving peasants who takeover fallow land 'cartas 
agrarias' which allow landless peasants to occupy the land until legal disputes over 
ownership are settled (Albertus, 2010). This has given the FNCEZ the rights to increase 
their participation in igniting a land reform process from below. These 'cartas agrarias' 
have been the cause for increased violence in the countryside, however, with 
assassinations of an estimated 225 landless peasant leaders since 2001 (Suggett, 2010). 
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For obvious reasons, the land reform process started off relatively slow, but by 
2003 over 1.5 million hectares of land was redistributed to roughly 130,000 families 
(Suggett, 2010:47). By 2004, El Frente was established and the amalgamation of peasant 
movements created a united solidarity front that initiated a much more powerful 
movement 'from below'. By the end of 2004, 2.2 million hectares of land had been 
redistributed and Chavez reformed the Land Law to speed up the process by focusing 
more on 'underutilized' or 'unproductive' private land (Gindin, 2005).16 In the midst of 
all this, Chavez created the Coordinadora Agraria Nacional Ezequiel Zamora (CANEZ) to 
unite all of the peasant organizations. Although the attempt at consolidation was with 
good intentions, FNCEZ opted to maintain its autonomy and not be directly affiliated 
with the Venezuelan government. This decision to remain autonomous is an important 
factor for the success of the movement 'from below' in the land reform process. As 
Borras concludes in a study on the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP) 
in the Philippines in 2001: 
"The symbiotic interaction between autonomous societal groups from below and 
strategically placed state reformists from above provides the most promising 
strategy to offset strong landlord resistance to land reform, facilitating state 
expropriation and redistribution of highly contentious private estates to previously 
landless and near land-less peasant" (Borras, 2001:571) 
16 The terms 'underutilized' and 'unproductive' are in accordance with any land that is not producing at 
80% of its capacity, according to government standards. 
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These state-society relations are extremely important for successful agrarian reform 
processes to make sustainable, lasting changes to the unequal structural relations in the 
countryside. When social movements become co-opted by the government, they lose their 
autonomy to push for more change and criticize the government for its maldoings. 
Autonomy is important, even if both powers from above and below hope to achieve 
similar goals. It makes for a system of checks and balances and allows peasants 
themselves to lead the way and make demands to their government. 
As the agrarian reform process became more radicalized, peasant movement also 
became more active. At the World Social Forum in Caracas in 2006, the FNCEZ {El 
Frente) collaborated with Brazil's MST and formed the Instituto Agroecologico 
Latinoamericano 'Paulo Freire' (IALA) which is an institute that educate Latin 
Americans on sustainable agriculture techniques. Furthermore, in 2007, the FNCEZ 
formed El Frente Nacional Comunal Simon Bolivar (FNCSB) which is an urban social 
movement to create awareness, solidarity, and communal participation in urban centres. 
The FNCEZ and CANEZ are also members of the largest international peasant movement 
in the world - La Via Campesina. This international peasant movement provides a 
framework to address peasant rights issues, creates a foundation of solidarity and support, 
shares research on a variety of agrarian issues, and enables peasant movements from 
around the world to share ideas, information, and network. 
There is no doubt that the FNCEZ has made huge advancements in its 
organization - establishing connections with other autonomous peasant movements, 
creating educational programmes for peasants in the region, occupying fallow lands, and 
maintaining pressure on the government to expedite the agrarian reform process. The 
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FNCEZ has peasant organizations in 16 of 23 states, including Apure, Tachira, Merida, 
Barinas, Portuguesa, Lara, Cojedes, Zulia, Guarico, Miranda, Vargas, Sucre, Anzoategui, 
Falcon, Trujillo, and Bolivar (FNCEZ, 2011). However, it needs to continue to evolve 
and grow with the agrarian reform process. In the last regional elections in 2008, the 
opposition won in the states of Carabobo, Miranda, Nueva Esparta, Tachira, and Zulia. 
Aside from Nueva Esparta, which is an island state, the opposition states are mainly in the 
north-west of the country. Likewise, the FNCEZ headquarters is located in north-west 
state of Barinas - meaning that the strongest autonomous peasant movement is in the 
same geographic location as those in opposition to the land reform. In terms of location, 
this is ideal for a reinforced movement 'from below'. In terms of the peasant movement's 
capacity, as empowerment increases through supportive social policy (increased 
education and health access) and participation increases in local development initiatives 
through Communal Councils, peasant movements will strengthen. The peasant movement 
'from below' has a positive interactive relationship with the state's policies 'from above' 
which creates an optimal environment for an agrarian transformation. 
In terms of numbers, the MST in Brazil has roughly 1.5 million members, whereas 
the FNCEZ consists of roughly 15,000 families - or roughly 60,000-70,000 people. As a 
percentage of each country's population, the MST makes up roughly 0.79% of Brazil's 
population; while the FNCEZ makes up roughly 0.31% of Venezuela's total population 
(CIA World Factbook, 2011). It is important to keep in mind that the MST was 
established in 1985 and has continuously grown throughout the years. However, it is 
important that the FNCEZ continue to expand its membership and educate people to 
exercise their rights and gain sovereignty over their agricultural lands. In contrast to the 
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MST, the FNCEZ has favourable governmental policies and support from above that can 
make for huge leaps forward and accelerate the process of transforming the countryside 
into a more equitable, food secure system of social production where the people who 
work the land, maintain the fruits of their labour. 
The lack of more vibrant peasant organizations may, however, be due to historical 
circumstances. The oil boom in the early 1900s under the Gomez dictatorship led to a 
mass rural-urban migration that deflated the rural economy. The concentration of the oil 
industry created massive flows of urbanization and, despite the attempted Agrarian 
Reform Law of 1960 under Betancourt, agricultural production was plagued by a lack of 
proper support and the Dutch Disease. Despite Chavez's efforts thus far, 93% of the 
population still lives in urban areas (CIA World Factbook, 2011). These circumstances 
have undoubtedly eroded peasant movements over the generations and perhaps a loss of 
identity with the countryside is also contributing factor. Moreover, with Chavez in power 
peasants have regained a sense of hope. They now have the support services and a 
government willing to expropriate and redistribute land on a much more equitable basis. 
With Chavez supporting armed civilian-militias in the countryside, state-supported and 
autonomous peasant organizations, as well as Communal Councils that allow 
communities to directly voice their needs and participate in local politics - the potential 
for Venezuela to transform the countryside through strong state-society interactions is 
enormous. Both entities must continue and properly organize themselves to push for a 
socialist transformation. 
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The Venezuelan Economy and Social Indicators 
Venezuela's economy has undergone impressive growth since Chavez came to power. 
Since the government took control over the national oil company - PDVSA - in 2003, 
Venezuela's GDP increased 94.7% in five years, which is an impressive 13.5% average 
annual growth rate (Weisbrot, Ray, and Sandoval, 2009; Banco Central de Venezuela, 
2011). In 2009 and 2010, the economy shrank by 3.2% and 1.5% respectively, but has 
since bounced back with a 4.5% GDP growth in the first quarter of 2011 (Banco Central 
de Venezuela, 2011). And, although the government is heavily involved in the economy, 
most of the economic growth over the decade has been in the non-oil sector of the 
economy; while the private sector has grown faster than the public sector (Weisbrot, Ray, 
and Sandoval, 2009). As a report by the Center for Economic and Policy Research notes: 
"The fastest growing sectors of the economy have been finance and insurance, 
which has grown 258.4 percent during the current expansion, an average of 26.1 
percent annually; construction, which has grown 159.4 percent, or 18.9 percent 
annually; trade and repair services (152.8 percent, or 18.4 percent annually); 
transport and storage (104.9 percent, or 13.9 percent annually); and 
communications (151.4 percent, or 18.3 percent annually). Manufacturing grew 
98.1 percent during the expansion, or 13.2 percent per year" (Weisbrot, Ray, and 
Sandoval, 2009:7) 
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This shows the government's efforts at diversifying the economy to lessen their 
dependence on the oil industry and overcome the 'Dutch Disease'. These non-oil 
activities mentioned above, if continued development and growth persist, will benefit the 
rural sector (and agriculture) with increased capacity and expertise in such things as 
construction, trade and repair services, transport and storage, communications, 
manufacturing, etc. These sectors can facilitate the development of the countryside 
through increased infrastructure development. 
In terms of poverty reduction, the percentage of population categorized as 'poor' 
decreased over 50%, from 60.9% in 1997 to 29% in 2009. The percentage of population 
categorized as 'extremely poor', meanwhile, went from 29.5% in 1997 to 7.4% in 2009 
(Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 Id). Considering that the UN Millennium 
Development Goals calls for countries to reduce extreme poverty by half from 1990-
2015, these statistics are impressive. During the same period, the country's Gini 
Coefficient went from 0.4874 in 1997, to 0.4068 in 2009 (Gobierno Bolivariano de 
Venezuela, 201 Id). According to a recent study done by the Economic Commission of 
Latin America, Venezuela has the lowest Gini Coefficient in the region, making it the 
most equal - in terms of income distribution - country in Latin America (ECLAC, 
2010:16). 
As a country that emphasizes the need for food security and food sovereignty - as 
documented in its Constitution - the government has supported several policies and 
programmes to ensure everyone has access to sufficient amounts of food, despite being a 
net-importer of food. From 1998 to 2007, average caloric intake has risen from 91.1% of 
recommended levels in 1998, to 101.6% in 2007 (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 
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201 lb). Moreover, from 1997 to 2006, deaths related to malnutrition have fallen from 4.7 
to 2.3 deaths per 100,000 people. These positive impacts in terms of food security have 
been made possible largely due to the Mercal's and PDVAL as state food distributers. 
These state-run food distribution networks have also been complemented by the 
Programa Alimenticio Escolar (PAE) which provides three free meals per day to over 
four million students throughout the country (Weisbrot, Ray, and Sandoval, 2009:11). 
The PEA not only ensures that young children have access to food, but also takes the 
burden off low-income families to provide three meals a day to their children and 
encourages parents to send their children to school. 
In terms of the agricultural sector, although the government has taken appropriate 
measures to render the country more food secure, by no means has it achieved self-
sufficiency in agricultural production. According to the FAO, from 2005-2007 Venezuela 
had a net food trade deficit of $2.24 billion US dollars (FAO, 2010). Furthermore, as a 
percentage of GDP, net food trade from 1995-1997 was -1.2; from 2000-2002 it was -1.0; 
and from 2005-2007 it was -1.2. However, due to the increased GDP growth, from 2001-
2006 Venezuela experienced a positive 3.3% change in their net food trade relative to 
GDP growth (FAO, 2010). Agriculture accounts for just 4% of total GDP. 
Other indicators suggest that the country is still experiencing a rural-urban 
migration. In 1998, Venezuela's rural population as a percentage of the total, was 11.5%. 
In 2009, it was only 6.3%. Likewise, employment in agriculture as a percentage of total 
employment was 10% in 1998. In 2007, it was 8.7% (World Bank, 2011). Although these 
numbers have decreased, Venezuela has actually increased its food production. According 
to the World Bank, Venezuela's Food Production Index (FPI, 2000=100) was 89 in 1998 
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and increased to 122 in 2009 (World Bank, 2011). This is equivalent to a 37% increase in 
agricultural production over the decade. The increased levels of production are largely 
from public investments, as the government increased its agricultural financing by 
5,783% from 1998-2007 (Schiavoni and Camacaro, 2009). In addition, agricultural credit 
to support the agrarian reform programme, has increased from approximately $164 
million in 1999 to $7.6 billion in 2008 (Schiavoni and Camacaro, 2009). With this large 
increase in public investment and productivity, Venezuela has managed to become self 
sufficient in a number of important staple foods. From 1998 to 2008, Venezuela has 
reached levels of self sufficiency in corn, pork, and rice with production increased of 
132%, 77%, and 71%, respectively (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 2009b). 
Domestic production for other important staples such as beef, chicken, and eggs meets 
70%, 85%, and 80% respectively. Domestic milk production has increased 900% since 
1998, but still only fulfills 55% of domestic demand (Gobierno Bolivariano de 
Venezuela, 2009b). These figures show that the government has taken great strides in 
increasing production, but overall they are still far from being food self sufficient. 
In terms of health indicators, Venezuela's access to medical care has been greatly 
expanded as well. "From 1999 to 2007, the number of primary care physicians in the 
public sector increased more than twelve times, from 1,628 to 19,571, providing health 
care to millions of poor Venezuelans who previously did not have access to health care" 
(Weisbrot, Mark, Rebecca Ray, and Luis Sandoval, 2009:12). This has contributed to the 
decrease in infant mortality (under age one) from 19.0 per 1,000 births in 1999 to 14.0 per 
1,000 births in 2008 (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 lb). 
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Meanwhile, education rates have also increased. Basic education net enrolment 
rates increased from 85% in 1997, to 93.6% in 2007. While secondary education 
enrolment has increased from 21.2% to 35.9% during the same time period. This is likely 
due to the substantial increase (10X) in public education investment by the government 
from 4,313,487 Bf in 2001 to 41,203,600 Bf in 2010 (Gobierno Bolivariano de 
Venezuela, 2011b). Since 1998, adult literacy has also increased from 92% to 95% in 
2007 (Gapminder World, 2011). 
It is evident that Venezuela has experienced very positive outcomes, in terms of 
economic growth and human development. The UNDP's Human Development Index 
shows an increase from 0.637 in 2000, to 0.696 in 2010. Compared to the region, 
however, Venezuela is still slightly below average as the HDI for Latin America and the 
Caribbean has gone from 0.662 in 2000, to 0.706 in 2010 (UNDP, 2011). HDI provides a 
composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education, 
1 7 and income. 
Conclusion 
All of these indicators are helpful in determining the state of Venezuela's economic and 
social development. It is evident that Venezuela is going through an era of progressive 
change. In terms of the agrarian reform - we can not equate all of these successes to such 
a process. However, as reiterated throughout this work, agrarian reform is not just about 
redistributing the land, providing subsidies, credit, access to markets, and technical 
17 See Figure 5: HDI: Health, Education, Income 
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assistance. These reforms must happen within a growth-oriented development strategy 
based on the economic and societal context. The myriad of social 'Misiones', the attempt 
to diversify the economy, as well as the Communal Councils have empowered the 
formerly excluded people in the country. With improvements in health, education, and 
social security, the country is able to support the previously marginalized populace. With 
a diversified economy, employment opportunities are expanded. Through participatory 
democracy in the Communal Councils, communities are able to make demands and voice 
their needs to manage their local communities. Communal Councils also empower entire 
communities through the accumulation of social capital. The structure of Communal 
Councils increases their social capital or, "the capacity of the poor to network and 
organize collectively", strengthening the movement 'from below' (Petras and Veltmeyer, 
2006:84; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000). These social and economic developments 
empower the poor through social inclusionary policies and are conducive to a more 
politically active populace. 
What these economic and social indicators also tell us is that the Venezuelan 
populace is undergoing a transition of increased social mobility. As people receive 
benefits from their government, expectations increase, as do opportunities. In turn, people 
have a greater relationship with the government - specifically in the Venezuelan case, due 
to the social 'Misiones' and Communal Councils. As people become accustomed to 
receiving such benefits they become more actively involved in seeking other 
opportunities for social and economic advancement. These actions often come in the form 
of political engagement, or increased political participation. In Venezuela, Chavez has 
managed to create more political awareness and participation through these two 
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aforementioned initiatives. As a result, the marginalized have become active voters - not 
only benefitting Chavez, but also increasing social capital and creating an environment 
conducive to strong social movements. This process of increased capacity of the poor to 
network and organize collective is a very important contributing factor to the success of 
any redistributive state-led agrarian reform programme. 
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Chapter 5 
Agrarian Reform in Venezuela: Limitations and Weaknesses 
In March 2011, I conducted twenty semi-structured, open ended interviews in ten 
different towns/villages in the state of Lara. During the formal interviews, an 'interview 
guide' was used with a list of 39 questions - all of which were not necessarily addressed, 
but topics and themes were consistent, although subject to vary depending on the 
participant. The interviews were often preceded by observation and informal 
conversations so as to develop a better understanding of the context and build somewhat 
of a relationship with the participants. The use of semi-structured interviews was useful as 
it allowed participants the freedom to express their views in their own terms and address 
particular issues of personal and societal importance. Of the random sample of 
participants, 18/20 were involved in agriculture as a major source of income; 13/20 
supported Chavez and had overall positive views/experiences with the land reform 
programme. Participants ranged from 24 years to 59 years; while only 2/20 were female. 
The table titled, "Interviewee Data" offers the key findings of my interviews. 
During my investigation in rural Venezuela, common themes arose concerning the 
ways in which the reform programme is being executed and effectively changing the 
unequal structure in rural areas. Although many of the participants interviewed did share 
positive experiences with the agrarian reform programme with increases in incomes, 
quality of life, and acquiring ownership over the means of production; it is the key 
weaknesses that must be addressed to render the programme more effective, efficient, and 
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consistent. These three key weaknesses in the land reform programme hinder its ability to 
effectively change the structural inequalities in rural Venezuela and make for real social 
change. The three key weaknesses identified by the majority of interviewees are as 
follows and will be further examined below: 1) Corruption and political sabotage; 2) 
Intermediaries; 3) Lack of regulation. 
Corruption and Political Sabotage 
Although Chavez had promised to put an end to corruption, it is still very much apparent. 
This was a common criticism amongst both those who support Chavez (Chavista's) and 
the opposition. The difference between these two camps is that Chavista's believe that the 
corruption is due to civil servants and bureaucrats who do not support Chavez. They 
believe that Chavez is doing all he can to end corruption, but due to the culture of 
corruption that was inherited, corruption has almost been institutionalized. They maintain, 
however, that with more time the 'revolution' will prevail. The opposition, on the other 
hand, believes that Chavez turns a blind eye to much of this corruption and takes part in 
the process. They believe that the PSUV18 is at the forefront of this corruption and is 
extremely favourable to those who support Chavez. The lack of 'constructive criticism' in 
the governmental process is also a cause of concern as people within government are 
scared to criticize or question Chavez as they may lose their job. 
Of the twenty participants interviewed in March 2011, seven believed that 
corruption was still a big problem with the current government and hinders the agrarian 
18 President Hugo Chavez's political party - The United Socialist Party of Venezuela 
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reform process. Of these seven participants, two were supporters of the PSUV, while the 
remainder were opposition. Although the majority of these claims were mere opinions, 
one was from a former Venezuelan military General who served from 1974-2004. 
General Colmenares is not a supporter of Chavez, but also asserted that the Venezuelan 
government has been plagued with corruption - Chavez even more so, from his 
experiences - and much more transparency is needed to ensure the people that their 
government is not embezzling public funds. 
Much more controversial are governmental acts of expropriation without 
compensation. The government's Law of Expropriations (2002), the Reformed Land Law 
(2005), and the Urban Land Law (2009), and Decree 1040 of the Mayor of Libertador 
(2009) are the legal frameworks in which expropriations with compensation take place. 
Reasons for expropriation include monopolistic behaviour, strategic importance, food 
security, abusive charges for services or products, excessive profit margins, economic 
sovereignty, and public benefit (US Department of State, 2011). Although these are broad 
reasons, they more or less allow the government to expropriate any business or land if it 
is not in accordance with their strategic interests. What is important is the compensation 
factor, so as to provide some insurance to foreign direct investment or domestic 
entrepreneurs and property owners. According to the US State Department, "There are 
now 17 cases involving U.S. and other investors before the World Bank International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)" (US Department of State, 
2011). Of the twenty people interviewed, three mentioned the government's neglect to 
compensate for expropriations. All participants agreed with the Land Law and the 
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expropriation with compensation, as long as the government follows through on its 
commitment and abides by its own constitution and laws. 
Even Alvaro Rodriguez, a Venezuelan farmer who had his land expropriated in 
2003, agrees with the Land Law and the entire agrarian reform process. Sr. Rodriguez, 
however, claims that he was the first farmer to have his land expropriated by the 
government in 2003. Rodriguez had 247 acres of dairy farmland and claims that he was 
producing at full capacity. He said that forty soldiers appeared on his property one day, 
demanding he leave while they tore down his fences and pointed their guns. Then, he 
said, 150 people squatted on his property and, after resisting for 3 months, he finally left 
his ranch and moved to Barquisimeto. Rodriguez, who comes from a wealthy family and 
studied at Austin State University, had just purchased another piece of farmland in the 
state of Zulia, close to the Colombian border, a few days prior to my interview in March 
2011. He said he has a passion for farming and will not give up his dream even though 
the he does not trust his government. Nonetheless, when asked about the agrarian reform 
policies, he was in favour of the laws and institutions in place. The problem, for him, is 
the inconsistent acts of implementation and the government breaking its own laws. This is 
a valid concern and one in which the government must address - as it, above all else, 
should abide by its own rules and regulations. It is instances like these that will lead to the 
demise of the agrarian reforms success and, ultimately, the 'Bolivarian Revolution' itself. 
The point of controversy, however, exists within the legal land titles. Land titles in 
Venezuela have an inherently weak legal framework. As previously mentioned, land titles 
are vague, outdated, and conflicting. In many cases, large landowners claim to own land 
that the Venezuelan government also claims to own. Due to the inconsistent legal 
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framework of land titles, expropriating land is highly contested and thus creates 
retaliatory behaviour by private landowners. Due to this contestation, it is reported that 
225 landless peasant leaders have been assassinated during the process of occupying and 
gaining land titles to latifundios (Suggett, 2010). 
Sr. Rodriguez voiced another concern about the government's use of revenues. He 
claims that the government uses false predictions concerning oil revenues when making 
the government budget. He said that, "they (the government) would predict that a barrel 
of oil would sell for $40. Meanwhile, in reality they would sell for $100. This $60 
difference would go unaccounted for" (Interview with Alvaro Rodriguez, 2011). Upon 
further investigation Sr. Rodriguez had a point. The 2007 budget assumed oil prices at 
$29 per barrel, while average selling price that year was $60.20 (Embassy of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States, 2008). The 2009 budget set oil 
prices at $40 per barrel, with the average market price at $55.96; while the 2011 budget 
maintained the $40 standard and the market average is $73.33 per barrel (Inflation Data, 
2011; BBC News, 2009). Although large discrepancies in projected and real prices are 
apparent, oil prices are extremely volatile, which is exactly why the government 
underestimates to such an extent. 
Moreover, the excess oil revenue is to be invested in the Fund for National 
Development (FONDEN), which supports social projects, natural disasters, and "any 
other project that needs funding according to the board and upon approval of the 
President" (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 lc). Although this fund is directed at 
addressing social needs, the special fund is managed by the presidency and not subject to 
budgetary oversight, which makes it a controversial resource pool. The FONDEN 
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resources go to support the CVA and other extension and support services associated with 
the agrarian reform and the social 'Misiones". As the government defends its position on 
underestimating the price to lessen the economy's dependence on international oil prices, 
the opposition sees it as a strategic means to embezzle oil revenues for Chavez and his 
cronies. Other factors including Venezuela's preferential oil prices to ALBA members, 
as well as trade in kind undoubtedly alter oil revenues as compared with international 
market prices. Nonetheless, the lack of transparency in FONDEN contributes to the 
oppositions arguments of corruption and influences public opinion, as Sr. Rodriguez 
expressed in the interview. 
According to Transparency International's 2010 corruption perceptions index 
(CPI), Venezuela ranks 164/178 with a score of 2/10 (0=highly corrupt; 10=very clean). 
To put this in context, Venezuela's first CPI in 1995 was 2.66/10; with its highest level 
reaching 2.8 in the pre-coup and pre-oil strike year of 2001. Even though these are very 
poor ratings this is not a reflection solely on the Chavez government. Take, for example, 
the shortest lasting coup in history of 2002, or the two month shutdown of Venezuela's 
oil industry in 2002-2003 - both of which were unconstitutional and highly illegal, yet 
supported by the opposition political parties and the United States government, as so 
explicitly shown in Eva Golinger's well researched book, "The Chavez Code". Moreover, 
other empirical studies indicate that in many instances local politicians of the opposition 
party "block the delivery of benefits to core supporters of the governing party" (Albertus, 
2010). 
The practice of corruption and illegal activities is present in Venezuela, but it 
takes place within both political camps. On the one hand, the governing party is accused 
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of not being accountable and transparent in the management of FONDEN which already 
disburses billions of dollars to social and economic development projects around the 
country. More seriously is the government's acts of expropriation without compensation, 
which will only increase class polarization, violence, and contribute to a lack of 
confidence in the government. On the other hand, the opposition has killed many innocent 
people in a coup attempt, created a massive economic crisis by shutting down the 
country's main economic driver (oil), and has sabotaged the governing parties attempt to 
deliver resources to those in need. 
Intermediaries 
It is quite clear that one of the main deficiencies of the agrarian reform programme - in 
terms of enabling new land beneficiaries to become viable farmers - is the problem of 
intermediaries. The majority of the farmers interviewed, from ten different locations, said 
that they must sell their produce to intermediaries at unfair prices. For small-medium 
scale farmers, price uncertainty caused by an over-supply of similar goods, has a serious 
impact on their incomes and livelihoods. Some claim that they cannot even cover 
production costs in certain cases. Intermediaries are the only option for many small-scale 
farmers, as Sr. Camacado, a manager of the Agua Salada Cooperative explained to me, 
"The people (consumers) in the market won't buy from producers. They have a deal with 
intermediaries who have an organized mafia and control over the system" (Interview with 
Antonio Camacado, 2011). Sr. Camacado recognized that the Agricultural Company of 
Venezuela (CVA) and Mision Mercal are government programs designed to solve this 
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problem, but are not yet organized and the government does not yet have the capacity to 
buy agricultural goods from all producers. In the meantime, many farmers settle for the 
intermediary price even if "Intermediaries don't give a fair price, but at least they will buy 
all or most of your crops, it's much more convenient" (Interview with Hector Jose 
Sanchez). 
During a focus group interview with six members of the Indio Camacaro 
Collective in Bucarito, Lara, I was informed that the state-run agency CVA buys all 
goods generated by the collective. Members of Indio Camacaro were pleased with the 
price they received and thought the government's programmes were working effectively. 
This, however, was the only instance in which people - based on my research in the field 
- were actually selling their goods to a government intermediary which guaranteed them 
a fair price. Other farmers acknowledged that the government, through the CVA, is 
working to replace private intermediaries, but the program has yet to come into fruition. 
It is imperative that the state establishes itself as a reliable, consistent intermediary 
that can guarantee fair prices to cooperatives and small - medium scale farmers. Instead 
of allowing the workings of the free market to dictate prices through virtues of supply and 
demand, the state needs to establish itself as an agency that will de-link prices to 
producers and consumers. The problem at present is not with the government's lack of 
vision, policy, or ideas, but its execution and implementation. The CVA has been 
established to guarantee a minimum price for farmers. Much like the Canadian Wheat 
Board of Canada, the CVA works as a decentralized state marketing board for agricultural 
products, eliminating competition between producers as well as intermediaries that could 
potentially distort prices unfairly for both producers and consumers. By eliminating 
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competition between farmers, while also guaranteeing higher prices, it will enable these 
producers to live a comfortable and viable livelihood in the countryside. 
The goals of the agrarian reform and its complementary policies are to increase 
food production, develop new productive relations and ensure low food prices for 
consumers - which will inevitably lead to decreased inequalities and poverty alleviation. 
In order for the government to achieve these desired state policies they must act as the 
intermediary between producers and consumers to ensure that a private intermediary is 
not undermining the entire redistributive approach by buying food at low prices from 
producers and selling high to consumers. This concentration of power amongst the 
intermediaries is still apparent in Venezuela despite government efforts. Carmen Tula, a 
fanner from Rio Tocuyo and active Communal Council member, said that consumers pay 
roughly ten times the amount that she receives from private intermediaries. Another 
farmer of twenty years, Leonardo Nelo, from Ollican, Lara, explained how the 
intermediaries set prices in an oligopolistic fashion so as to ensure they do not undercut 
each other. At the very least, these farmers can count on intermediaries to buy all of their 
produce, ensuring they receive some income for their months of labour. The majority of 
the participants interviewed knew about the Mercal and CVA projects to replace the 
intermediary, but the programmes have yet to fully develop. Even the farmers who 
supported the opposition and were not in favour of any of Chavez's policies agreed that 
the intermediaries must be replaced with a state purchasing and marketing agency. 
This producer—private intermediary—consumer distribution chain is no 
irregularity. On the international level it is an even bigger problem, as Raj Patel illustrates 
in his book, "Stuffed and Starved". Patel's hourglass figure is a great point of reference to 
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picture what is happening in the global food system, as well as Venezuela's domestic 
economy. 
Figure 4: The Hourglass Figure of the Global Food System 





Buying Desks: 110 




(Data and photo derived from Patel, Raj, 2007) 
The hourglass represents the concentration of power - with the intermediaries in 
the food system in the middle, and an enormous amount of farmers and even more 
consumers at the opposing ends (Patel, 2007:13). Fortunately, the Venezuelan 
government has much more power over its own economy and has the means and 
necessary tools to change these relations. The government must work to reinforce and 
establish the institutions in which they have already created: The Venezuelan Agricultural 
Corporation (CVA) and the Corporacion de Abastecimiento y Servicio Agricolas are 
mainly state purchasing entities; while Mercado de Alimentos, C.A (MERCAL) and 
Productora y Distribuidora Venezolana de Alimentos are the food marketing branches of 
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the network. The former two state-run institutions purchase goods from domestic 
producers at fair prices, while the latter two institutions sell to consumers at subsidized 
rates which are roughly 50% of the market price (Suggett, 2010). As reiterated throughout 
this work, it is not a question of ideas or vision that hinders this agrarian reform process, 
but a lack of institutionalization and capacity to properly use the available tools that will 
enable the necessary structural changes to unfold. 
Bureaucratic Inefficiencies and Lack of Regulation 
Another common weakness pointed out by the majority of interviewees is the heavily 
bureaucratic process one must surpass in order to access the benefits of many social 
programs, including land reform and its extension services. Despite the government's 
efforts to decentralize and push for more public participation through Communal 
Councils, the process can still be lengthy. According to Article 64 of the Land Law, 
"Within thirty days of receipt of the request, the Institute shall decide whether or not to 
grant the award (land)" (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 201 le). During my 
investigation in the field, the average time period from application to notification was one 
year. This lengthy process deflates peoples' interest and faith in the government's 
programs. The Law however, can be misguiding. The thirty day period is after the INTI 
has received the request, which may take some time. The following is the process that 
Luis Carmona went through to gain the title to the five hectares of land he had been 
renting for four years, as well as being granted another 5 hectares of formerly public land: 
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1.) Apply to your Communal Council for a document stating that you live in the 
community, belong to the CC, occupy land or are seeking to occupy land and give 
the coordinates of such land. You must state how many hectares, and if you have 
occupied it (as he had rented for 3 years), state how long you have occupied it. 
2.) With the approved Communal Council document, one then applies to the INTI 
stating how much land is requested and what they wish to grow. 
3.) If accepted, INTI sends a document of acceptance, granting applicant the 'title' to 
the land. 
4.) The Agricultural Bank of Venezuela inspects land and decides the terms of credit 
for production. 
This process can obviously be subject to unexpected time delays or inefficiencies 
depending on the location of the land requested and the quantity. 
Another weakness concerning the bureaucracy is its lack of oversight and 
regulation. The ability to receive low/no-interest credit, subsidies, or even land has 
become increasingly easy as the government distributes billions of dollars into these rural 
development programs. One farmer who owns fifty hectares of farmland with his four 
brothers, Sr. Garcia, said that many people apply for credits and other benefits and do not 
farm or produce anything, they just take advantage of the government's lack of regulation 
and oversight. The government has, however, tightened its regulation since vast amounts 
of resources were used improperly. Sr. Garcia, however, expressed his intentions of not 
paying his loan back because many others have not. The fact that others have done it and 
gotten away with it has influenced Sr. Garcia to take advantage as well. This, again, 
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contributes to a lack of confidence by those Chavistas that believe in and have sacrificed 
for the 'Bolivarian Revolution', as others reap the benefits and are content with 
government 'handouts'. These inefficiencies and the lack of regulation hinder the ability 
of the government to render the rural sector more productive and increase the countries 
food security. As a country that is still very dependent on food imports and is plagued 
with over-populated urban areas, the need to properly implement their development 
policies in the countryside is imperative. 
Conclusion 
The key weaknesses highlighted above are derived from primary field research conducted 
with people affected by the agrarian reform programme and key informants. The issues 
plaguing the reform were derived from statements made by each and every interviewee. 
After analyzing the data, it became clear that all the weaknesses pointed out by the 
participants were along similar lines and could be categorized in the three themes above. 
These weaknesses are the main obstacles hindering the reform programme in making a 
lasting and sustainable agrarian transformation in Venezuela. Without addressing these 
issues, Venezuela's agrarian reform programme will continue to create increased 
reactionary violence from the latifundista regime; be unable to enhance production due to 





Summary of Findings 
This study commenced with posing the problem of how to transform the countryside into 
a productive, efficient, and effective part of a country's economic, social and cultural 
development. We justified this as being a critical issue in development studies today since 
there are approximately three billion people in the developing world living in rural areas, 
and 70% of whom are living in poverty (World Bank, 2007). Since farming is a source of 
livelihood for approximately 86% of rural people (World Bank, 2007), it is a fundamental 
pathway out of poverty as highlighted in the 2008 World Bank Development Report on 
"Agriculture for Development". To meet the Millennium Development Goal that calls for 
halving the share of people suffering from extreme poverty and hunger by 2015, 
questions of land and labour are imperative. The literature suggests that there is a 
consensus on the main causes of persistent levels of poverty and inequality in the 
countryside which is due to the severe unequal distribution of land in developing 
countries. (Barraclough 2001: 26, Deininger 2004: 19, El-Ghonemy 1990: 152, Borras 
and Franco 2008:1). Moreover, we highlighted the World Bank's 2006 World 
Development Report on 'Equity and Development' which equates "a positive association 
between more unequal land distribution and lower GDP growth" (World Bank, 2006: 
pp.162). We also explored the 'inverse farm-size productivity relationship' which implies 
that small farms are more efficient than large farms (Binswanger-Mikhize et al. 2009: 
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11). It thus became clear that land (agrarian) reform is a major factor in reducing 
inequalities and alleviating poverty in rural areas. 
After reviewing the theoretical debates and competing models of agrarian reform, 
we concluded that a mutually reinforcing, interactive relationship between state and 
society provides the optimal conditions for a successful agrarian reform that will 
effectively alter the social relationships in rural society. Although the state creates the 
laws and institutions which regulate society, those laws must be interpreted correctly in 
order for proper implementation. Laws and institutions that are vague in nature create 
controversy as there is considerable room for interpretation. Thus, it is important that 
rules and regulations are specific and clear so as to ensure they are implemented in their 
desired manner. Strong state-society interaction can facilitate this process, as society can 
ensure proper implementation. It is therefore necessary for autonomous peasant 
movements to lead the land reform process from below and use their agency to support 
and validate the laws and institutions in place. The state and society are thus equally 
important in an agrarian reform process. The state must also use discriminatory and 
support policies to increase productivity in those productive relations in which they seek 
to encourage. 
In Venezuela, it is clear that they possess all the necessary components that 
provide the optimal conditions for a successful agrarian reform to transform social 
relations in the countryside. However, weaknesses in the ability of both the state and 
society to utilize their resources and increase their capacity have plagued the agrarian 
reform process. For the state, the degree of ambiguity in their laws and reports of 
corruption amongst mid-level government employees discredits the state and generates 
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reactionary violence and opposition to reform. The inability of the state to effectively 
increase the capacity of its purchasing and distribution agencies is also a hindrance for 
production as producers receive lower prices for their products from the private mafia of 
intermediaries. Moreover, the state needs to improve their managerial capacities and 
render their institutions more efficient. Long wait times for land applicants can 
discourage people from engaging in agricultural activities as they are required to seek 
employment elsewhere and may migrate to the cities. 
On the other end of the spectrum, peasants need to increase their agency and take 
a lead role in the land reform process. They need to act as the overseers and keep the 
lower-level government officials accountable. Additionally, they should utilize the 
resources the state has provided - the training, technical assistance, credit, education, and 
Communal Councils - to increase their capabilities and organize to act as a 'class for 
itself. As a 'class for itself, people exercise a political consciousness of common class 
interests and use their collective agency to make such demands. Rural social movements 
should therefore direct the land reform process through their demands and hold the 
government accountable for their promises and actions. Meanwhile, it is apparent that the 
state is attempting to create laws and institutions for peasants and workers to take a 
leading role in this social transformation. It is thus imperative that peasants continue to 




It is quite clear that the Chavez government recognizes the structural inequalities in the 
countryside and is approaching the problem in a relational way. The Land Law and 
Constitution are designed to dismantle the current landholding structure and introduce 
new forms of productive relations based on a worker-led system. The laws in place give 
formerly landless peasants the opportunity to have access to, and control over, land and 
its productive resources. New institutions have been created to ensure land beneficiaries 
receive the necessary support services to build productive and sustainable livelihoods: 
agricultural inputs, research assistance, technical support, irrigation and water facilities, 
tillage assistance, access to cheap credit, state purchasing, marketing, and distribution 
services, and training programmes. The Communal Councils have enabled people to 
become actively involved in community politics with a participatory democratic 
framework. Meanwhile, peasant movements have remained autonomous from the state 
and have been given the right to occupy fallow lands on their own terms until legal 
disputes are settled by the state. This MST-style occupation translates into increased 
empowerment and should have a positive influence on the movement from below. The 
state-led agrarian reform programme encompasses all of the broader socio-economic and 
political components to effectively transform the structural inequalities and dismantle the 
existing class structure that facilitates high levels poverty, marginalization, and 
exploitation to persist. 
The government is encouraging small-medium size landholdings and, more 
importantly, cooperative farms. This is in line with the economic theory adopted by most 
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academics today that the 'inverse farm size-productivity relationship' is more efficient 
and increases employment. Moreover, discriminatory policies towards latifundios are in 
place, as is implied in Artile 307 of the Constitution: "The predominance of large land 
estates is contrary to the interests of society". Larger estates, if deemed unproductive or 
cannot present a legal title, are subject to high tax rates and possible expropriation for 
redistribution. 
As the agrarian reform programme is an ongoing process and will undoubtedly 
stay that way as long as Chavez is in power, it is necessary to assess the programme based 
not only on the outcomes to date, but also the conditions in which it operates. Based on an 
extensive and thorough research study of ten different agrarian reform programmes, 
Akram-Lodhi, Borras and Kay (2007) offer a comprehensive model of a state-society 
interactive framework that consists of "four broadly distinct but interlinked factors or 
conditions (that) can facilitate a land reform that transforms social relationships" (Akram-
Lodhi, Borras and Kay, 2007:392). The agrarian reform in Venezuela will be assessed 
according to these conditions to evaluate the extent to which these conditions are present 
in Venezuela. These "Four Pillars" (Borras and McKinley, 2006) consist of strong, 
autonomous peasant movements; a state-supported agrarian reform; productivity-
enhancing measures; and within the framework of a national growth-oriented 
development strategy (Akram-Lodhi et. al, 2007:392-396). 
First, peasant movements have remained autonomous from state co-optation. 
Communal Councils can also work to facilitate increased levels of community 
organization and mobilization. The Ezequiel Zamora National Campesino Front (FNCEZ) 
and the coalition of pro-government peasant groups called Coordinadora Agraria 
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Nacional Ezequiel Zamora (CANEZ) have been active in occupying idle lands and 
advocating for an equitable land tenure system. Since 2001, 225 peasants have been killed 
during land occupations (Suggett, 2010). CANEZ, FNCEZ, and human rights group 
Provea have repeatedly complained that the government is not doing enough to 
investigate and prosecute those responsible for peasant assassinations. In 2010, perhaps as 
a response to peasant demands, Chavez announced the creation of a new peasant militia 
which will join the national Bolivarian Armed Forces (FAB) (Janicke, 2010). These new 
peasant militias are responsible for protecting peasant who may engage in conflict due to 
land occupations and any kind of landlord reactionary violence. The struggle in the 
Venezuelan countryside is not just over land and its productive resources, but is also a 
struggle for human rights, freedom, autonomous development and social justice. For an 
agrarian transformation to take place, social relations must be altered. As a result of this 
struggle, a class war has emerged in Venezuela between the landless peasants and the 
latifundistas. 
Although peasant movements are active and organized in Venezuela, they do not 
compare, in size or strength, to the MST in Brazil and the success they have had in 
leading land reform 'from below'. However, as CANEZ and FNCEZ become more active 
in occupying lands and gaining support in numbers, they can be a force for change. 
Although it is possible for autonomous peasant movements to make great gains in, and 
lead the process of, agrarian change (see, e.g. Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001; Veltmeyer, 
2007), there still needs to be a supportive state to institutionalize such change. In the 
current conditions of Venezuela, peasant movements need state-support, as they are not 
yet fully mobilized or organized to win a class war against the latifundista regime. With 
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government support - through peasant militias, Communal Councils, and high levels of 
social spending - peasants can utilize these tools to empower themselves through social 
capital and participation in local development. The highly decentralized Communal 
Councils established by the government creates an environment where people can come 
together to share ideas, network, and organize to improve their livelihoods. This type of 
environment is conducive to a greater degree of participation in local development issues 
which could be lead to a stronger, more vibrant peasant movement. This is how the state's 
policies 'from above' are reinforced and pushed even further from autonomous peasant 
movements exercising their demands and creating progressive change 'from below'. 
Secondly, with a supportive state, demands made by peasant movements are more 
likely to be carried out and institutionalized. The state, after all, has the power to create 
the legal framework to carry out the land reform programme. In the Venezuelan case, 
where peasant movements are not as mobilized and active, the state is actually leading the 
reform and creating conditions for peasant movements to play bigger role in the process. 
The state's agrarian reform programme consists of expropriating unproductive private 
landholdings and providing technical support, training, cheap credit, and infrastructure 
investment. Moreover, the state is operating on an anti-neoliberal policy platform which 
encourages changes in productive relations, while using discriminatory trade policies to 
protect their domestic producers. With the state also launching peasant militias to protect 
peasant occupations, it is evident that the state is acting in the best interests of the landless 
peasants and is working to change the social relationships in the countryside to eliminate 
poverty and social exclusion. With the Communal Councils, the state has created an 
environment for increased participation in local issues and to voice their demands to the 
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government. Thus, it becomes clear that the state is leading this land reform effort, but at 
the same time, is creating space for peasants and rural people to use their agency to 
improve their situation 'from below'. The symbiotic, mutually reinforcing state-society 
relationship creates the ideal conditions to offset strong landlord resistance and 
implement peasant-supported policies based on their own demands. 
Thirdly, in order for new beneficiaries of the land reform to be productive and, at 
the very least, be able to meet local demand, it is essential that the state provide 
substantial productivity-enhancing investment. In Venezuela this support is delivered 
through the social Misiones, the CVA, and PDVAL which not only offer public 
investment, loans, technical assistance, and training, but also are designed to eliminate the 
intermediaries by acting as state purchaser and distributer of agricultural goods. Although 
agricultural productivity has increased, it is still nowhere close to being able to satisfy 
domestic demand. As explained in the key weaknesses and recommendations of this 
study, the state purchasing agencies (CVA and CASA) and the state distribution agencies 
(PDVAL and Mercal) need to be prioritized as key facilitators in this agrarian 
transformation. As private intermediaries continue to dominate the purchasing and 
distribution channels, producers will receive low prices for their produce. It is important 
that the state increase the capacity of these agencies to guarantee higher prices for 
producers. This will increase the quality of rural livelihoods and render the countryside 
more attractive, encouraging an urban-rural migration. 
Lastly, the overarching macroeconomic policies in Venezuela attempt to 
complement the land reform process, but due to inadequate production, high levels of 
agricultural imports remain prominent. According to Article 301 "The State reserves to 
141 
itself the use of trade policy to protect the economic activities of public and private 
Venezuelan enterprises. Business enterprises, organs or persons of foreign nationality 
shall not be granted with regimes more advantageous than those established for 
Venezuelan nationals. Foreign investment is subject to the same conditions as domestic 
investment." Despite these efforts, Venezuela is still a net importer of food. The 
government has signed an Agreement on Food Security and Sovereignty with Ecuador 
"aimed at improving food exchange and developing programs in accordance with each 
nation's food needs" and has also initiated the Fondo para la Seguridad Alimentaria in 
which Venezuela provides subsidized oil to ALBA members for agricultural products in a 
trade-in-kind framework (Pineiro, Bianchi, Uzquiza, and Trucco, 2010). 
Due to the lack of sufficient domestic agricultural production, Venezuela still 
imports roughly two-thirds of the food it consumes. Unlike most other countries in the 
region who are net food exporters, instead of protecting its domestic producers with 
import tariffs, Venezuela only applies foreign exchange controls on imports that are 'non­
essential' food items. Many other items - of which adequate production levels cannot be 
met domestically - are exempt from import tax (Wilpert, 2007). The government also 
uses a discriminatory taxation policy which exempts essential food items from a 12% 
Value Added Tax (VAT). These policies allow the government to encourage food 
products which are needed and in demand, while discouraging those food items in which 
supply is sufficient for the domestic economy. Although Venezuela is a member of the 
WTO, the government still has authority over its trade policy as stated in Article 301 of 
the Constitution. As a result, Venezuela favours domestic products and has banned the 
importation of foreign goods until domestic production has been removed from the 
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market. These discriminatory policies protect domestic producers from unfair, highly 
subsidized foreign competition - a key tenant of the food sovereignty movement.19 
In terms of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), the Ley de Biodiversidad 
Biologica (Biodiversity Law), published in the Official Gazette No. 5,468 of May 24, 
2000, created a national office for biodiversity, while the Ministry of Environment has the 
authority to oversee all genetically modified organisms. According to the United States 
government, however, "there are no specific guidelines for registering genetically 
modified foods or food products" (Government of the United States, 2011), which implies 
that the government has set up a framework to monitor and potentially prohibit the use of 
GMOs, but has yet to restrict their usage. For intellectual property rights, the Intellectual 
Property Registration Institute (SAPI) is responsible for IPR administration. Under 
Chavez, SAPI "has moved to promote 'alternatives' to traditional concepts of intellectual 
property" (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010). Moreover, in September 2008, the 
government restored a 1955 law that prohibits patents on foods and medicines, while 
previous stipulations ban patenting animals and species, and genetic material (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2010). All of these policies are in line with the food sovereignty 
framework and show that Venezuela is pursuing 
It is thus evident that Venezuela has the necessary elements to implement a 
successful agrarian reform programme. However, success is not defined by the tools one 
holds, but how one can use those tools to their full capacities. This is the challenge for 
Venezuela - its ability to make the necessary changes to put their tools and resources to 
good use. The following section provides policy-oriented recommendations that will help 
19 See Tables 9-11 titled, "List of Products" 
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remedy the key weaknesses identified and create the conditions for long term success in 
transforming the countryside. 
Recommendations 
Venezuela is presently pursuing a model of agrarian reform that attempts to dismantle the 
existing power structure in the countryside. The policies are in place, the institutions have 
been established and real, redistributive, state-led land reform is in motion. Many of 
Venezuela's rural poor now have access to land and its productive resources. The Land 
Bank, the state-regulated market prices, the state-run food markets, and distribution 
institutions have enabled many of the formerly landless peasants to access low/no-interest 
loans, obtain fair prices for their crops, and access markets. In many ways, this new land 
reform model, designed with the help of the largest peasant organization in the world - La 
Via Campesina - has produced many positive outcomes in creating the policies, 
institutions, and framework to facilitate a structural transformation in the countryside. 
However, many problems still persist. The latifundistas have resisted and continue 
to resist this 'Bolivarian Revolution' in the countryside, as is shown with ongoing 
disputes, violence, and corruption within institutions. Meanwhile, government 
inefficiencies and inadequacies continue to plague a successful reform. These factors 
hinder the ability of strong peasant movements to gain momentum and support amongst 
the greater population. Without strong, mobilized peasant organizations in the 
Venezuelan countryside, it will be very difficult for these policies to turn into reality. 
None of these challenges are mutually exclusive or static - they have a symbiotic 
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relationship with a constant push and pull affect that need mutual reinforcement. What 
makes many agrarian reform initiatives fail is the lack of attention to detail with regards 
to support services and giving peasants more agency. The lack of consistency, regulation, 
or support services can cause a domino effect of failure that renders the entire programme 
unsuccessful. The movement from above must be continuously supported by the 
movement from below and vice versa - the failure of one opposing force will likely result 
in the failure of the whole. This 'interactive framework' regarding the reflexive relations 
between state and society is imperative as the success of any land reform programme is 
based on the relationship between the state, autonomous peasant movements, and market 
forces which can be mutually reinforcing or mutually destructive (Fox, 1993). 
Given the current circumstances however, Venezuela has the resources, political 
will, and a growing process of peasant participation that has the potential to flourish into a 
true social transformation of the countryside. The following is based on my own research 
in the field and the numerous secondary sources used in this work. Together, this research 
has led me to conclude that the following recommendations are necessary requirements in 
order for Venezuela's state-led agrarian reform to transform the structural inequalities in 
the countryside, alleviate poverty, render the country food secure and pave the road 
towards food sovereignty. 
Firstly, one of the most important hindrances based on a myriad of evidence from 
secondary sources, personal appeals, and pure economic and social theory is the presence 
of private intermediaries. State-led agrarian reform in the Venezuelan context is 
20 The following recommendations have also been influenced by Michael A. Lebowitz who kindly shared 
some ideas about agricultural subsidies with me in a note he wrote in 2008 for Venezuela's then-Minister of 
Planning. Document available upon request. 
145 
attempting to not only encourage and enable people to claim land and become viable 
farmers, but also to encourage domestic production and consumption at fair prices. The 
government is undertaking an 'agrarianists' approach to agricultural development by not 
only transferring the surplus value back into the rural economy, but also funnelling 
resources from the industrial centres (oil) into the countryside. To redistribute the land 
and create a vibrant, productive, agricultural sector depends on an urban-rural migration 
that requires incentives to make for an attractive rural livelihood. At the same time, the 
country wants to pave the way towards food sovereignty by first rendering the country 
food secure. These two dynamics require both high wages for producers and low prices 
for consumers. 
The present system in Venezuela is the opposite. Producers receive low prices for 
their goods, while consumers pay high prices. Meanwhile, the private intermediaries reap 
the benefits. In an effort to keep prices low for low-income families, the government has 
set price controls on certain essential food items keep prices low for consumers. Without 
subsidizing the supply-end of the food chain, however, these price controls have come at 
the detriment of producers who inevitably suffer from increased production costs and a 
simultaneous price ceiling for their outputs.21 This policy discourages increased 
production which is contradictory to the government's overall agricultural policy 
objectives. Thus, it is absolutely imperative that the government prioritize the 
effectiveness of its state purchasing institutions - the CVA and CASA. These institutions 
21 Products with price controls include: cooking oil, white rice, sugar, coffee, flour, margarine, pasta, 
cheeses, and tomato sauce. See Government of Canada (2011) Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada: Agri-
Food Trade Service, Venezuela, <http://www.ats.agr.gc.ca/lat/4215-eng.htm> Accessed June 2011; and 
Government of the United States. (2011) "Venezuela Producers are waiting for a price adjustment." Global 
Agricultural Information Network. August 17 2010. 
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have been established, as described above, but have yet to fully function effectively. 
These state purchasing agencies will induce production as they will guarantee farmers a 
high price for their products. 
On the other side, MERCAL and PDVAL - the state marketing and distribution 
agencies can provide consumers with goods at lower, affordable prices. They can also 
facilitate nation-wide distribution and marketing to ensure excluded regions are food 
secure. The state thus replaces the intermediary to de-link prices to producers and 
consumers that encourages more production and domestic consumption. If these state 
purchasing and distribution institutions are ineffective, which is currently the case in 
Venezuela, then the government must direct more investment to render them effective. 
Allotting more resources to these crucial farmer support programmes is critical and can 
likely be solved by attracting expert personnel through higher salaries. The government 
has an abundance of resources available through oil revenues, but they need to be 
invested in the appropriate programmes or institutions if they want their policy goals to 
become a reality. 
It is important that these artificial pricing mechanisms and subsidies meet the 
goals of the desired governmental policies. If the desired policies are to stimulate 
agricultural production, develop new productive relations, and ensure low prices for food, 
then the state must make sure it uses a discriminatory strategy. To encourage the 
formation of agricultural cooperatives and small-medium sized landholdings, it is 
necessary that these pricing mechanisms and subsidies be directed at this target group. 
The policy will not suffice if it is open to all producers. Also, if the government wants to 
direct these goods to certain areas then the channels of distribution must be organized. 
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The MERCALs and PDVAL should be strongly connected ensuring that they are 
distributing subsidized food in areas that are less food secure. 
Moreover, to attract an urban-rural migration requires more incentives for young 
people to trade the 'city life' for a rural lifestyle. Incentives such as trips to Argentina, 
Brazil, Cuba, or Bolivia to learn different farming techniques could induce more people 
to become farmers. One farmer that participated in my interviews, Luis Carmona, had the 
chance to go to Argentina to learn about cattle farming. Purely from the time spent with 
him and our conversations, I could tell that he really enjoyed the experience and felt quite 
proud and privileged. Although this was sponsored by the government, it is not something 
that is promoted, guaranteed, or even common upon moving to the countryside. However, 
if institutionalized, incentives as such could encourage more urban-rural migration. 
Strengthening these institutions will effectively increase the regulatory 
mechanisms and bureaucratic inefficiencies that plague the process today. The high rate 
of turnover in ministerial posts impedes the institutionalization process and requires high 
transaction costs. Making a higher investment in personnel to attract experts that follow 
through with the institutions goals is a necessity. Salaries should reflect the importance of 
the given programme or institution. It is understandable that Chavez is reluctant to 
appoint someone who is not fully committed to the socialist transformation, as political 
sabotage prevails within the government bureaucracy itself. Nonetheless, the importance 
of adequate personnel is imperative as it is they who ensure proper implementation and 
functionality of the desired policies. 
Lastly, the Chavez Administration, who wrote the 1999 Constitutions and Land 
Law must abide by its own rules and regulation and ensure farmers compensation upon 
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expropriation. Private farms that are being productive and supplying the domestic 
economy with agricultural supply is needed to increase food security in the country - and 
the government is supposed to respect their rights. However, confusion sets in with legal 
land titles - something that is extremely vague in Venezuela. Instead of expropriating 
highly productive, private landholdings for not having proper legal titles to land, the 
government should use taxation mechanisms and direct distribution to desired channels. 
Changing the relations of production will be phased in slowly as campesinos are able to 
earn a better livelihood through cooperative farming than working as a wage labourer on 
a private farm. But to dismantle productive private farms for not holding proper land titles 
when they've been farming that land for over a generation will only reflect poorly on the 
government's legitimacy and decrease the country's food security. 
Also, the degree of interpretation on expropriation creates decreased legitimacy. 
The reformed Land Law in 2010, redefined a latifundista as being "a piece of land that is 
larger than the average in its region or is not producing at 80% of its productive capacity" 
(Suggett, 2010). This is extremely vague and will, without question generate controversy 
and resistance by the landholding elite. To remedy this problem, the state should 
specifically define the latifundio and how it measures 'productive capacity'. These 
changes will increase security for landholders and lead to increased productivity. It will 
also increase legitimacy and decrease controversy and therefore conflict. 
Moreover, the process of social transformation - changing the relations of 
production to give workers control over, and access to, land and its productive resources -
will come into fruition with discriminatory economic policies. In the meantime, the 
government needs to properly establish itself as a state purchaser and distributer to ensure 
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campesino beneficiaries of a healthy and viable livelihood. Cases such as that of Sr. 
Rodriguez described above in my own field research, as well as others demonstrated by 
Wilpert (2007) - where productive private landowners are forced off their land without 
compensation, produces a divisive social and political environment that encourages more 
violence in the countryside and political sabotage by the opposition. Although Chavez's 
policies towards agrarian reform are very thorough and well designed, his lack of 
legitimacy by the opposition is due to these circumstances which create social and 
political backlashes. A more pragmatic approach is needed to unite the country and allow 
the opportunity for everyone to live a secure, viable, livelihood in the countryside. To do 
so, the government should respect the property rights of those who have been working the 
land for at least two generations. The 'ownership' should still be under the conditions that 
the land remains productive and that outputs are directed towards food security. 
Venezuela does not suffer from a lack of resources or the necessary tools to create 
optimal conditions for a socially transformative agrarian reform. Its long term success, 
however, will depend on the ability of both the state and society to increase their 
capacities and become more organized to effectively and reciprocally use available 
resources to counter landlord opposition and transform the agrarian structure. 
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Argentina Cuba Peru Venezuela Colorrtiia Paraguay 
Chile Uruguay Mexico Brazil Ecuador Bolivia 
Country HDI Health Education Income 
Chile 0.78 0.93 0.76 0.68 
Argentina 0.78 0.88 0.76 0.69 
Uruguay 0.77 0.9 0.73 0.68 
Cuba 0.76 
Mexico 0.75 0.9 0.69 0.69 
Peru 0.72 0.85 0.73 0.61 
Brazil 0.7 0.84 0.63 0.64 
Venezuela 0.7 0.86 0.6 0.66 
Ecuador 0.7 0.88 0.64 0.6 
Colombia 0.69 0.85 0.63 0.61 
Bolivia 0.64 0.73 0.72 0.51 
Paraguay 0.64 0.83 0.62 0.51 
Data compiled from: United Nations Development Programme (2011) International 
Human Development Indicators: Venezuela. < 






Table 10: List of products that are subject to import licenses 
Yellow corn Sorghum 
Soya beans Palm nuts and kernals 
Soya bean oil Other oils 
Palm oil Sunflower seed oil 
Coconut oil Other vegetable fats and oils 
Soya bean cake Animal and vegetable fats 
Degras, yellow grease Milk and cream, no concentrated 
Milk in powder, not exceeding 1.5% fat Whole milk 26% 
Cheese Sugar Cane 
Table 11: List of products exemptedfrom import tax 
Live bovine animals Meat of bovine 
animals, fresh, chilled, 
frozen, including 
boneless 
Powdered milk, infant 
formula and soy-based 
infant formula 
Durum wheat and other 
wheat 
Potato seeds Sugar cane seed for 
sowing 
Oilseeds (soybean, 
sunflower, cottonseed and 
palm nuts and kernels) for 
sowing 
White and yellow corn 
seed for sowing 
Vegetables, for sowing: 
onion, broccoli, carrot, 
lettuce, and tomato 
Dry beans, peas and lentils, 
for sowing 
Dry beans, peas and 
lentils 




Table 12: List ofproducts exempted from Value-Added-Tax (VAT) 
Rice Coffee, beans or grounded Milk, soy-bases 
All flours, of vegetable origin Tuna, canned, natural Cheese, white, hard 
Bread and pasta Sardines, canned Margarine and butter 
Eggs Milk, crude or pasteurized Poultry, fresh or frozen 
Salt Milk, powdered Certified seeds 
Sugar Milk, infant formulas Vegetables 
Source: Government of the United States. (2011) Venezuela Food and Agricultural 
Import Regulations and Standards - Narrative. Global Agricultural Information Network. 
June 28 2011. 
<http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Food%20and%20Agricultur 
al%20Import%20Regulations%20and%20Standards%20-
%20Narrative Caracas Venezuela 6-28-2011 .pdf> Accessed July 2011 
Appendix I 
Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999 (Selected Articles) 
Article 70: Participation and involvement of people in the exercise of their sovereignty 
(...) in social and economic affairs: citizen service organs, self management, co-
management, cooperatives in all forms, including those of a financial nature, savings 
funds, community enterprises, and other forms of association guided by the values of 
mutual cooperation and solidarity. (...) 
Article 115: The right of property is guaranteed. Every person has the right to the use, 
enjoyment, usufruct and disposal of his or her goods. Property shall be subject to such 
contributions, restrictions and obligations as may be established by law in the service of 
the public or general interest. Only for reasons of public benefit or social interest by final 
judgment, with timely payment of fair compensation, the expropriation of any kind of 
property may be declared. 
Article 118: The right of workers and the community to develop associations of social 
and participative nature such as cooperatives, savings funds, mutual funds and other 
forms of association is recognized. These associations may develop any kind of economic 
activities in accordance with the law. The law shall recognize the specificity of these 
organizations, especially those relating the cooperative, the associated work and the 
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generation of collective benefits. The state shall promote and protect these associations 
destined to improve the popular economic alternative. 
Article 305: The State shall promote sustainable agriculture as the strategic basis for 
overall rural development, and consequently shall guarantee the population a secure food 
supply, defined as the sufficient and stable availability of food within the national sphere 
and timely and uninterrupted access to the same for consumers. A secure food supply 
must be achieved by developing and prioritizing internal agricultural and livestock 
production, understood as production deriving from the activities of agriculture, livestock, 
fishing and aquiculture. Food production is in the national interest and is fundamental to 
the economic and social development of the Nation. To this end, the State shall 
promulgate such financial, commercial, technological transfer, land tenancy, 
infrastructure, manpower training and other measures as may be necessary to achieve 
strategic levels of self-sufficiency. In addition, it shall promote actions in the national and 
international economic context to compensate for the disadvantages inherent to 
agricultural activity. The State shall protect the settlement and communities of non 
industrialized fishermen*, as well as their fishing banks in continental waters and those 
close to the coastline, as defined by law. 
Article 306: The State shall promote conditions for overall rural development, for the 
purpose of generating employment and ensuring the rural population an adequate level of 
well-being, as well as their inclusion in national development. It shall likewise promote 
agricultural activity and optimum land use by providing infrastructure projects, supplies, 
loans, training services and technical assistance. 
Article 307: The predominance of large land estates is contrary to the interests of society. 
Appropriate tax law provisions shall be enacted to tax fallow lands and establish the 
necessary measures to transform them into productive economic units, likewise 
recovering arable land. Farmers and other agricultural producers are entitled to own land, 
in the cases and forms specified under the pertinent law. The State shall protect and 
promote associative and private forms of property in such manner as to guarantee 
agricultural production. The State shall see to the sustainable ordering of arable land to 
guarantee its food producing potential. In exceptional cases, quasi-tax contributions shall 
be created to provide funds for financing, research, technical assistance, transfer of 
technology and other activities that promote the productivity and competitiveness of the 
agricultural sector. These matters shall be appropriately regulated by law. 
Article 308: The State shall protect and promote small and medium-sized manufacturers, 
cooperatives, savings funds, family owned businesses, small businesses and any other 
form of community association for purposes of work, savings and consumption, under an 
arrangement of collective ownership, to strength the country's economic development, 
based on the initiative of the people. Training, technical assistance and appropriate 




13 de Abril Cultura Miranda Ribas 
Alimentacion Guaicaipuro Musica Robinson 
I 
Arbol Habitat Negra Hipolita Sonrisa 
Barrio 
Adentro 
Identidad Ninos y Ninas del 
Barrio 
Sucre 
Che Guevara Jose Gregorio 
Hernandez 
Nino Jesus Villanueva 
Cienca Madres del Barrio Piar Zamora 
Cristo Milagro Revolucion Energetica 
More info available at: http://www.gobiernoenlinea.ve/miscelaneas/misiones.html 
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